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State Legislatures versus the Supreme
Court: Abortion Legislation
in the 1980'st
B.J. GEORGE, JR.*
This article provides a broad overview of the continuity and changes in
abortion legislation and cases in a variety of topic areas throughout the
United States and abroad. The author concludes that further abortion law re-
forn may be unnecessary.
Abortion regulation was a matter exclusively for state legislatures
until 1973, when the United States Supreme Court brought medically
indicated abortions within the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Roe v. Wade' and Doe v. Bolton.2 As will be surveyed in
Parts I and II of this article, some liberalization in the scope of lawful
abortions was evident in several legislatures before 1973,** but few
statutes approached the breadth of the privacy right decreed by the
Court in Roe and Doe.
Since 1973, a majority of legislatures have tried to impose func-
tional limitations on the availability of abortions both before and af-
ter viability. Many of these efforts have been invalidated by
subsequent decisions by the Court, but in many instances the legisla-
tures have left their statutes unrevised. Thus, the onus is on the
courts to squelch efforts to invoke unconstitutional laws against preg-
nant women and their physicians. Unconstitutional laws still exist
because, in many states, a majority of legislators are hostile to freely
t This article will comprise a portion of ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW, ed.
D. Walbert, J. Butler, to be published by Facts on File (mid-1985). Published by
permission.
* B.A., 1949, J.D., 1951, University of Michigan; Professor of Law, New York
Law School.
** In Parts II and III of this article, only the names of the states and not specific
statutory citations appear. For more information, see infra note 25.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
available abortions,3 whereas in others they appear to be cowed by
threats of reprisals at the polls from the so-called "right-to-life"
movement.
A pragmatic understanding of the causes of unsatisfactory legisla-
tive coverage of abortion law does not change the fact that state stat-
utes in too many jurisdictions provide no guidance to, or protection
for, pregnant women and their medical advisors. Consequently, a
legislative limbo occurs in which one of two phenomena is likely to
appear.
The first possibility is that medical abortion becomes an out-of-
view dimension of hospital administration governed by local or state
public health regulations. This alternative may prove a practical ac-
commodation acceptable to both legislators and physicians. Legisla-
tors are not called on to take action visible to their constituents
which the latter will view as approving abortions, and the medical
profession can treat abortion like any other dimension of medical
practice. The second possibility is official disapproval of therapeutic
abortions that will force pregnant women, their physicians, and the
administrators of clinics to turn to the judiciary for redress.
Whether this state of affairs will change within the next decade or
so is debatable. If it does, it will be because state legislatures accept
as immutable the constitutional doctrines espoused by the Supreme
Court; that the Court has not retreated from its earlier interpretation
of the Constitution is evidenced by its reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade
principles in its 1983 decision in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.4
In the following pages, a brief review of the conflicting interests
recognized in or affected by abortion legislation is provided. Next,
the basic constitutional principles set forth by the Court in 1973 and
thereafter are discussed. Finally, the compatibility of state legislation
in 1984 with the federal Constitution is evaluated.
3. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text. Abortion proved a matter of
virulent political controversy during the 1984 presidential election campaign. The Re-
publican Party supported constitutional amendments to recognize fetal life as funda-
mental. Republican Party Platform Text of 1984, 42 Cong. Q. 2096, 2110 (Aug. 25,
1984), and called for appointment of judges at all levels "who respect traditional family
values and the sanctity of human life." Id. at 2110-11. The Democratic Party sup-
ported the 1973 Supreme Court decisions and opposed constitutional amendments to
restrict or overturn them; it stressed "reproductive freedom as a fundamental human
right." Democratic Party Platform Text of 1984, 42 Cong. Q. 1747, 1767 (July 21, 1984).
4. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). Justice Powell's opinion stated:
These cases come to us a decade after we held in Roe v. Wade that the right to
privacy grounded in the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, encompasses a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy. Legislative responses to the Court's decision have required us on
several occasions ... to define the limits of a State's authority to regulate the
performance of abortions. We. . . reaffirm Roe v. Wade.
Id. at 2487 (citations omitted).
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I. CONFLICTING INTERESTS AFFECTED BY ABORTION LEGISLATION
Discussions of the desirability or illicitness of abortion revolve
about four foci: the fetus; the pregnant woman; the family into which
a child will be born if a pregnancy goes to term; and the surrounding
community.
As to the first focus, there clearly is a semantic issue. A choice
from among an array of terms-conceptus, zygote, embryo, fertilized
ovum, fetus or prenatal infant-advertises the thinking of the
speaker and not a scientifically impeccable choice of terms.5 Which-
ever term is selected, concern about fetuses typically reflects two
contradictory schools of thought.
According to one of these schools, inviolate life comes into being
from the time an ovum is fertilized. The strongest adherence to this
view has been found within the Roman Catholic faith, which has con-
demned abortion under all circumstances. 6 There is, however, also
Protestant support for the idea.7 The second view is that the possible
fate of a full-term fetus should be taken into account. If a child
would be born deformed, mentally defective or otherwise incapable
5. On other semantic aspects of the abortion debate, see Fromer, Abortion Ethics,
30 NURSING OUTLOOK 234, 234-35 (April 1982) [hereinafter cited as Fromer]; Hardin,
Semantic Aspects of Abortion, 24 ETC.: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS 263 (1967).
See also Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the
Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 107 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Chemerinsky].
6. Canon 1398 (1983): "A person who actually procures an abortion incurs a latae
sententiae [automatic] excommunication." On the corresponding predecessor provision,
canon 2350, § 1, see 8 C. BACHOFEN, COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW 397-402 (1931).
In support of the Roman Catholic position, see, e.g., Brown, Recent Statutes and the
Crime of Abortion, 16 LOY. L. REV. 275 (1970); Decker & Decker, The Credibility Gap
That Kills, 131 AMERICA 47 (Aug. 10, 1974); Giannella, The Difficult Quest for a Truly
Humane Abortion Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 257, 292 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Gian-
nella]; Granfield, Law and Morals, 4 CRIMINOLOGICA 11 (Feb. 1967); Noonan, Abortion:
From "An Almost Absolute Value in History," MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 290 (S.
Gorovitz et al. ed. 1976).
7. See, e.g., H. THIELICKE, ETHICS OF SEX 226-47 (J. Doberstein trans. 1964) [here-
inafter cited as H. THIELICKE]; Baum, Abortion: An Ecumenical Dilemma, 99 COMMON-
WEAL 231 (Nov. 30, 1973); Brown, An Evangelical Looks at the Abortion Phenomenon,
135 AMERICA 161 (Sept. 25, 1976); Eller, Let's Get Honest About Abortion, 92 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 16 (Jan. 1-8, 1975); Ramsey, Ethics of a Cottage Industry in an Age of Com-
munity and Research Medicine, 284 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 700, 701-03 (1971); Note,
Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs and the First Amendment, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 487,
497-503 (1980).
Mainline Protestant denominations generally take a contrary position. For example,
The United Methodist Church at its 1984 quadrennial general conference supported
the doctrines espoused in United States Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 110-
31 and accompanying text, and asserted that continuance of pregnancies which endan-
ger the life or health of women or the life, health or mental capacity of children is
of living a normal life, or born into a highly detrimental environment
for which it could not be adequately compensated,8 it may be prefera-
ble to terminate its incipient life. This premise is likely to be an ar-
gument incident to advocacy of liberalized abortion based on social
necessity.9 Adoption of the first view of fetal life impels rejection of
all abortion.1o Yet to adopt the second is usually to favor abortion in
a relatively wider array of instances.
The second focus is on pregnant women.11 Most women concerned
"not a moral necessity." UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, BOOK OF RESOLUTIONS 92
(1984).
For a general survey of contemporary religious positions, see Nelson, The Churches
and Abortion Law Reform, 1983 J. CHRIST. JURIS. 29.
Traditional Jewish law views abortion as a tort, not a criminal activity. However,
some contemporary rabbinic sources speak of it in terms of homicide. See Sinclair,
Legal Basis for the Prohibition on Abortion in Jewish Law, 15 ISRAEL L. REV. 109
(1980).
8. See Dahlberg, Abortion, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 379, 389 (R.
Slovenko ed. 1965); Krimmel & Foley, Abortion: An Inspection Into the Nature of
Human Life and Potential Consequences of Legalizing Its Destruction, 46 U. CIN. L.
REV. 725, 780-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Krimmel & Foley].
9. See Hardin, Abortion-Or Compulsory Pregnancy?, 30 J. MARRIAGE & THE
FAMILY 246, 247 (1968); Samuels, Termination of Pregnancy: A Lawyer Considers the
Arguments, 7 MED., SCI. & L. 10, 12-13 (1967).
10. See H. THIELICKE, supra note 7; but see Giannella, supra note 6, at 301-02.
11. See Jones, Abortion and the Consideration of Fundamental Irreconcilable In-
terests, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 565, 612-13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Jones]; Thomson, A
Defense of Abortion, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 47 (1971); cf Note, Isolating the
Male Bias Against Reform of Abortion Legislation, 10 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 301
(1970).
Maternal life and health are increasingly recognized as grounds for lawful therapeu-
tic abortions in other countries through legislation. For a survey of national laws, see
Dourlen-Rollier, Legal Problems Related to Abortion and Menstrual Regulation, 7
COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 120, 126-32 (1975).
The English Abortion Act, 1967, has had influence in other Commonwealth nations.
See Dickens & Cook, Development of Commonwealth Abortion Laws, 28 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 424, 442-56 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Dickens & Cook]; Menon, The Law
of Abortion With Special Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean, 5 ANGLO-AM. L.
REV. 311, 327-37 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Menon].
The Canadian Criminal Code § 251(4) allows licensed medical practitioners to termi-
nate pregnancies in licensed hospitals if necessary to preserve a woman's life or health.
See generally Dickens, Eugenic Recognition in Canadian Law, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
547, 562-65 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dickens]; Micallef, Meaning and Interpretation
of "Unlawful" in Canada's Abortion Law, 23 C. DE D. 1029 (1982).
Therapeutic abortion is asserted to be contrary to the Irish Constitution. Mathews,
Quantitative Interference with the Right to Life: Abortion and Irish Law, 22 CATH.
LAW. 344, 356-58 (1976). On a "right-to-life" amendment to that constitution, see Re-
cent Developments: This Amendment Could Kill Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 287
(1984).
In India, the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTPA), replaced § 312 of
the Indian Penal Code, which had allowed abortions only to save maternal life. MTPA
§ 3(2) allows termination of pregnancy by an individual medical practitioner during
the first trimester, and from the thirteenth through the twentieth week on the good
faith medical opinion of two practitioners, that continuation of pregnancy would risk
the life of a pregnant woman or threaten grave injury to her physical or mental
health, or that there is a substantial risk that the child, if born, will suffer from physi-
cal or mental abnormalities which will seriously handicap it. Grave injury to mental
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with their legal position favor a free choice on their part. Indeed, this
is a strong dimension of the Supreme Court's constitutional analy-
sis.1 2 One exception is the contention that intercourse producing
pregnancy is licit only if done within marriage and for procreation.13
Hence, an unwanted pregnancy is unfortunate, but the fulfillment of
divine mandate. Therefore, a woman must carry a fetus to term,
whatever the consequences. This school of thought aside, most state-
health is presumed in instances of rape and contraceptive failure, and a woman's "ac-
tual or reasonably foreseeable environment" may be taken into account in determining
the risk to maternal health. Abortions can be performed only by registered practition-
ers in a governmentally-approved facility, and must be consented to by the patient or
her guardian if she is younger than 18. After the twentieth week of pregnancy, abor-
tions are allowed only if necessary to preserve a woman's life; life-threatening emer-
gencies also justify performance of abortions without the concurrence of a second
practitioner in other than licensed facilities. See generally Bose, Abortion in India: A
Legal Study, 16 INDIAN L. INST. J. 535 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Bose]; Menon, Popu-
lation Policy, Law Enforcement and the Liberalization of Abortion: A Socio-Legal In-
quiry Into the Implementation of the Abortion Law in India, 16 INDIAN L. INST. J. 626
(1974).
In Israel, the Criminal Law Amendment (Abortion) Law, 1977, allows consensual
abortion for women under 17 or over 40, women pregnant because of illegal, con-
sanguinous or nonmarital relations, women whose fetuses are likely to be born with
physical or mental handicaps, or women whose pregnancies might cause grievous harm
to them or their other children because of difficult family or social conditions exper-
ienced by them or their families. See Falk, The New Abortion Law of Israel, 13 ISRAEL
L. REV. 103 (1978) (containing English translation of text at 109-10); Slater, Weiner &
Davies, Illegal Abortion in Israel, 13 ISRAEL L. REV. 411 (1978).
In Christian League of South Africa v. Rail, [1981] 2 S.A. 820, the court denied the
petitioning organization's claim to be appointed curator ad litem for the unborn child
of an unmarried woman, pregnant as the result of rape, who had obtained a judicial
certification for an abortion. See Bedil, Can a Fetus Be Protected From Its Mother?, 98
S. AFR. L.J. 462 (1981).
The West German therapeutic abortion statute, Law of June 18, 1974, [1974]
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I, § 1297 (see legislative history in Horton, Abortion Law Re-
form in the German Federal Republic, 28 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 288 (1979)), was declared
unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court, Jt. of Feb. 25, 1975, 39
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1975 Juristenzeitung 206, on the basis that it conflicted with
the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), art. 2(2), which guarantees everyone "the right to life
and to inviolability of his person"; the term "Jeder" (everyone) was construed to em-
brace fetal life. See Gerstein & Lowry, Abortion, Abstract Norms, and Social Control:
The Decision of the West German Federal Constitutional Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 849,
859, 863 (1976); Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Ger-
many, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 255 (1977). On subsequent unsuccessful efforts by pro-choice
proponents to invoke art. 8(1) of the European Convention before the European Com-
mission on Human Rights, see Note, Abortion Law Reform, in Europe: The European
Commission on Human Rights Upholds German Restrictions on Abortion (Brueg-
gemarm and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany), 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 162 (1980)
(also surveying contemporary legislative developments in Austria, France and Italy).
12. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (concerning privacy implications).
13. For an interpretation of Saint Augustine's view of sexual relations not too re-
moved from this, see D. BROMLEY, CATHOLICS AND BIRTH CONTROL 9-15 (1965).
ments of policy are sympathetic toward pregnant women. This is
based on the importance of health concerns rather than the complete
favoring of free choice.14
A third focus is on the family unit to which the pregnant woman
belongs and into which the baby will be born. Some schools of
thought stress concern for the freedom of sexual partners to decide
whether they will have children.15 Others emphasize the economic
well-being of the whole family. The family unit may be adversely af-
fected if limited resources must be stretched to care for another
member, or the emotional deprivation experienced by siblings if pa-
rental care is diluted by yet another child.16 Concentration on factors
like these almost always leads to support of liberal abortion.
A final focus is on the needs of the community. Any of the con-
cerns already listed, of course, can be restated in terms of social in-
terests (e.g., protection of the life of the fetus, protection of maternal
health, or protection of the health of a viable family unit). But
within the community dimension there are at least two additional
concerns. One is the factor of population control. Abortion clearly
can be a means of birth control, albeit a much less satisfactory form
than mechanical or chemical contraceptive methods. 17 In the past,
14. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Privacy: Does It Allow a Woman the Right to
Determine Whether to Bear Children?, 20 AM. U. L. REV. 136 (1970). See also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 154 (Court rejected absolute constitutional protection for abortions
of choice not based on medical considerations).
15. See J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 92-99 (Beacon Press ed. 1960);
Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 47 (1971).
16. See Krimmel & Foley, supra note 8, at 792-96. Only Japan appears to embody
this specifically in its statute. Eugenic Protection Law (Yu-seihogoho) (Law No. 156
of 1948, as amended), art. 3(5) permits abortion "if there are several children and the
mother's health will be seriously impaired if she again delivers." Art. 14 permits a
doctor authorized by a district medical association to terminate a pregnancy at his or
her discretion, with consent of both husband and wife, for several reasons, including
the likelihood of substantial injury to the mother's health for either physical or eco-
nomic reasons if the pregnancy continues to term (author's translation and para-
phrase). Some Scandinavian legislation extends about as broadly. Clemmesen, State of
Legal Abortion in Denmark, 112 AM. J. PSYCH. 662 (1956); Klintskog, Survey of Legis-
lation on Legal Abortion in Europe and North America, 21 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 79 (1953).
The English Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1(2), permits medical practitioners to take
account of "the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment" in
deciding whether, under § 1(1)(a), there is risk of "injury to the physical or mental
health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if
the pregnancy were terminated." Id. at § 1(1)(a). See G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 256 (1978) [hereinafter cited as G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW]; Simms,
Abortion Law Reform: How the Controversy Changed, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 567, 568-71.
India's Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, § 3(2) embodies similar considera-
tions. See supra note 11.
17. The dividing line between abortion, on the one hand, and contraceptive devices
or pharmaceuticals preventing the implantation on the uterine wall of a fertilized
ovum, on the other, is not intrinsically clear. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160-61;
Brahams, Postcoital Pill and Intrauterine Device: Contraceptive or Abortifacient?,
1983 LANCET, vol. 1, no. 8332, p. 1039 (May 7, 1983); Tunkel, Modern Anti-Pregnancy
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the population control use of abortion has been evident in some cul-
tures.' 8 With improved contraceptive methods, reliance on abortion
for that purpose has become less necessary. Some writers have sug-
gested that legalized abortion as a means of population control
manifests an impermissible exercise of state power,19 or have ex-
Techniques and the Criminal Law, 1974 CRIM. L. REV. 461. On amniocentesis and
other sex-determining and sex-selecting techniques, see Nolan-Haley, Amniocentesis
and the Apotheosis of Human Quality Control, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 347 (1981); Warren,
Law of Human Reproduction: An Overview, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 49-51 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Warren]; Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe v. Wade:
How Viable is Roe's Viability Standard?, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113, 125-30 (1983);
Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion Liberty and a
Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281, 284-88 (1981).
On other socio-economic concerns, see Menon, supra note 11, at 317-18.
18. See Roemer, Abortion Law Reform and Repeal: Legislative and Judicial De-
velopments, 61 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 500, 505-06 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Roemer],
describing such a reliance on abortion in several Pacific Basin nations. India's Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, seems strongly aimed at population control. See
Kelkar, Impact of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971: A Case Study, 16
INDIAN L. INST. J. 603, 693 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kelkar].
Traditional Japanese attitudes encouraged large families and therefore viewed the
use of contraceptives as improper, even by married couples, see R. BEARDSLEY, J. HALL
& R. WARD, VILLAGE JAPAN 335-36 (1959), but that view has weakened substantially,
particularly in urban areas where nuclear families have replaced the extended family
units typical of rural Japan. See R. DORE, CITY LIFE IN JAPAN 205 n.196 (1958).
Kelkar, supra, at 619 records advice by Japan's former Premier Sato to Indian authori-
ties not to rely heavily on abortion as a means of population control, based on Japa-
nese experience.
19. See H. THIELICKE, supra note 7, at 215-25; Kimmel & Foley, supra note 8, at
796-97. Cf. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 868-69
(8th Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (requirement that woman be
told approximate length of pregnancy unconstitutional because it would eliminate use
of menstrual extraction and similar techniques, which under the state law would be an
abortion); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 190-91 (E.D. La. 1980) (definition
of abortion was not impermissibly vague even though it might have included IUD's
and morning-after pills [two forms of birth control], since no other statutory formula-
tion would be more precise, and abortion does not include contraceptive measures).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(A) (1984) defines pregnancy as implantation of an embryo in
the uterus, which excludes morning-after pills from the scope of abortion provisions.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(8) (West 1984) excludes from the definition of abor-
tion birth control devices or medications. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1983) ex-
cludes from the statutory definition of abortion the use of IUD's or birth control pills
"to inhibit or prevent ovulation, fertilization or the implantation of a fertilized ovum
within the uterus." W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-2 (1979) states that abortion is not consid-
ered an approved method of family planning and is excluded from state-supported
family planning programs, and WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.80(1)(West Supp. 1983) prohibits
family planning services from promoting, encouraging or performing voluntary termi-
nations of pregnancy.
On contraception as a desirable alternative to abortion, see Sneideman, Abortion: A
Public Health and Social Policy Perspective, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 187, 206-
12 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sneideman].
The matter of in vitro fertilization is also addressed in some legislation, e.g., ILL.
pressed fear that it will result in too stark a decline in population
levels to permit the state to survive. 20 In reality, however, abortion
produces only incidental population control consequences, 21 and so
poses no serious threat either to population levels or citizens'
liberties.22
A second social factor addresses the freedom of the medical profes-
sion to approach termination of pregnancies on the same basis as
other medical problems, free from arbitrary controls. This, too, has
found strong support in the United States Supreme Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence.2 3
These concerns, although not necessarily comprehensive, demon-
strate the principal policy interests implicated by abortion legislation
and constitutional precedents governing it. In most American juris-
dictions to 1967, abortions were allowed only to save the lives of preg-
nant women.24 Activists within the self-proclaimed "right-to-life"
movement believe the United States Constitution should be amended
to prohibit all abortions, or at a minimum, to allow only those neces-
sary to save maternal life. In contrast, the Supreme Court's current
constitutional analysis recognizes a woman's freedom of choice. Any
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (person causing fertiliza-
tion of human ovum outside body of a living human female is deemed to have care and
custody of child for purposes of neglect statute, but does not apply to lawful participa-
tion in pregnancy termination); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422(3) (West Supp. 1984) (fel-
ony to buy or sell living human conceptus); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e)(5)
(1983) (various data to be reported, including "number of fertilized eggs destroyed or
discarded"). See Dickens, supra note 11, at 573-74; Noonan, Christian Tradition and
the Control of Human Reproduction, 1983 J. CHRIST. JURIS. 1, 11-15; Warren, supra
note 17, at 5.
20. That may have underlain the rescission in 1956 of the USSR law allowing easy
abortion. See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 219-20
(1957) [hereinafter cited as G. WILLIAMS, SANCTITY]. That rescission in turn, however,
is reported to have been modified. P. GEBHARD, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & C. CHRIS-
TENSON, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND ABORTION 208-11 (1958). So was a similar change in
Bulgarian law. Roemer, supra note 18, at 504.
21. Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population Control in the United
States, 25 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 593, 597-98 (1960); Tietze, The Current Status of Fer-
tility Control, 25 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 426, 442-44 (1960). Abortion as a means of
population control seems to be significant in the People's Republic of China. Luk,
Abortion in Chinese Law, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 372, 389 (1977).
22. Indeed, Dr. Thielicke's concerns (see supra note 17 and accompanying text)
find no home in American constitutional jurisprudence, which stresses the right of
married and unmarried persons to have information about contraception and access to
contraceptives. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983) (hold-
ing federal statute prohibiting mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives
unconstitutional); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (legislation allowing distribution of contraceptives to mar-
ried couples, but not to single persons, violated the equal protection clause); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning state law banning use of
contraceptives).
23. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973); see also infra notes 110-31 and ac-
companying text.
24. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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woman early in pregnancy may, in consultation with a willing physi-
cian, choose to have an abortion. As pregancy advances, medical con-
siderations become more significant but can never be eclipsed by a
desire solely to preserve fetal life.
Accordingly, the tension in the 1980's is between abortion as a di-
mension of medical practice and prohibition of abortion as unwar-
ranted termination of human fetal life. Abortion for purposes of
population control, eugenics or preservation of family strength and
harmony is not within the ambit of the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional concerns, and finds no home in today's legislative chambers.
For now, concerns of this nature are for moral, ethical and theologi-
cal debate, not litigation or the legislative process.
II. LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION BEFORE 196725
A. Criminal Statutes
1. Statutes Penalizing Abortion
Criminal statutes outlawing abortion date from 1821.26 Common
law precedent was so scant that it played an insignificant role in eval-
uating the legality of abortions.27 Statutes were roughly classifiable
into those which prohibited all abortions and those which allowed
some abortions under carefully limited circumstances. The laws of
four states28 provided no exceptions to a general prohibition against
abortion, although judicial interpretations softened the harsh impact
25. In Parts II and III of this article, only the names of the states and not specific
statutory citations appear. This is because almost all the legislation in force through
1973 has been replaced. Persons wishing then-contemporary citations may find them
in George, The Evolving Law of Abortion, 23 CASE W. RES. 708 (1972) passim.
26. See G. WILLIAMS, SANCTITY, supra note 20, at 152.56; Quay, Justifiable Abor-
tion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 173, 231-38 (1960); Special Project:
Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 93-100.
27. Most common law cases covered only conduct that caused miscarriages after
fetuses had quickened. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 186-88 (3d ed.
1982).
On the historical antecedents and development of the law of abortion, see Dellapena,
The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITr. L. REV. 359, 365-
407 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Dellapena]; Destro, Abortion and the Constitutions:
The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1267-82 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Destro]; Dickens & Cook, supra note 11, at 425-41; Menon, supra
note 11, at 323-26; Special Project: Survey of Abortion Lau, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 73-
100 [hereinafter cited as Special Project].
28. La., Mass., N.J., Pa. In New Hampshire, the attempted abortion statute al-
lowed no exceptions, while a companion provision penalizing completed abortions jus-
tified acts necessary to save maternal life.
of the legislation.29 In the remaining states and the District of Co-
lumbia, abortions were permissible to preserve maternal life.
Even during that era, a few states went beyond saving the lives of
pregnant women. Some permitted abortions to preserve the life of
an unborn child,30 a qualification with little or no effect other than to
exempt induced labor at or near term from the scope of abortion
law.31 Two states allowed abortions necessary to forestall serious and
permanent bodily injury,32 while two other jurisdictions recognized
any maternal health considerations.33
A number of difficult legal problems arose in administering restric-
tive legislation. The first had to do with classes of persons authorized
to perform abortions in instances of exigency. Twenty-six states ap-
peared to allow anyone to perform an abortion,34 while the rest re-
quired that abortions be done by physicians or surgeons.
The second turned on whether necessity was to be determined on
an objective or strict liability basis, or whether a good faith belief in
the existence of justifying medical grounds would suffice. Many stat-
utes seemingly defined necessity as an objective element,35 although
some courts embraced a good faith professional belief that necessity
existed, despite the rather plain statutory language to the contrary. 36
This usual language was ameliorated to some extent where the bur-
29. Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 677, 171 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1961)
(physicians who acted in an honest belief that abortions were necessary to avoid great
peril to maternal life or health did not violate the statute, if their judgments corre-
sponded with the average judgment of doctors in the communities where they prac-
ticed); State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 126-28, 58 A.2d 709, 710-11 (1948)
(abortions necessary to save life, but not health).
30. Conn., Minn., Mo., S.C., Wash.
31. This is dealt with today in statutory definitions of abortion. See infra notes
150-59 and accompanying text.
32. Colo., N.M.
33. Ala., D.C. Occasionally, broad judicial interpretations achieved the same re-
sult. See, e.g., Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971) (physical and mental
health); Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850 (1961) (physical and
mental health).
34. Ala., Ariz., Conn., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Ky., Me., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., Nev.,
N.D., Ohio, Okla., R.I., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., W. Va., Wyo. Missouri legislation
appeared to favor unlicensed abortionists. Abortion was proscribed unless necessary to
preserve the life of a woman or her unborn child, but if the person performing an
abortion was not a licensed physician, it was a defense that the performance had been
advised by a duly licensed physician to be necessary for the purpose. Thus, a licensed
physician was held to a standard of objective necessity while an unlicensed person
could rely on medical advice whether or not the abortion was objectively necessary.
The statute probably was intended to protect registered nurses and other hospital and
medical staff personnel, but was not so limited.
35. Ala., Ariz., Conn., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Me. (good faith belief no defense:
State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 A. 817 (1927)); Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.D.
(good faith belief no defense: State v. Shortridge, 54 N.D. 779, 211 N.W. 336 (1926));
Okla., R.I., S.D., Utah, Vt., Wyo.
36. Honnard v. People, 77 Ill. 481 (1875); State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221
N.W. 592 (1928).
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den of proving want of medical necessity was placed on the prosecu-
tion.37 Legislation in three states38 and the District of Columbia was
specific in stating that belief or motivation, and not objective neces-
sity, governed the statutory exception from coverage.
The common law requirement that a fetus be quick before there
could be a criminal abortion 39 had disappeared from statutory law:
twenty-three states40 referred only to pregnancy while four other
states used "whether quick or not."41 In a handful of states, duration
of pregnancy had begun to reemerge as a legal element of abortion
which had begun to expand the scope of noncriminal abortion.42
Therapeutic abortions were limited in three states to the period of
nonviability.43
Another array of legal problems arose when, despite efforts to
abort a fetus, no miscarriage occurred. This might have resulted
from an interrupted or incompletely performed abortion or from the
fact the woman was not pregnant. Some thirty-two states44 and the
District of Columbia eliminated the first problem by penalizing the
administration of drugs, use of an instrument or any other means in-
tended to produce an abortion. If a woman was not pregnant, how-
ever, it might have been argued under common law concepts that the
crime was "impossible" to attempt.45 Such a defense was unavailable
under abortion statutes which prohibited abortion activity affecting
37. Compare the Supreme Court interpretation of the District of Columbia Code
to that effect, in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
38. Tenn., Tex., W. Va. Several statutes enacted after 1967 in Ark., Fla., Ga., N.Y.,
N.C., Or., and S.C. set a standard of "reasonable belief." That was a compromise posi-
tion between strict liability and criminality turning on exclusively subjective consider-
ations, but it achieved criminality based on criminal negligence. That standard of
culpability seems inappropriate in the context of abortion, although perhaps recogniza-
ble in manslaughter prosecutions if a woman dies from the effects of a bungled
abortion.
39. See generally G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 252-53; Note,
Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis, 21 CASE W. RES. 521, 526-27 (1970).
40. Ala., Ariz., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., La., Mich., Miss.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.C., N.D., Okla., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Wyo.
41. Ark., Ky., Me., Tenn. Statutes punishing attempted abortion also reduced the
practical significance of pregnancy as an element of the crime of abortion. See infra
notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
42. Cal., Colo., Del., N.Y., Or., Wash.
43. Alaska, Hawaii, Wash.
44. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., La., Me.,
Mass., Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, S.C., S.D.,
Tenn., Utah, Va., Wash. Texas had a special attempt provision which achieved the
same result.
45. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 438-46 (1972); R. PER-
KINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 627-35 (3d ed. 1983). The doctrine of impossibility is
"any woman,"46 a woman "whether pregnant or not,"47 or a woman
believed by a defendant to be pregnant.48 Several courts relied on
such language to affirm convictions for abortion even though the af-
fected women were not pregnant.4 9
2. Statutes Prohibiting Killing an Unborn Quick Child
Six states made it a separate offense to willfully kill an unborn
quick child under circumstances in which, had the mother and not
the fetus been killed, the crime would have been murder or man-
slaughter.50 The aim of these statutes was not entirely evident from
either language or interpreting precedent, but their targets probably
were those who intended to cause pregnant women to miscarry with-
out their consent and who used physical violence against them for
that purpose.51
3. Statutes Penalizing Death of Pregnant Women Resulting from
Abortion
Under classical theory, should a pregnant woman die as a result of
a criminal abortion, the abortionist should be guilty of either second-
degree murder based on felony murder in the commission of a felony
not enumerated under traditional first-degree murder statutes, the
intentional infliction of grave bodily injury, or the reckless perform-
ance of activity with known dangerous consequences, or guilty of
manslaughter based on criminal negligence.52 Several states con-
fronted such cases directly by providing augmented punishment for
performing an abortion should a woman die as a result,53 or by char-
acterizing the death as either murder54 or manslaughter.5 5
repudiated in Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(a)(P.O.D. 1962). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 110.10 (McKinney 1975).
46. Cal., D.C., Iowa, La., Mass., Ohio, Pa., Va., Wash., W. Va.
47. Ill.
48. Ind., Ky., R.I., Vt., Wyo.
49. People v. Kutz, 187 Cal. App. 2d 431, 435, 9 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1960); Urga v.
State, 155 So. 2d 719, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 829 (1964);
People v. Marra, 27 Mich. App. 1, 5, 183 N.W.2d 418, 419 (1971); Wyatt v. State, 77 Nev.
490, 503, 367 P.2d 104, 111 (1961). Cf Williams v. State, 218 Tenn. 359, 363-66, 403
S.W.2d 319, 322-23 (1966) (no defense that substances and instruments could not cause
miscarriage). The Kentucky and Maine statutes, however, varied punishment levels
according to whether a miscarriage actually resulted.
50. Ark., Fla., Mich., Miss., N.D., Okla.
51. Such statutes clearly accorded independent personality to fetuses since the
crime was called manslaughter and usually placed with other homicide offenses
(where abortion legislation did not usually appear).
52. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 244-45; Wechsler &
Michael, Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 702-23 (1937).
53. Colo., Mass., N.J., N.M., R.I., S.C., Vt.
54. D.C., N.H., Tex., W. Va.
55. Mich., Mo., N.Y., N.D.
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4. Statutes Penalizing Women Who Seek Abortions
In default of special legislation, women who sought or submitted to
abortions were generally not viewed as accomplices to the crime. 56
Rhode Island and Vermont preserved that doctrine by statute.57 In
several states, however, legislatures decreed that women who solic-
ited or submitted to abortions that were not necessary to preserve
their lives were criminals.58 These statutes had two significant legal
consequences and one practical result as well.
One consequence was that accompanying statutes sometimes re-
quired corroboration of a woman's testimony,59 or were interpreted
in that way. 60 A second was that women who underwent abortions,
as putative criminal defendants, could claim privilege against self-in-
crimination when summoned to testify for the prosecution against an
abortionist.61 Because, however, that testimony frequently is critical
to establishing guilt, some legislatures either purported to abolish
56. See, e.g., Heath v. State, 249 Ark. 217, 219, 459 S.W.2d 420, 422 (1970), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 910 (1971); Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 Mass. 274, 277, 29 N.E. 471,
471 (1892); In re Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 118-19, 123 N.W.2d 253, 254-55 (1963) (woman
could not be held for commission of abortion on herself, and thus was not an aider or
abettor thereof); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 450, 67 A.2d 141, 144 (1949) (interpreted stat-
ute failing to denounce participation in abortion by pregnant woman as evidencing leg-
islative policy to leave woman involved unpunished); State v. Shaft, 166 N.C. 407, 409,
81 S.E. 932, 933 (1914); Smartt v. State, 112 Tenn. 539, 553, 80 S.W. 586, 589 (1904); Wil-
lingham v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 98, 99, 25 S.W. 424, 424 (1894). Compare State v. Clif-
ford, 133 Iowa 478, 480, 110 N.W. 921, 922 (1907) (victim could not be charged because
she had died as a result of the abortion, but court characterized her as a conspirator so
that her statements were admissible against the abortionist as a declaration promoting
the common criminal enterprise), with Snyder Appeal (Commonwealth v. Fisher), 398
Pa. 237, 246, 157 A.2d 207, 212 (1960) (woman is a victim and cannot be a conspirator).
Contra Steed v. State, 27 Ala. App. 263, 170 So. 489, affd, 233 Ala. 159, 170 So. 490
(1936); State v. McCoy, 52 Ohio St. 157, 160, 39 N.E. 316, 316 (1894).
On the English law, see 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1191-92 (4th ed. 1976);
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 253.
57. Revisers' comments to Louisiana statute indicated an intent to preserve earlier
case law to the same effect.
58. Ariz., Cal., Conn., Idaho, Ind., Minn., N.Y., N.D., Okla., S.C., Utah, Wash., Wis.,
Wyo. State courts did not always apply the literal language of these statutes outside
their specific coverage, and thus held that women were not accomplices under the pri-
mary abortion statutes. See State v. Burlingame, 47 S.D. 332, 198 N.W. 824 (1924); State
v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P.2d 1071 (1934).
59. Cal., Idaho, Mont., N.D., S.C.
60. People v. Peyser, 380 Ill. 404, 44 N.E.2d 58 (1942); State v. McCoy, 52 Ohio St.
157, 39 N.E. 316 (1894).
61. See Snyder Appeal (Commonwealth v. Fisher), 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207
(1960).
privilege in such cases, 62 or conferred immunity against prosecution
for complicity in abortion on women who testified.63 That brought
the matter around full circle to where it would have been had partici-
pating women not been denominated criminals in the first place.64
However, legislation penalizing abortion patients may have conferred
a practical advantage on prosecutors by allowing them to threaten
prosecution if a woman did not cooperate and to promise her immu-
nity from prosecution if she did.
5. Statutes Penalizing Activity Facilitating Performance of
Abortions
Physicians performing abortions use instruments which are part of
the ordinary equipment of gynecologists and obstetricians.65 It is un-
realistic for law enforcement officials to attempt to control the use of
such instruments; in any event, the very nature of physician and hos-
pital supply channels makes it unlikely that laypersons could procure
them. In the decades before Roe v. Wade, however, self-induced
abortions were a major public health problem, 66 and the devices and
chemical substances used were clearly identifiable and devoid of le-
gitimate modern uses. Since they were controllable without adverse
impact on legitimate medical practice, legislatures consistently tried
to control their availability.
The advertising of abortifacients was penalized in twenty-three
states. In nineteen of them, a special statute covered abortifacients
either alone or in the context of medicines preventing conception,
curing venereal disease and the like,67 while in others the prohibition
appeared in the context of obscenity regulation.68 The unconstitu-
tionality of this form of legislation was recognized only recently.69
State legislatures also sought to regulate commerce in abortifacients
by prohibiting their manufacture, 70 distribution, 71 furnishing,72 keep-
62. Minn., Wash. Such statutes were obviously unconstitutional under Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
63. Nev., N.J., Ohio, S.C.
64. See, e.g., In re Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 123 N.W.2d 253 (1963); In re Vince, 2 N.J.
443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
65. J. BATES & E. ZAWADSKI, CRIMINAL ABORTION 38-39 (1964).
66. Id. at 85-91.
67. Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., Fla., Idaho, Ill., Ind., La., Mass., Mich., Mo., Pa., R.I.,
S.D., Vt., Va., Wis., Wyo. Like statutes were repealed in 1967 and 1968 in Maine and
Maryland.
68. E.g., Colo., Miss.
69. See infra note 442 and accompanying text.
70. Mass. (subsequently declared unconstitutional in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), in its application to contraceptives), Minn., Nev., N.Y., Wash.
71. Colo., Ill., La., Md.
72. Tex. (invalidated in Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd on
other grounds, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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ing or exposing for sale,7 3 giving away,74 or lending.75 Two states re-
quired all sales to be under registerable prescriptions.76 Oregon
penalized those who furnished premises knowing that nontherapeu-
tic abortions would be performed there. Most of this legislation, too,
is incompatible with modern first amendment notions.77
III. ACCELERATING TRENDS TOWARD LEGALIZED THERAPEUTIC
ABORTION: 1968-1973
A. Coverage of Revised Abortion Legislation
1. Grounds for Therapeutic Abortions
The Model Penal Code,78 promulgated by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1962, asserted a strong and perhaps paramount influence on a
legislative expansion of the grounds for legal abortion during the pe-
riod 1968-1973. The Code posited the lawfulness of abortions neces-
sary to safeguard the physical and mental health of pregnant women;
thirteen states had recognized this ground by 1973.79 A second
ground for abortion, accepted in twelve states, allowed pregnancies to
be terminated on eugenic grounds, i.e., because a fetus if born would
be seriously mentally or physically handicapped.0 A third, based on
humanitarian considerations, permitted victims of rapes ' or incest8 2
to have their pregnancies terminated. Three states, however, went
73. Colo., Del., Ill., Iowa, Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Nev., R.I., Vt.,
Wash.
74. Colo., Del., Iowa, Mass., Mim., Miss., Mo., Nev., Vt., Wash.
75. Colo., Mass., Miss.
76. Colo., Mich.
77. See infra note 454 and accompanying text. On the English law, see 11 Hls-
BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1193 (4th ed. 1976); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 16, at 264-65.
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
79. Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Kan., Md., N.M., N.C., Or., S.C., Va. English
legislation adopted the same position. English Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1(1)(a). See
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 257-60.
80. Ark., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Kan., Md., N.M., N.C., Or., S.C., Va. The English
Abortion Act contains similar coverage. English Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1(1)(b)
("substantial risk" of "such physical abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped").
See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 256-57. Similar legislation is found
in Singapore (Singapore Abortion Act, 1969), and South Australia. See Roemer, supra
note 18.
81. Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Kan., Md., Miss., N.M., N.C., Or., S.C., Va.
Whether statutory as well as forcible rape was included had to be determined in each
state in light of statutory cross-references.
Parliament declined to recognize rape as an independent basis for abortion. See G.
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, at 260-61.
82. Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Kan., N.M., N.C., Or., S.C., Va.
far beyond the Model Penal Code pattern to eliminate all restrictions
on medically indicated abortions.83 Consequently, only those jurisdic-
tions were relatively free of impact from the 1973 Supreme Court de-
cisions in Roe and Doe, as far as grounds for justifiable abortion were
concerned.
2. Length of Pregnancy
As mentioned earlier,8 4 length of pregnancy often bore on the law-
fulness of therapeutic abortions. Thus, even the three most liberal
states before 1973 found this dimension of their statutes invalidated.
3. Residency Requirements
As some legislatures expanded the permissible scope of therapeutic
abortions, they manifested a fear that their states would become
abortion havens for residents of other jurisdictions with restrictive
laws. Therefore, a number required periods of residency before an
abortion could be performed.85 Such legislation usually placed the
burden on pregnant women to assert residency, not on physicians to
ascertain the truth of claims of residency; only the Georgia and Vir-
ginia statutes attached perjury consequences to declarations of resi-
dency. These statutes fell under Doe v. Bolton.86
4. Preliminary Approval by Medical Peers
Even before the abortion law revision movement a number of
states requiredS7 or permitted, as an alternative to an operating phy-
sician's personal professional judgment, the advice of other independ-
ent physicians.88 Later legislation generally mandated preliminary
consultation with or approval by medical colleagues before abortions
could be performed. Approval could be gained through certification
by medical practitioners other than a physician wishing to terminate
a pregnancy,8 9 by a hospital review committee,90 or by both.91 Be-
cause peer concurrence took time, several states legislated an emer-
83. Alaska, Hawaii, Wash. The English Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, §§ 1(1)(a), (2),
reaches about the same result by permitting medical practitioners to consider the ac-
tual or reasonably foreseeable environment of pregnant women in deciding whether
their physical or mental health may be injured by pregnancy, as well as the risk to
siblings if an additional child is born. See also supra note 16.
84. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
85. Alaska, Ark., Del., Ga., Hawaii, N.C., Or., S.C., Va., Wash.
86. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
87. La., Miss.
88. Fla. (repealed 1972), Neb., N.H., Ohio, Wis. Missouri provided for advice by
one duly licensed physician if an abortion was performed by one who was not a duly
licensed physician. On this anomaly, see supra note 34.
89. Ark., Del., Ga., Kan., N.C., Or., S.C. Concurring physicians generally could not
be relatives of or associated in medical practice with a doctor who wished to perform
an abortion. The English Abortion Act, 1967, c. 7, § 1(1), requires the good faith opin-
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gency exception for situations in which a woman's life would be put
in jeopardy unless an abortion were performed immediately. A rati-
fication of medical necessity then had to be obtained swiftly after an
abortion. 92 The degree to which such requirements have survived
the Court's 1973 abortion decisions is discussed below.9 3
5. Special Approval in Rape and Incest Cases
Statutes which allowed abortion in rape and incest cases on hu-
manitarian grounds94 generally required some form of substantiation.
A woman's claim of violation was not an automatic reason because
medical grounds did not necessarily justify abortion in all instances
of sexual assaults. Sometimes some form of complaint or affidavit by
a victim sufficed, 95 but more commonly approval or certification by
prosecuting authorities was needed.96
6. Persons Authorized to Perform Abortions
Revised statutes before 1973 required terminations of pregnancy to
be performed by physicians licensed in the jurisdiction.97 The stat-
utes did not touch on the legal status of nurses and medical
paraprofessionals who performed or participated in lawful therapeu-
tic abortions, but one may assume that prosecuting authorities were
unenthusiastic about prosecuting persons acting in such a capacity.
At any rate, no precedent on the matter emerged.
7. Place of Performance of Abortions
Statutes which restricted the grounds for lawful abortion to health,
ion of two medical practitioners, as does India's Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Act, 1971, § 3(2).
90. Cal., Colo., Del., Ga., Md., N.M., Va. Alaska left the matter to administrative
regulation. On the counterpart requirement under the CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE
§ 251(4), see Harris & Tupper, Study of Therapeutic Abortion Committees in British
Columbia, 11 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1977) (in comparison with the English Abor-
tion Act, 1967).
91. Del., Ga.
92. Ark., Kan., N.C., Or., S.C., Wash. The English Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1(4),
creates an emergency exception if abortion is necessary to save the life or prevent
grave permanent injury to a pregnant woman's physical or mental health.
93. See infra notes 318-25 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
95. Ark., Ga., N.M., N.C., S.C., Va.
96. Cal., Colo., Del., Ga., Md., Or., S.C.
97. Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Kan., Md., N.M., N.Y., N.C., S.C., Va.,
Wash. England's Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, §§ 1(1), 2(1)(b), contains a like require-
ment.
eugenic or humanitarian concerns almost always required abortions
to be performed in accredited hospitals.98 Two states, however, al-
lowed abortions to be performed in approved clinics away from full-
service hospitals.99 The unconstitutionality of some situs restrictions
is discussed below.100
8. Required Records and Reports
As legislatures began to recognize the licitness of medically indi-
cated abortions, they also instituted record keeping and reporting re-
quirements. Sometimes, applications or certificates needed only to be
retained in medical office or hospital patient files,101 but periodic re-
ports to state agencies increasingly came to be mandated.102 Require-
ments were imposed that the identity of abortion patients be kept
confidential. The constitutionality of much broader contemporary re-
porting legislation is commented on below.103
9. Freedom of Conscience Exemptions
Many doctors, nurses and hospital employees have strong religious
or moral scruples against abortion, and many private, particularly
church-affiliated, hospitals will not tolerate the performance of abor-
tions on their premises. As therapeutic abortion came increasingly to
be recognized, the question arose whether individuals or hospitals
could refrain legally from participation. Many states had legislated
to allow a freedom of conscience exemption.1 0 4 The number of such
statutes has markedly increased since Roe and Doe were decided.105
B. Resort to Litigation: The New Frontier
The wave or, perhaps more accurately, ripple of legislative reform
probably had peaked by 1973. In any event, advocacy increased rap-
98. Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Kan., Md., N.M., N.C., S.C., Va.,
Wash., Wis.
99. Alaska, Wash. England's Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1(3), allows abortions to
be performed in a hospital or place approved by the Minister of Health or Secretary of
State, subject to an emergency exception. Id. at § 1(4).
100. See infra notes 301-08 and accompanying text.
101. Ark., Colo., N.M. Sometimes this form of record keeping was imposed in addi-
tion to reporting requirements, as in Georgia, Maryland and Oregon.
102. Del., Fla., Md., S.C. Oregon left the matter to administrative regulation, which
also is the stance of the English Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 2.
103. See infra notes 366-79 and accompanying text.
104. Alaska, Ark., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Md., N.M., Or., S.C., Va., Wash. A
similar exemption for medical practitioners is provided in England's Abortion Act,
1967, c. 87, § 4(1), but the burden of proof is on a practitioner who refuses an abortion
on that basis. For a criticism of India's Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971,
based on a failure to include similar language, see Minattur, Medical Termination of
Pregnancy and Conscientious Objection, 16 INDIAN L. INST. J. 704 (1974).
105. See infra notes 384-410 and accompanying text.
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idly for constitutional invalidation of legislative restrictions on thera-
peutic abortion.106 The principal grounds advanced were the
following: vagueness and indefiniteness in abortion legislation deny-
ing due process of law;107 infringement of equal protection, through
either an arbitrary legislative classification of eligibility and ine-
ligibilty for abortion' 08 or financial discrimination against indi-
gents; 10 9 or invasion of a constitutionally protected right of
privacy.11 0 What might have evolved from a long process of constitu-
tional litigation is unknowable, because the Supreme Court in 1973
asserted its primacy in the constitutional regulation of abortion
legislation.
IV. BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
As matters eventuated, the Court built its doctrinal framework on
the constitutional right to privacy, which it thought "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy.""' This analysis has been followed in subsequent cases, 112
most recently in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health. 113 In selecting the "right to privacy" rationale, the Court spe-
cifically repudiated the claim that fetuses are "persons" within the
106. See generally Baude, Constitutional Reflections on Abortion Reform, 4 J.L. RE-
FORM 1 (1970); Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730 (1968); Comment, Abortion
Laws: A Constitutional Right to Abortion, 49 N.C.L. REV. 487 (1971).
For a retrospective view, see Moore, Moral Sentiment in Judicial Opinions on Abor-
tion, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 591 (1975).
107. See generally Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
108. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating legislation penalizing
sale of alcoholic beverages to males at a greater age than females).
109. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971).
110. See the contraceptive cases cited supra note 22; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (private possession of pornography).
111. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See generally Chemerinsky, supra note
5; Jones, supra note 11, at 605-12; King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal
for the Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1650-57 (1979); Krimmel
& Foley, supra note 8; Moore, Moral Sentiment in Judicial Opinions on Abortion, 15
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 591, 625-34 (1975); Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the
Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (1979); Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not To
Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Parness & Pritchard]; Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1569 (1979).
112. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976).
113. 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1983) (Roe is entitled to stare decisis recognition).
meaning of the fourteenth amendment: "[T]he unborn have never
been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."114 Thus, a
human being entitled to direct constitutional protection emerges at
live birth, not conception. 115 This premise has since been reaffirmed
by the Court.116
The Court's basic constitutional premise is also attested to by the
Court's rulings on standing to attack abortion legislation. A woman
who is pregnant at the time legal action commences 117 has standing
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162.
115. Id. at 161-62.
116. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481,
2500 (1983):
[The ordinance] requires the physician to inform his patient that 'the unborn
child is a human life from the moment of conception,' a requirement inconsis-
tent with the Court's holding in Roe v. Wade that a State may not adopt one
theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions.
Id. (citation omitted).
That this is the crux of the Court's abortion rationale is reflected in efforts to per-
suade Congress to adopt for presentation to the states for ratification a right-to-life
anmendment or to enact a human life statute on the strength of § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. On the constitutionality of the latter approach, see Emerson, The Power
of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court: The Human
Life Bill, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 129 (1982) (questioning constitutionality); Estreicher, Con-
gressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life"
Legislation, 68 VA. L. REv. 333 (1982) (questioning constitutionality); Gordon, The Na-
ture and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 656, 689-94 (1976)
(questioning constitutionality); Hyde, The Human Life Bill: Some Issues and Answers,
27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1077 (1982); Isaacs, The Law of Fertility Regulation in the
United States: A 1980 Review, 19 J. FAM. L. 65, 70-71 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Isaacs]; Pilpel, Hyde and Go Seek: A Response to Representative Hyde, 27 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1101 (1982); Note, Constitutionality of the Human Life Bill, 61 WASH. U.L.Q.
219 (1983) (suggesting constitutionality). The implications of such a bill for certain
forms of contraception are discussed in Note, Personhood and the Contraceptive Right,
57 IND. L.J. 579 (1982).
On the constitutional amendment, see Destro, supra note 27, at 1319-51. A survey of
constitutional provisions in other nations may be found in Mukerjee, World Constitu-
tions and Population: A Preliminary Survey of World Constitutions, 16 INDIAN L.
INST. J. 675, 679-87 (1974).
The right to life controversy manifests itself in other ways. See, e.g., Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 589 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1984) (FEC
could not invoke 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982) to prevent antiabortion group from expending
funds for a special election issue of its prolife publication, distributed at the time of an
election for federal office. Congress did not intend to include such activities as regu-
lated support for political candidates, since it would have violated the first amendment
had it done so.); Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451 (D.R.I. 1984) (city sponsorship of
fountain as memorial to "The Unborn Child," with plaque quoting Deut. 30:19,
"Choose life, then, that you and your descendants may live," did not amount to estab-
lishment of religion; plaintiffs pointed out Roman Catholic sponsorship of the memo-
rial had a declared objective of including aborted fetuses).
117. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 124-25, the Court rejected the appellee's contention
that the case had been mooted because Roe's pregnancy long since had been termi-
nated by birth or abortion. Pregnancies will come to term before usual appellate
processes can be completed, but "[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the same
woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us."
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because her right of privacy is directly affected by legal prohibitions
against abortion.'1 8 On the other hand, married women (with their
husbands) who assert that they might become pregnant in the future
and require termination of pregnancy for health reasons do not have
standing. 1 9 Doctors who may be prosecuted or otherwise interfered
with in their practice also are directly affected,12o as are clinics and
facilities providing abortion services.1 21
Having recognized that women's claims to abortion find support in
a constitutional right to privacy, the Court nevertheless rejected the
contention that such a right is absolute, allowing a woman "to termi-
nate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for
whatever reason she alone chooses."'122 A "pregnant woman cannot
be isolated in her privacy," for she "carries an embryo and, later, a
fetus .... "123 Accordingly, abortion is never completely free from
state regulation, although the scope of state powers grows slowly
with a pregnancy and has ceiling limitations far lower than those rec-
ognized in state legislation before 1973.
During approximately the first trimester of pregnancy124 "'the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
Therefore, pregnancy truly "could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading review .
Id. (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
118. Id. at 153.
119. Id. at 127-29.
120. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973). See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 124-27, a medical doctor, a defendant in a
pending criminal prosecution, was not allowed to appeal. This was not because of a
want of standing, but because the Court's doctrine of preclusion, set forth in Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prohibits fed-
eral courts from intervening in matters pending in state courts; potential prosecutions
are not within the doctrine. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 189, the Court thought it
unnecessary to decide whether nurses, clergy, social workers and counseling services
had standing because it resolved all the issues affecting them in connection with the
physicians' attack on the state statute.
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 n.21 (1980), discussed infra in notes 470-74 and
accompanying text, the Court found that the constitutional entitlement of a physician
advising financially unable Medicaid recipients was no greater than the entitlement of
the patient; therefore, he or she had no greater due process protections.
121. Abortion clinics were allowed to litigate constitutional issues in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), and City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). See also Deerfield Medical Center v.
City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (abortion clinic had standing to
assert privacy rights of women who might be unable to obtain abortions if municipality
denied occupational license to clinic on basis of zoning ordinance).
122. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
123. Id. at 159.
124. The Court's definition of "trimester" is discussed infra in notes 177-78 and ac-
companying text.
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician,' without in-
terference from the State."125 "The participation by the attending
physician in the abortion decision, and his responsibility in that deci-
sion"126 underlie the standing accorded to physicians to litigate abor-
tion decisions.127 Throughout early pregnancy, minor regulations can
be imposed if they further "important health-related State concerns,"
but only if they do not "interfere with the physician-patient consulta-
tion or with the woman's choice between abortion and childbirth."128
After the first stage, states may choose to impose reasonable re-
strictions relating to the preservation and protection of maternal
health,129 but state regulation cannot "depart from accepted medical
practice" or increase the costs and limit the availability of abortions
"without promoting important health benefits. 130 After viability,131
a state "may regulate an abortion to protect the life of the fetus and
even may proscribe abortion except where it is necessary, in appro-
priate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother."132
These, then, are the basics of the Court's regulation of abortion,
the constitutional structure for most of its decisions on specific as-
pects of abortion law. This does not mean, however, that no other
constitutional rationale will be invoked. For example, the Court has
relied on the vagueness and indefiniteness concept under the due
process clausels3 to strike down penal statutes invoked against physi-
cians.1 34 Equal protection, in contrast, has not had significant impact
on abortion law.135
125. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 61 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
at 164).
126. Id
127. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2493
(footnote omitted).
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
130. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2493. On the minimal risk of medically-administered abortion, see Sneideman, supra
note 19, at 194-97.
131. "[A] point purposefully left flexible for professional determination, and depen-
dent upon developing medical skill and technical ability .... Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 61 (footnote omitted). See also infra notes 179-82 and accompa-
nying text.
132. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 61 (paraphrasing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. at 163-65).
133. See cases cited supra note 107.
134. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2503-04 (ordinance making it a misdemeanor not to dispose of remains of unborn chil-
dren in "a humane and sanitary manner," held vague and indefinite); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. at 390-401 (viability determination and standard of care provisions
in felony statute voided for vagueness).
135. See infra notes 462-65, 473-74 and accompanying text. Efforts to claim a right
to abortion based on free exercise of religion under the first amendment likewise have
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V. SCOPE AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CURRENT
ABORTION LEGISLATION
A. Legislative Responses to the 1973 Decisions
The initial impact of Roe and Doe was manifested by state high
court decisions invalidating traditional abortion legislation.136 On oc-
casion, legislatures have apparently decided to do nothing. The re-
cent New Jersey criminal code contains no abortion provisions.137
Likewise, the text of the Texas provisions no longer appears; they
have been replaced by a compiler's notation of "unconstitutional."138
Most legislatures, however, revamped their statutes in response to or
anticipation of judicial invalidation of pre-1973 legislation.
A handful of states retained139 or adopted140 a policy of leaving
been rejected. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-21 (1980); Women's Servs. v. Thone,
636 F.2d 206, 209 (8th Cir. 1980).
136. E.g., People v. Norton, 181 Colo. 47, 507 P.2d 862 (1973); State v. Mirmelli, 54
Ill. 2d 28, 294 N.E.2d 257 (1973) (per curiam); State v. Hultgren, 295 Minn. 299, 204
N.W.2d 197 (1973) (per curiam) (nonphysician); State v. Hodgson, 295 Minn. 294, 204
N.W.2d 199 (1973) (per curiam) (physician); Spears v. State, 278 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 454 Pa. 429, 312 A.2d 13 (1913) (per curiam) (nonphysi-
cian); State v. Lawrence, 261 S.C. 18, 198 S.E.2d 253 (1973); State v. Munson, 87 S.D.
245, 206 N.W.2d 434 (1973); Doe v. Burk, 513 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1973). Although the court
in State v. Sulman, 165 Conn. 556, 339 A.2d 62 (1973), held that the unconstitutionality
of its abortion statute rendered it unenforceable against all offenders, in State v.
Menillo, 171 Conn. 141, 368 A.2d 136 (1976) (on remand from Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9 (1975)), it held later that the statute's unconstitutionality as applied to phy-
sicians did not destroy its effectiveness as to nonphysicians.
137. The matter was left to a legislative study commission. New Jersey Criminal
Law Revision Comm'n Final Report, Commentary 259 (1971). A comprehensive abor-
tion regulation statute was approved by the New Jersey Legislature, Assembly Bill No.
1285, but was vetoed by Governor Brendan Byrne on Jan. 3, 1980.
Illegal abortions can be prosecuted under simple assault provisions, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:12-1(a)(1) (West 1982), since consent to acts causing more than trifling inconven-
ience is legally irrelevant to criminality. Id. § 2C:2-10(b); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2)
(P.O.D. 1962).
138. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4512.1-4512.4, 4512.6 (Vernon 1976). Criminal
abortions could be prosecuted as assault under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(1),
22.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974), however, and consent is valid only if a victim knows the in-
jury to be a risk of "recognized medical treatment." Id. § 22.06(2)(B).
139. ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.105 (1982). See Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage,
631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981). The state had taken this approach to the problem before
1973. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
140. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.260(1) (1981) (although § 442.250 (1983) tracks the
Roe grounds for lawful abortion); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.341(A) (Page 1980)
(although the provision lists only some matters for regulation without an ejusdem
generis clause). Failure to comply with procedures in an administrative procedure act
governing promulgation of regulations can invalidate regulations. See, e.g., McKee v.
Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977) (regulation restricting use of public funds for
therapeutic abortion invalidated for failure to comply with APA notice requirements).
regulation of therapeutic abortion to administrative agencies. Most
have accomplished substantial revisions with the Supreme Court's re-
versal of its constitutional principles as their guide. 141
Several legislatures, however, voiced their restiveness or outright
opposition to the Court's doctrine. Some stated a preference for nor-
mal childbirth over abortion,142 and others affirmed the state's obli-
gation to protect human life whether unborn or not.143 Nebraska
objected to Supreme Court "intrusion" and "deplored" the destruc-
tion of unborn human lives which would result, 144 while Montana an-
nounced its intent to restrict abortions to the extent it could do so
constitutionally.145 Illinois146 and Kentucky 147 declared their intent
to prohibit abortions should the Supreme Court reverse its constitu-
tional stance or should the Constitution be amended to permit them
to do so. Idaho has gone the furthest in that regard. It has standby
provisions148 to come into force through gubernatorial proclamation
141. Cf. MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.010 (Vernon 1983) ("It is the intention of the [legisla-
ture] to reasonably regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the supreme
court of the United States"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202(c) (Purdon 1983) ("In
every relevant civil or criminal proceeding in which it is possible to do so without vio-
lating the Federal Constitution, the common and statutory law of Pennsylvania shall
be construed so as to extend to the unborn the equal protection of the laws and to fur-
ther the public policy of this Commonwealth encouraging childbirth over abortion.").
Articles on current abortion legislation from the standpoint of theology and ethics
include Eidsmoe, A Biblical View of Abortion, 1983 J. CHRIST. JURIS. 17; Fletcher,
Abortion and the True Believer, 91 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1126 (Nov. 27, 1974); Fromer,
supra note 5, at 239-40; Nelson, The Churches and Abortion Law Reform, 1983 J.
CHRIST. JURIS. 29; Orloski, Abortion: Legal Questions and Legislative Alternatives, 131
AMERICA 50 (Aug. 10, 1974).
142. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-4 (Burns 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.011
(West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1981).
The Supreme Court indicated that states are not prevented from making such a
value judgment and implementing it by allocation of public funds. Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977). See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1980) (utilizing
Maher v. Roe principles in the context of the Hyde amendment prohibiting the use of
Medicaid funds for abortions; see infra text accompanying notes 470-74).
143. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1984-1985) ("the
unborn child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal
person for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right to life
from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State"); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 311.710(5) (1983) ("declared policy ... to recognize and to protect the lives of all
human beings regardless of their degree of biological development .... "); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-102 (1983) ("tradition of the state of Montana to protect every
human life, whether unborn or aged, healthy or sick . . . [and] intent to extend the
protection of the laws of Montana in favor of all human life"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
325(4) (1979) ("this state is prevented from providing adequate legal remedies to pro-
tect. . . unborn human life"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-01 (1981) ("purpose ... is to
protect unborn human life . . . [and] reaffirms the tradition of the state of North Da-
kota to protect every human life whether unborn or aged, healthy or sick").
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325 (1979).
145. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102 -103 (1983).
146. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1984-1985).
147. Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.710(5) (1983).
148. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-614 -18-615 (1979).
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should the constitutional picture change. 149 Obviously, legislative
resonations of this nature, while therapeutic for anti-abortion legisla-
tors and their constituents, have no legal force and must be ignored
by state judges.
States vary in the placement of therapeutic abortion provisions
within the body of statutes. Some have continued the tradition of pe-
nal code regulation supported by ancillary provisions elsewhere, but
a great many have chosen the context of laws governing the healing
professions with residual or ancillary criminal provisions. The statu-
tory analysis which follows looks first at civil or civil-oriented legisla-
tion, then at criminal law provisions, and finally at restrictions
affecting publicly funded abortion services.
B. Noncriminal Regulation of Therapeutic Abortion
1. Definitions
a. "Abortion."
The new focus on abortion as a medical technique has brought
about modernized legal definitions, usually of the term abortion, but
sometimes of "miscarriage"150 or "feticide."151 A few states content
themselves with defining abortion as termination of pregnancy, 152
while others specify methods in a comprehensive way.153
Abortion implies intent or purpose, but statutes frequently spell it
out anyway, either generally'54 or in terms of intent to produce fetal
149. Id. § 18-613.
150. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(1)(B) (1980).
151. IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979). This may well reflect a legislative bias
against abortion. See supra notes 5, 142-49 and accompanying text.
152. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(8)-(9) (West Supp. 1984); MD. PUB. HEALTH
CODE ANN. § 20-208(a) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-72 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.02.070 (1977).
153. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (criminal
code context); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1596(1)(A), 1598(2)(A) (1980); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301(1) (Supp. 1983)
(including all procedures undertaken to kill a live unborn child and to produce miscar-
riage). See generally Warren, supra note 17, at 27; Note, (Ciminal Liability of Physi-
cians: An Encroachment on the Abortion Right?, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 592-93
(1981).
154. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-604(1) (1979) (intentional); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7
(West 1979) (intentional); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(1) (1981) (purposeful); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1596(1)(A), 1598(2)(A) (1980) (intentional); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 12K (West 1983) (knowing destruction or intentional expulsion or re-
moval); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2835(1) (West 1980) (purposeful); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.015(1) (Vernon 1983) (intentional); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(1) (Supp.
1984) (intent); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(2) (McKinney 1975) (intent); OKLA. STAT.
death.155 More frequently, the intent element is stated inversely, i.e.,
a purpose other than to induce live birth 156 or to remove a dead fe-
tus. 1 57 Only rarely does a definition of abortion include references to
viability5 8 or period of gestation;159 such matters usually are dealt
with in substantive provisions.
b. "Conception."
A definition of conception probably is functionally unnecessary to
delineate the scope of therapeutic abortion. Nevertheless, some
states have specifically provided one in neutral terms such as "fecun-
dation of the ovum by the spermatozoa."'160 Sometimes the definition
relates to some other term like "pregnancy," while at other times it
is synonymous with "fetus" or "unborn child." These terms are of
doubtful constitutionality if invoked to limit therapeutic abortions.' 6 '
c. "Pregnancy."
The term "pregnancy" is defined variously as implantation of an
embryo in the uterus,162 or as the condition of a woman carrying a
fetus or embryo within her body as a result of conception.163 The
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(1) (West 1984) (purposeful); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-1 (Supp. 1984)
(intent); VA. CODE § 18.2-71 (1982) (intent); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-101(a)(i) (1977) (intent).
155. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 311.720(1) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(a)(1) (1982).
156. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.011(1) (West Supp. 1984) ("intention other than to
produce live birth"); IDAHO CODE § 18-604(1) (1979) (viable birth); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-58.5-1(b) (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.20 (West 1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.240 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(1) (1981) (not including com-
pletion of incomplete spontaneous miscarriage); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(a) (Law.
Co-op. 1977) (other than delivery of viable birth); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-
1(1) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301(1) (Supp. 1983); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 151(a)
(Supp. 1983). See also supra note 154.
157. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.011(1) (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
58.5-1(b) (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.20 (West 1979); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1596(1)(A), 1598(2)(A) (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12K (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.015(1) (Vernon 1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.240 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(1) (1981) (embryo or fetus); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(1) (West 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-1(1) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301(1) (Supp.
1983); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 151(a) (Supp. 1983).
158. ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981) (nonviable fetus). On the unconstitutionality
of prohibitions against all abortions after viability, see supra notes 131-32, infra notes
180-83 and accompanying text.
159. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (after end of second trimester); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(1)(B) (1980) (miscarriage defined as interruption of
pregnancy of less than 20 weeks duration).
160. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(4) (West 1984) ("fertilization ... by the
sperm of a male individual"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(g) (Law. Co-op. 1977); WYO.
STAT. § 35-6-10la(iii) (1977).
161. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
162. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(A) (1978).
163. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12K (West 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
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first definition is another legislative means of exempting contracep-
tive techniques which prevent implantation ("morning-after pills")
from the coverage of abortion statutes,164 while the second definition
usually is tied to legislative descriptions of fetuses or unborn
children.
d. "Fetus" and related definitions.
Those state legislatures which have defined "fetus" have not been
motivated by a desire to assure medical personnel that medical termi-
nology is recognized in the law. Instead, they seem to have used such
definitions as another way of sniping at the Supreme Court.165
For example, Illinois states that "fetus" and "unborn child" each
means a human being from fertilization until birth.166 Kentucky de-
fines "fetus" the same way.' 6 7 Other states use the term "unborn
child" to the same effect.168 To the extent that these provisions serve
to vent legislative steam and soothe right-to-life constituents, no
harm is done. If, however, they are intended to limit the availability
of medically indicated abortions, they are a nullity under the
Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine.
e. "Trimester."
A few statutes contain definitions of trimesters, perhaps because
that is significant under Roe v. Wade.169 Idaho defines the first tri-
mester as the initial thirteen weeks of pregnancy,170 the second tri-
mester as the portion of gestation between the( fourteenth week and
viability,171 and the third as the segment after viability. 72 Penn-
§ 3203 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(f) (Law. Co-op. 1977); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-6401(a)(vi) (1977).
164. See supra note 19.
165. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
166. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(9) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
167. KY. REV. STAT. § 311.720(5) (1983).
168. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12K (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.015(5) (Vernon 1983) ("[h]uman offspring from conception until birth at every
stage of biological development"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(2) (West 1984)
("from the moment of conception, through pregnancy, and until live birth including
the human conceptus, zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo amd fetus").
On Canadian doctrine, see Weiler & Catton, The Unborn Child in Canadian Law, 14
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 643, 645-47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Weiler & Catton]; Note,
Abortion Law in Canada: A Need for Reform, 42 SASK. L. REV. 221, 232-38 (1977).
169. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
170. IDAHO CODE § 18-604(4) (1979).
171. Id. § 18-604(5). The provisicn sets out a conclusive, irrebuttable presumption
sylvania uses a period of twelve weeks for the first trimester.173 Illi-
nois delineates the first trimester as twelve weeks from ovulation
rather than computed on the basis of menstrual cycle,174 whereas
South Carolina computes it from conception. 175 Indiana divides each
pregnancy into three equal parts of three months each.176
In 1983, the Supreme Court selected the beginning of the last men-
strual period experienced by a woman before impregnation as the
means to define trimester.177 The Court adhered to this trimester
analysis as "a reasonable legal framework for limiting a State's au-
thority to regulate abortions."'178 To the extent that state legislatures
use a variant definition to limit the availability of abortions which
the federal constitution guarantees, they invite invalidation of the of-
fending provisions.179
f. "Viability."
The point of viability is important under the Supreme Court's de-
lineation of constitutionally protected abortion.SO The Court defined
viability as the point in a pregnancy at which "the fetus is 'potentially
able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid.'
Presumably the fetus is capable of 'meaningful life outside the
in favor of licensed physicians that the second trimester does not end before the begin-
ning of the 25th week of pregnancy. Id.
172. Id. § 18-604(6).
173. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3203 (Purdon 1983).
174. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(1) (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1984-1985). "Via-
bility" is the only other term defined. Id. § 81-22(2).
175. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(i) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (through 12th week); concep-
tion is defined id. § 44-41-10(g). The second trimester extends from the 13th through
the 24th week, id. § 44-41-10(j), and the third trimester from the 25th week through
termination of pregnancy. Id. § 44-41-10(k).
176. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1(a) (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1984).
177. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481,
2493 n.15 (1983).
178. Id. at 2492 n.11. See also Comment, The Trimester Approach: How Long Can
the Legal Fiction Last?, 35 MERCER L. REV. 891, 909-13 (1984).
179. A declaration of unconstitutionality is even more likely if criminal penalties
turn on ascertaining the stage of pregnancy. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-3 (Burns 1979
& Supp. 1984) requires a physician to determine viability and certify which trimester
of pregnancy the patient is in. Section 35-1-58.5-4 makes noncompliance a class C fel-
ony. If such a standard functions as an impediment to free implementation of a preg-
nant woman's constitutional claim to a therapeutic abortion, it will be struck down.
See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2493.
180. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. See also Special Project, supra
note 27, at 128-47; Note, Criminal Liability of Physicians: An Encroachment on the
Abortion Right?, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 600-01 (1981); Note, Viability and Fetal
Life in State Criminal Abortion Laws, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 324 (1981); Note,
Current Technology Affecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1221, 1239-42 (1982); Comment, Fetal Viability and Individual Autonomy:
Resolving Medical and Legal Standards for Abortion, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1340, 1356-63
(1980); Comment, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink
Abortion Law, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1194, 1202-14 (1982).
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mother's womb,' ... [which] 'is usually placed' at about seven
months or 28 weeks, but may occur earlier."1s1 Quite a number of
states have utilized that language or a near variant of it.182 This is
obviously the only safe course, because the Court has made it clear
that viability cannot be determined arbitrarily in terms of life, but
must rest on each woman's pregnancy. 8 3
g. "Live born."
Four statutes contain definitions of live birth and live born.184
These do not impact directly on abortion, but are relevant in connec-
181. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 63 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
at 160, 163). See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 386.
182. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-604(7) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(2) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (reasonable likelihood of sustained survival of fetus outside
womb, with or without artificial support); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1(e) (Burns 1979
& Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.20 (West 1979) ("indefinitely outside womb";
"[tihe time . . . may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a
particular fetus is viable is a matter of responsible medical judgment"); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 311.720(8) (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.5 (West Supp. 1984) (indefinitely
outside womb); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411(2) (West Supp. 1984); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.015(6) (Vernon 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(6) (Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.1-02(7) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(3) (West 1984); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 3203 (Purdon 1983) (stage of fetal development, when in the physician's judg-
ment "in light of the most advanced medical technology and information available...
there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained survival of the unborn child outside the
body of ... [the] mother, with or without artificial support."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(b)(3) (1982) (in providing infor-
mation for women, physician must describe in equivalent terms); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-
101(a)(vii) (1977).
183. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64-65. There is latent difficulty
in, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411(2) (West Supp. 1984) ("[d]uring the second half of
its gestation period a fetus shall be considered potentially 'Ndable' "), if that is intended
to extend the limitations on post-viability abortions to women whose fetuses are not
yet viable. South Carolina establishes a presumption of viability no sooner than the
24th week of pregnancy. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1977). This is ac-
ceptable if a woman with a viable fetus can obtain an abortion based on medical con-
siderations not related to her life and health (assuming that does not infringe the
constitutional status of the fetus, an implication of its Roe v. Wade analysis the Court
has not yet explored), but unacceptable if invoked to deny an otherwise proper abor-
tion to a woman who has not experienced fetal life by the 24th week of pregnancy.
Viability constitutionally may be defined in terms of a reasonable likelihood that a
fetus is capable of sustained survival outside the uterus. Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp.
464, 468-69 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
See also Fromer, supra note 5, at 237-39.
184. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) ("[i]t shall not
be construed to imply that any human being aborted is not an individual under the
Criminal 'Code of 1961.' "); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1595 (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.1-02(4) (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (Purdon 1983) ("human being
was completely expelled or extracted from her or his mother and after such separation
breathed or showed evidence of any of the following: beating of the heart, pulsation of
tion with legal responsibility to safeguard the lives of viable fetuses
born alive during or as a consequence of an abortion.185
2. Persons Performing Abortions
Roe v. Wade was explicit that abortion is a medical matter and that
licit abortions must be performed by professionally qualified per-
sons. 186 Accordingly, therapeutic abortion laws are uniform in re-
stricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians.1s 7 The
the umbilical cord, definite movement of voluntary muscles or any brain-wave
activity").
185. See infra notes 347-51, 437-39 and accompanying text. In Constitutional Right
to Life Comm. v. Cannon, 117 R.I. 52, 363 A.2d 215 (1976), the court held that states are
bound by the chronological approach of the Supreme Court to accommodate the con-
flicting private and public interests.
186. 410 U.S. at 165. Abortion may be inferred to be a medical matter from the
wording (i.e., the first trimester decision is left to the "medical judgment of the preg-
nant woman's physician"). I
187. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951
(West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31a(c)
(West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN
§ 390.001(1)(a), (3) (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-140(a) (1982); IDAHO
CODE §§ 18-604(2), 18-608, 18-609 (1979), and 18-606(2) (hospital, nurse or other health
care personnel do not commit a crime if in good faith they provide abortion-related
services in reliance on the directions of a physician or pursuant to a hospital admission
authorized by a' physician); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-22(3), 81-23.1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-58.5-1(d), 35-1-58.5-2(1)(A) (Burns 1979 &
Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (1981);
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 311.720(7), 311.750 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(8.1), (9)
(West Supp. 1984) (unless physician lacks training and experience to perform the pro-
cedure); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(1), (3)(A) (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE
ANN. §§ 20-207, 20-208(a) (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §§ 12L, 12M
(West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(1)(1) (West Supp. 1984) (or physician in train-
ing under supervision of licensed physician); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (Vernon 1983);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(1)(a) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT § 28-335 (1979) (abortion by
other than a licensed physician a felony); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.250(1)(a) (1983) (in-
cluding physician in employ of United States); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (1978);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1975) (abortion by duly licensed physician is
justifiable under certain circumstances); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.45.1(a), (b) (1981); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14.02.1-04(1) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731(A) (West 1984); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(a) (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20 (Law. Co-op.
1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-23A-1(2) (including physician in employ of
United States), 34-23A-3 to -5 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c) (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-301(2) (1978 & Supp. 1983), 76-7-302(1) (1978) (including qualified
physician in federal employment); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-72 to .2-74 (1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (1977); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-6-101 (a)(v), 35-6-103, 35-6-111 (1977)
(statutory references are to physicians performing abortions, and abortion by other
than a physician is punishable as a felony).
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 151(b)(1) (Supp. 1983), refers to licensed physicians during
the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, but subsections (2) and (3) limit abortions thereafter
to those performed by licensed surgeons or gynecologists. If there is no supportable
medical basis for that limitation, and it serves to make otherwise lawful abortions less
readily available than would normally be the case, the latter limitation is unconstitu-
tional under City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2509-12.
If a state legislature does not legitimate therapeutic abortions performed by licensed
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converse of this is that persons other than physicians who perform
abortions can be punished.'8 8 Perhaps a potential area of litigation
lurks concerning whether nurses or medical paraprofessionals can be
prosecuted under such statutes. Often these individuals, who are su-
pervised by licensed physicians and who follow accepted medical
techniques in performing therapeutic abortions, appear to be covered
by criminal statute, because they are not licensed physicians. One
may assume that if a restriction of lawful abortion to licensed physi-
cians is not consonant with accepted medical practice, and a conse-
quence is the impediment of pregnant women in their quest for
lawful abortions, the restriction is constitutionally unacceptable.' 8 9
3. Physician-Patient Consultation
The Supreme Court has spoken of abortion as something based on
physician-patient consultation,190 because consent by the patient is a
condition to lawful abortion. 191 Counseling is reflected in different
ways in legislation. It may be sanctioned for minors,192 or posited as
an appropriate subject of administrative regulation.193 As a form of
consumer protection law, institutions announcing the availability of
counseling services must have qualified staff members to provide
them.'94 Illinois and Pennsylvania specifically require it as a condi-
tion for a determination that an abortion is necessary.19 5
Some legislation,196 however, clearly states that it is ancillary to
more elaborate statutory requirements concerning information which
physicians, a court must read in that exemption from penal law coverage. See, e.g.,
People v. Bricker, 389 Mich. 524, 208 N.W.2d 172 (1973).
188. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam). See infra notes 412-15
and accompanying text.
189. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2509-12.
190. See id. at 2493.
191. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65-61. See infra notes 232-40 and
accompanying text.
192. Eg., V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 291(a) (1977) (public or private hospitals, institu-
tions and personnel may counsel minors concerning pregnancy, including abortion).
193. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.1(B)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (with
legislatively mandated content); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.723(b)(2)(a) (1983) (but with leg-
islative objectives specified); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.341(A)(5) (Page 1980).
194. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.063 (Vernon 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-736
(West 1984).
195. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.1(B)(1)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985)
(administrative regulations must provide for, this); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(b)
(Purdon 1983).
196. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-736 (West 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-
23A-10 (1977) (physicians must make available to patients at request information about
must be communicated to pregnant women before they can consent
to abortion. If the informational process functions to deter or impede
decisions to have abortions, it is unconstitutional,197 and associated
counseling requirements will fall with it.
4. Information to Patients
An informed consent is a prerequisite to a lawful therapeutic abor-
tion.198 A patient must be given information about "just what would
be done and . ..its consequences," 199 and state legislation may en-
sure that the abortion decision is made "in the light of all attendant
circumstances-psychological and emotional as well as physical-that
might be relevant to the well-being of the patient."200 In the case of
immature minors, state concerns to protect pregnant girls and to pro-
mote family integrity justify special measures to ensure that "the
abortion decision is made with understanding and after careful delib-
eration." 2 1 A sizeable number of states have picked up on this di-
mension of the Court's jurisprudence, in some instances to
implement its intent, but at other times with an obvious purpose of
scaring patients away from decisions to seek abortions. The latter
form of legislation has produced a new level of constitutional inter-
vention by the Court.202
Statutes call for communicating information that, in a physician's
best professional judgment, a woman is pregnant 203 and the length of
the pregnancy to the time of consultation.204 They require informa-
professional social service and counseling service agencies in the state providing a full
spectrum of alternative solutions for problem pregnancies).
197. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
198. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67, 85. See also City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2499-2500.
199. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.7.
200. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 394.
201. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2500
n.32.
202. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
203. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599 (Supp. 1984-1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.039(2)(1) (Vernon 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.253(1)(a) (1983) (a copy of the
pregnancy test results should be made available); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(5)(a)
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-3(d) (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(b)(1)
(1982).
204. E.g., ILL. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-23.2(1)(iii) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (ges-
tational age of fetus at time abortion will be performed); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.726(2)
(1983) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599 (Supp. 1984-1985) (number of weeks
from probable time of conception); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2)(2) (Vernon 1983)
(same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.253(1)(b) (1983) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-
02(5)(b) (1981) (based on information provided by patient or medical and laboratory
evaluations); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)(iv) (Purdon 1983) (probable gesta-
tional age of unborn child at time abortion is to be performed); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
4.7-3(b) (Supp. 1984) (gestational age of fetus at time of disclosure); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-4-202(b)(2) (1982) (based on information provided by patient or medical and labo-
ratory evaluation).
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tion about the abortion procedure to be used,205 and the effects206
and risks207 associated with abortion. Three states call for patients to
be provided with the name of the physician who will perform the
abortion.208 Several authorize communication of any other informa-
tion a counselor believes significant to an informed consent.20 9 With
205. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(a)(1) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.025(2)
(West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1(f) (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1984); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(1)(4) (West
Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(3)(a) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(8)(b)
(Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-736 (West 1984) (such information must be
given before a hospital can advertise that it offers counseling services); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-4.7-3 (Supp. 1984); S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control R. 61-12, § 203(C)(3)
(1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(1) (1978); VA. CODE § 1.8.2-76 (1982).
206. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(a)(2) (1981) (probable effects of procedure
on woman, including effects on child-bearing ability and possible future pregnancies);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.025(2) (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(1)(4)
(West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2)(4) (Vernon 1983) (possible emotional
or psychological consequences); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(3)(b) (1983) (physical
and psychological effect); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.253(1)(c) (1983) (any known immedi-
ate and long-term physical or psychological dangers); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3205(a)(1)(ii) (Purdon 1983) ("[tlhe fact that there may be detrimental physical and
psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable"); S.C. Dep't of Health &
Envtl. Control R. 61-12, § 203(C) (1976).
207. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(a)(4) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-
23.5(1)(ii) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (particular medical risks associated with par-
ticular abortion procedure to be employed); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.726(2) (1983) (same);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599 (Supp. 1984-1985) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983) (possible complications associated with use of procedure and
performance of abortion itself); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2)(4) (Vernon 1983) ("imme-
diate and long-term physical dangers of abortion and psychological trauma resulting
from abortion and any increased incidence of premature births, tubal pregnancies and
still-births following abortion"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.253(1)(c) (1983) (similar lan-
guage to Missouri); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(5)(d) (1981) (same); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)(iii) (Purdon 1983) ("[t]he particular medical risks associated
with the particular abortion procedure to be employed including, when medically accu-
rate, the risks of infection, hemorrhage, danger to subsequent pregnancies and infertil-
ity"), § 3205(a)(1)(v) (medical risks associated with carrying child to term) (Purdon
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-3(d) (Supp. 1984) (but information need not be commu-
nicated if there is a medical basis, certified in writing in patient's record, for nondisclo-
sure); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(b)(6) (1982) (numerous benefits and risks are
attendant on either continued pregnancy and childbirth or to abortion depending on
patient's circumstances; physician to explain benefits and risks to best of ability and
knowledge of circumstances), 39-4-202(c) (particular risks associated with pregnancy
and childbirth and abortion or child delivery technique to be employed, including at
least a general description of medical instructions to be followed after abortion or
childbirth to insure safe recovery) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5(4) (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-76 (1982) (risks if any in her particular case to her health).
208. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.2(1)(i) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KY.
REV. STAT. § 311.726(2) (1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)(i) (Purdon 1983).
209. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.5(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (physi-
cian or persons associated with them can express personal views concerning the valid-
ity or importance of information required to be communicated); KY. REV. STAT.
the possible exception of certain language in the Missouri, Nevada
and North Dakota statutes bearing on the consequences of abortion,
which may or may not be supportable by current medical knowl-
edge,210 the information required to be given is compatible with the
Supreme Court's expectations. 211 This probably cannot be said, how-
ever, of requirements that pregnant women be told about the use of
anaesthesia or analgesics to prevent fetal pain,212 or information that
abortion is a major surgical technique. 213
A common legislative requirement is that a pregnant woman be
told about alternatives to abortion,2 14 including the availability of
§ 311.726(4) (1983) (same); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(3) (Vernon 1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.253(1)(h) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(5) (1981) (any other explanation of
information which in the exercise of the physician's best medical judgment is reason-
ably necessary to allow the woman to give an informed consent with full knowledge of
the nature and consequences of abortion); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-3(d) (Supp. 1984)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(2) (1978) (other factors deemed necessary to a vol-
untary and informed consent).
At least four states, Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-1985), Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.253(1) (1983), Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3208(a) (Purdon 1983), and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-5(c)
(Supp. 1984), require women to receive printed information in a language they can un-
derstand, with a notation whether an interpreter has been used during counseling.
Statutes in Rhode Island, id. § 23-4.7-5 (d), and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 34-23A-10.1 (Supp. 1984), allow for a copy to the patient at her request.
210. To the extent there is no significantly greater risk of premature births, tubal
pregnancies and stillbirths following induced abortion in comparison to spontaneous
miscarriages and normal childbirth, based on current medical experience, the statutory
language probably provides the "parade of horribles" which leads to constitutional in-
validation. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct.
at 2500. See also inkfra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
211. This pattern of legislation is constitutional, from indications in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2501, sustaining ordinance
language similar to most of the cited statutes.
212. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (class B misde-
meanor to fail to inform). This seems unconstitutional in light of Supreme Court com-
ments in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2500 n.34.
213. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(b)(4) (1982) (abortion in a considerable number of
cases constitutes a major surgical procedure). Such a warning was invalidated in City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2500 ("a dubious
statement"; trial court expert evidence supported a conclusion that it is a minor surgi-
cal procedure. Id, at 2500 n.35).
214. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(a)(5) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.025(2)
(West Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.729(1) (Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1599 (Supp. 1984-1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2)(6) (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(3)(c) (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(8) (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.253 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.1-02(5)(f) (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2)(i-iii) (Purdon
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-5(b)(1) (1984); S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control R.
61-12, § 203(C)(1) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(b)(5) (1982). The Massachusetts
statute was held constitutional in Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d
1006, 1020-21 (1st Cir. 1981).
During the 1984 presidential election campaign, both major political parties agreed
that education about alternatives to abortion was important. See Democratic Party
Platform of 1984, 42 Cong. Q. 1747, 1767 (July 21, 1984) ("family life education pro-
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services and financial aid,215 adoption 216 and counseling. 217 In several
states, public agencies supply forms and other information concern-
ing public and private agencies available to help women if they re-
quest. 218 One state provides that a woman cannot be denied public
assistance if she refuses to consent to an abortion.2 19
With some hesitancy, one can assume that these requirements,
standing alone, may be imposed constitutionally. The Court noted
that "a State is not always foreclosed from asserting an interest in
whether pregnancies end in abortion or childbirth,"220 and informa-
tion about alternatives and support services appears to be as neces-
sary for an informed selection among alternatives as information
about the medical dimensions of abortion and childbirth.
The same cannot be said, however, of statutory requirements that
patients be told the specifics of fetal development and characteristics.
Utah has gone the farthest in this regard,221 but several other states
require similar information.222 The Supreme Court voided language
grams . . . aimed at reducing the need for abortion"); Republican Party Platform of
1984, 42 Cong. Q. 2096, 2110 (Aug. 25, 1984) (commending organizations "providing pos-
itive alternatives to abortion by meeting the physical, emotional, and financial needs of
pregnant women and offering adoption services where needed").
215. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.5(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 311.729(1) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599 (Supp. 1984-1985); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2)(i) (Purdon 1983) (medical assistance benefits may
be available for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care), 3205(a)(2)(ii) (father is li-
able to assist in support of child, even if father has offered to pay for abortion) (Pur-
don 1983).
216. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
305(2) (Supp. 1983).
217. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-10 (1977).
218. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81.23.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KY. REV.
STAT. § 311.729(1) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3208(a)-(c) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-5(a) (Supp.
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5(1)(a) (Supp. 1983).
219. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983). The statute was sustained
as constitutional in Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1020-21 (1st
Cir. 1981). See also infra notes 485-89 and accompanying text.
220. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2500
n.33.
221. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5(1)(b) (Supp. 1983) requires the state department
of health to provide descriptions of "physical characteristics" of normal unborn chil-
dren at two-week intervals, "beginning with the fourth week and ending with the
twenty-fourth week . . . accompanied by scientifically verified photographs of an un-
born child" at each stage of development, including "information about physiological
and anatomical characteristics, brain and heart function and the presence of external
members and internal organs during the applicable stages of development."
222. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(a)(3) (1981) ("[f]acts of fetal development
as of the time proposed abortion is to be performed"); IDAHO CODE § 18-609 (Supp.
1984) (similar); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.5(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985)
typical of these statutes because it "would involve at best speculation
by the physician."223 Therefore, one may doubt that a physician or
counselor constitutionally could be prosecuted for a failure to comply
with legislative requirements which seem on their face to be in-
tended to discourage free choice of abortion, and not to provide neu-
tral information relevant to a woman's decision.
In sum, although some of the specific information required under
several state laws cannot constitutionally be required of physicians,
most of the individual requirements are probably valid. Neverthe-
less, if one stands apart and surveys the totality of information man-
dated in some jurisdictions, particularly Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri,
Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Utah, the legis-
lative purpose seems clear-to discourage consents to abortion, a gov-
ernmental motive which the Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional. 224
There is one other dimension of unconstitutionality in many infor-
mation statutes. Some do not specify who must impart the informa-
tion,2 2 5 or allow for alternative sources to physicians.226 A number of
(probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of fetus at various gestational
ages at which abortion might be performed, including relevant information concerning
possibility of fetal survival); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.729(3) (1983) (same); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983) (information about stage of development of un-
born child); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2)(3) (Vernon 1983) (like Delaware); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(3)(a) (1983) (similar); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(5)(c) (1981)
(similar); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202(b)(i) (Purdon 1983).
223. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2500
(footnote omitted). See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 867-
68 (8th Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983) (plurality opinion) (wo-
man's decision was burdened insofar as anxiety and tension involved in such a decision
are increased without medical justification); Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti,
641 F.2d 1006, 1021-22 (1st Cir. 1981) (information not directly related to any medically
relevant fact, would cause many women "emotional distress, anxiety, guilt, and in
some cases increased physical pain"). There is no impediment to state regulations re-
quiring patient counseling without specifying the content. Birth Control Centers, Inc.
v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1984).
224. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2501: "By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible list of information, Ak-
ron unreasonably has placed 'obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [a woman
is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her decision.' " Id. (quoting Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977)).
225. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(a) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1(f)
(Burns 1979 & Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(1)(4) (West Supp. 1984); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-326(8) (Supp. 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(3) (Purdon
1983) (woman to certify in writing that she has received the information required),
§ 3205(a)(4) (physician must receive copy of woman's certification before performing
abortion) (Purdon 1983).
226. E.g., FLA. STAT. Ann. § 390.025(2) (West Supp. 1984) (covers only abortion
counseling or referral agencies); IDAHO CODE § 18-609(3) (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 18-23.5(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.729(4) (1983); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(3) (Purdon 1983) (woman certifies that physician or
agent has given required information); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-3 (Supp. 1984) (either a
physician or associated personnel or authorized agents to give information); S.C. CODI-
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states, however, require physicians, often on threat of criminal penal-
ties, to communicate the information personally.227 The Supreme
Court invalidated that approach in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health,228 although it confirmed that a physician can-
not abdicate his or her ultimate responsibility for the medical aspects
of abortion. Therefore, states can require physicians to verify that
adequate counseling has been provided by qualified persons and that
a patient's consent is informed.
One may also note in passing that only one state requires informa-
tion to be given to spouses.229 Presently no state requires parents' or
guardians' consent. 230 The legitimacy of these mandates turns on the
constitutionality of requiring spousal or parental consent.
231
5. Consent
a. General requirements.
As noted, medically indicated abortions must be consented to.232
This means a free choice on a woman's part-freedom from any coer-
cion.233 It is common to include the requirement of consent in legis-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-10 (1977) (triggered only by a patient's request for informa-
tion about counseling service agencies).
227. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599 (Supp. 1984-1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.039(2) (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-106(2) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.253 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-02(5), 14-02.1-03(1) (1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-4-202(b) (1982) (patient must sign form indicating physician has orally in-
formed her); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(2) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-76 (1982).
228. 103 S. Ct. at 2501-03. The Court reasoned that consent of a woman can still be
informed even though the physician has allowed another "qualified individual" to
counsel her. Id. at 2502.
229. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 18-23.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
230. A similar Missouri provision was held invalid in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 866 (8th Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983)
(plurality opinion).
231. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (spousal consent); infra notes
243-51 and accompanying text (parental consent).
232. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65-67. Cf. Guste v. Jackson, 429
U.S. 399 (1977) (court should not have invalidated state consent statute as far as wo-
men generally were concerned). See also Smith v. Bentley, 493 F. Supp. 916, 928 (E.D.
Ark. 1980).
233. That norm appears occasionally in legislation. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 707.8(3) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (procuring consent through force or intimidation a
felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(g) (Purdon 1983) (coercion of minor or mental
incompetent); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(b)(3) (1982) (obtain or procure abortion);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-312 (1978) (coercion to obtain abortion).
The issue arises indirectly from time to time. See, e.g., People v. Pointer, 151 Cal.
App. 3d 1128, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1984) (court could not require as a condition of proba-
tion following conviction of child endangerment that the defendant not conceive again;
this might force an abortion when there were other methods of forestalling future
child endangerment); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources,
297 Or. 562, 687 P.2d 785 (1984) (court invoked state constitutional provisions to invali-
date administrative regulation limiting number of elective abortions a woman could
have under public funding). Cf. Sanchez v. Sirmons, 121 Misc. 2d 249, 467 N.Y.S.2d 757
(Sup. Ct. 1983) (arbitration clause in a medical consent form was not binding in mal-
practice suit based on bungled abortion unless defendant physician established that the
woman knew she was waiving the right to a jury trial; the circumstances of an abor-
tion decision made such awareness unlikely).
A refusal to undergo an abortion cannot be asserted as a defense in a "wrongful
birth" action (see infra note 383) based on a claim that a plaintiff had brought about
the damages through her own choice. Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 185
Cal. Rptr. 76 (1982); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 163, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl.
1978) (any interpretation of traditional doctrine which would require an abortion
would be "an invasion of privacy of the grossest and most pernicious kind"). Nor is a
plaintiff required to mitigate damages by undergoing a second abortion after a bungled
one by a physician defendant. Delaney v. Krafte, 98 A.D.2d 128, 470 N.Y.S.2d 936
(1984).
A constitutional issue is inherent in statutory provisions, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 81-27, -28 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (physician and hospital must notify juvenile
court that infant has been born and juvenile court must determine whether it has been
abandoned); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-7(c), (d) (Burns Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.040 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(2) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.1-03 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-18 (1977) (all facts and circum-
stances involving birth and abortion are relevant and material evidence in parental
rights termination, dependency or neglect proceedings; state department of social serv-
ices may commence proceedings); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-207 (1982); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 15.022 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (action to terminate parental rights may be based
on abortion other than to save woman's life), that after a consent has been filed and a
live birth results, the child is deemed abandoned and a ward of the state unless the
consent is retracted before birth occurs.
The constitutionality of such provisions appears suspect. Cf. Freiman v. Ashcroft,
584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 941 (1979) (court invalidated statutory re-
quirement that physician inform patient of that consequence). The Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 62 n.2, found that the physician plaintiffs
lacked standing to attack this portion of the Missouri statute. See also Parness &
Pritchard, supra note 110, at 293-95.
In instances of termination of the rights of a mother, one should consider Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), in which the Court acknowledged
that "a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and manage-
ment of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants defer-
ence and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection'." (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). Hence, a state which terminates that interest "will
have worked a unique kind of deprivation." Id. "A parent's interest in the accuracy
and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a com-
manding one." Id Consequently, a hearing meeting the administrative due process re-
quirements established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), is a prerequisite to
termination of parental rights. An automatic termination by statute, or based on pre-
sumptions of neglect resting on consents to lawful postviability abortions, does not
meet that constitutional standard. Cf Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816, 847-56 (1977) (foster parents had a limited liberty interest in termination of
custodial status, but state procedures amply recognized Mathews v. Eldridge concerns).
A husband presumably would have equivalent claims.
As to putative fathers (fathers of children born outside marriage), the Court has in-
dicated that they must be given an opportunity to develop a relationship with their
children. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983). Only if they do not avail
themselves of such an opportunity can their claims to parental status be terminated
summarily through adoption proceedings. Id. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978). Otherwise, they have procedural protections, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
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lation,234 quite frequently with the additional mandate that a consent
be in writing235 or certified.236 Consent may be dispensed with only
in cases of immediate threat to a woman's life 237 or health.238 Other-
wise, crimina239 or civi1240 sanctions may be pursued against those
(1972), which as a matter of equal protection must be equal to those an illegitimate
child's mother enjoys. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (sex bias violates
equal protection clause). These holdings, too, seem to preclude invocation of the above
state statutes against fathers of illegitimate children.
234. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (Supp. 1982) (at woman's request); IDAHO
CODE § 18-609 (Supp. 1984); and § 18-610 (1979) (refusal to consent is binding irrespec-
tive of nonage or incompetency); IowA CODE ANN. § 707.8(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985);
KY. REV. STAT. § 311.726 (Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(1)(4) (West Supp.
1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney
1975) (abortion not justified without consent); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070(a) (1977).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(f) (Purdon 1983) forbids any court, judge, executive
officer, or administrative agency to issue orders, other tham in instances of a medical
emergency, to require abortions without express, voluntary consent, and WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 66.04(1)(m) (West Supp. 1984) prohibits payment of incentive funds for
abortions.
235. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)
(West Supp. 1984); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-214(c)(1) (1982) (refusal to con-
sent cannot be penalized); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S, and § 12Q (West 1983)
(must be delivered to physician performing abortion [presumably, in referral cases]);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.027 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-104(3), 50-20-
106(2) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-326(8), 28-327 (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.252 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738(A)(2) (West 1984) (physician's report
must indicate who signed consent form); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.435(1) (1983); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(3) (Purdon 1983) (informed consent requires certification by
woman that required information has been given her); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-2 (Supp.
1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(h) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (form must be witnessed); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(a) (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(1) (1978); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 151(b) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-76 (1982).
236. Women may be required to certify they have been given the information re-
quired by statute. See supra notes 198-224 and accompanying text. See, e.g., ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(1) (Supp. 1983-1984); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 20-
211(d) (Supp. 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(3) (Purdon 1983). A physician
may be required to certify the same thing as a condition to receiving a valid consent.
See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.045 (Vernon 1983) (requires that woman shall certify in
writing); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-106(2) (1983).
237. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(b) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(c)
(West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2(1)(B) (Bums Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.412(2) (West Supp. 1984) (unlawful to perform abortion on unconscious wo-
man unless unconscious for purpose of abortion or necessary to save woman's life);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-106(3) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327 (Supp. 1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.252 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30(a) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (and un-
less woman has been adjudicated mentally incompetent).
238. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-609(5) (Supp. 1984) (grounds recognized in law); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 38-23.2(B)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (medical emergency);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8(2) (West 1979) (life or health of pregnant woman or fetus).
239. E.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(c) (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
who perform abortions.
b. Consent by minor.
A pregnant minor must consent to an abortion like her elders.
This is noted specifically in some statutes,241 subject to an emergency
exception.242 The bulk of litigation, however, has been generated by
requirements of consent by parents or legal guardians.243
c. Consent by parent or guardian.
It has been common to require consent by both parents,244 one par-
ent 245 or a guardian 246 before an unmarried, unemancipated minor
ANN. § 34-23A.10.2 (Supp. 1984) (and matter reported to professional disciplinary au-
thority); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-314(2) (Supp. 1983).
240. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(d) (Purdon 1983) (physician who complies
with consent provisions is not civilly liable).
241. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.027(3) (Vernon 1983) (emancipated minor must con-
sent like adult); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (1984) (at request of minor and parent or
guardian); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2602(A)(3) (West 1984) (general consent law); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(a) (Purdon 1983) (pregnant minor and a parent). Occa-
sionally, a general consent law allowing minors, capable of doing so, to consent to med-
ical techniques contains a specific exception in cases of abortion. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 88-2902 (1981). That might suggest an equal protection violation, unless there is
a medical basis to support the exclusion-a medical basis difficult to document in light
of, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972), and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
242. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(3) (Vernon 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.030(2)
(1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2602(A)(3) (West 1984).
243. See infra notes 244-51 and accompanying text. Cf. State v. Norflett, 67 N.J.
268, 287-89, 337 A.2d 609, 619-20 (1975) (in prosecution against lay abortionist for con-
tributing to delinquency of minor, a minor can manifest delinquency by consenting to
abortion).
244. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981); ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2271 (Supp.
1984) (surgical consent law); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81.51-.54 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.732(1) (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12S (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4)(b) (West Supp. 1984) (if parent or
guardian authorizes abortion in writing, doctor need not comply with parental notice
provision); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(1)(a) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
738(A)(2) (West 1984) (reporting form must indicate who signed consent, including
parents).
245. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1790(b)(3) (1981) (if minor not residing in household with either of parents or guard-
ian); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(a) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-
54(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (remaining parent if one parent has died, deserted
his or her family or is unavailable); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983)
(surviving parent or divorced parent with custody); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(1)(1)
(Vernon 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-
03(2)(b), 14-02.1-03.1(1)(a) (1981) (for abortion after viability, a parent if living, a sur-
viving parent or custodial parent in cases of separation or divorce); 18 PA. CONST.
STAT. ANN. § 3206(a) (Purdon 1983) (one parent); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (Supp.
1984) (one parent); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30(b), (c) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (unmarried
and less than sixteen years of age or adjudicated a mental incompetent); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-76 (1982) (parent of woman adjudicated mentally incompetent).
246. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(3)
(1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-54(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
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can have an abortion. A guardian may be given the exclusive power
to decide whether someone judically determined to be mentally in-
competent may have an abortion.24 7
The constitutionality of these provisions has been the object of con-
siderable decisional law. During the first trimester of pregnancy, a
state cannot impose a blanket requirement that every pregnant mi-
nor obtain the consent of a parent or guardiail.248 A pregnant mi-
nor's consent controls if she is capable of giving it.249 If a minor is
§ 311.732(2) (Supp. 1984) (or person in loco parentis if no parent or guardian); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4)(b) (West
Supp. 1984) (if guardian authorizes abortion in advance, physician need not comply
with parental notice requirement); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(1)(1) (Vernon 1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-03.1(1)(b), 14-02.1-03.1(1)(a)
(1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738(2) (West 1984) (reporting form must indicate
whether guardian signed consent); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-41-30(b) (Law. Co-op. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070(a) (1977).
247. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2555 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(3)
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4) (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-
54(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.332(1) (Supp. 1984); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(a) (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30(c) (Law. Co-op.
1976); VA. CODE § 18.2-76 (1980).
248. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-75. See also Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Massachusetts statute requiring parental consultation and
consent).
249. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. See generally Buchanan,
The Constitution and the Anomaly of the Pregnant Teenager, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 553
(1982).
Danforth suggests the legal legitimacy of requiring parental consents to abortions
(or denials of consent) for minor mental incompetents. 428 U.S. at 75. See also Matter
of Barbara C., 101 A.D.2d 137, 474 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984) (hospitalized mentally-ill minor
could receive abortion when parent consented; no requirement of independent judicial
review).
Analogies for resolving the constitutionality and lawfulness of a guardian's or par-
ent's decision concerning abortion probably must be drawn from the jurisprudence re-
lating to sterilization of mental retardates. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(Court sustained constitutionality of sterilization statute invokable against "feeble-
minded" persons); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612-13 (Alaska 1981) (court approved use
of the same conditions as those established in In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264-65, 426 A.2d
467, 482-83 (1981)); In re Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1978), cert. denied sub nom. Tulley v. Tulley, 440 U.S. 967 (1979) (father of a men-
tally-retarded woman has no statutory authority to request a sterilization order); In re
A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981) (general parental consent statute did not allow parents
to approve sterilization of a mentally-retarded child); P.S. by Harbin v. W.S., 452
N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1983) (juvenile court had power to order ,sterilization of mentally-re-
tarded son with parental consent without specific enabling statute); Wentzel v. Mont-
gomery General Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147
(1985) (court has inherent parens patriae authority to entertain parental application
for sterilization of incompetent minor); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974) (juve-
nile court has no authority to order sterilization of minor female at parents' request);
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (court has inherent parens patriae juris-
diction to allow sterilization of noninstitutionalized female, at parental request, but
unmarried and unemancipated, and there is doubt whether the minor
can make an informed consent to an abortion, the Court has indi-
cated that either parental 250 or judicial 251 consent may be required.
If state statutes recognize complete discretion on the part of eman-
cipated (or married) minors to select abortion as the mode of termi-
nating their pregnancies, and provide expeditious judicial proceedings
to determine whether unemancipated minors are capable of choice,
they are constitutional. Many states, however, have not revised their
legislation to reflect the refinements expected by the Supreme Court.
d. Spousal consent.
The Supreme Court invalidated all requirements of spousal con-
sent,252 which has shifted legislative attention in most jurisdictions to
spousal notification as a condition to abortion.253 Nevertheless, a few
states continue to retain a requirement of spousal consent. 254 This
probably reflects a disinclination to recognize Supreme Court doc-
must find, among other things, that minor cannot understand nature and significance
of sterilization, incompetency is probably permanent, incompetent person is fertile and
capable of procreation); In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976) (court approved
sterilization order for mental retardate at parents' request); In re Guardianship of
Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (court has inherent power to order sterili-
zation of mentally-incompetent person at parental request, but should not do so unless
substantial medical evidence has been adduced establishing that sterilization is in the
best interests of the retardate; court established a presumption against sterilization
which proponents must overcome by clear, cogent and convincing evidence); In re
Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981) (established public
policy to allow sterilization of 22-year-old woman, incapable of consent, at insistence of
parents should be matter for legislation).
250. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2497-98 (explaining the Court's ruling in Bellotti). See also Planned Parenthood
League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1011-13 (1st Cir. 1981) (court rejected due process and
equal protection attacks on Massachusetts statute which required either parental con-
sent or judicial determination that minor was competent to consent).
251. See infra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
252. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67-72. Cf. Hagerstown Reproduc-
tive Health Servs. v. Fritz, 295 Md. 268, 454 A.2d 846, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3538 (1983)
(court vacated as moot an appeal of a lower court injunction, issued at a husband's re-
quest, against performance of an abortion until he consented because the abortion al-
ready had been performed); Coleman v Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 471 A.2d 1115 (1984)
(husband cannot enjoin medically indicated abortion for wife). English case law adopts
a similar position, although not, of course, on constitutional grounds. See Paton v.
Trustees of British Pregnancy Advisory Service, [1978] 2 All E.R. 987, [1978] 3 W.L.R.
687.
A corollary is that the father of a child cannot defeat his duty to provide financial
support for his child on the basis that he had not been given an opportunity to decide
whether a fetus should be aborted, or that he had offered to pay for a first-trimester
abortion. See People ex rel. S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982) (citing authorities).
253. See infra notes 263-70 and accompanying text.
254. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (Supp. 1984) (abortion must be at request
of woman and husband); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(b) (West Supp. 1984) (written
spousal consent to indicate notice and opportunity to consult; predecessor provision
held unconstitutional in Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), affd, 428 U.S. 901
(1976)).
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trine, but serves only to impel judicial nullification. If statutes refer
to spousal consent for minor married women and mental incompe-
tents,255 issues of constitutionality should be resolved on the basis of
parental consent in such instances. 256
e. Judicial approval for abortions.
The Court has required that if a minor is not emancipated, a state
may require either parental consent or a judicial determination in
lieu of it.257 If there is no specific legislation, a parental consent re-
quirement will be ruled unconstitutional. 258 Several states have pro-
vided for such a judicial avenue.259
If the procedures are clear and expeditious, such legislation will be
sustained as a legitimate alternative to parental consent for minors
incapable of giving it.260 However, if a court concludes that a minor
is competent to give an informed consent, it can only certify that fact,
allowing the minor to exercise her Roe v. Wade rights. The state
cannot forbid an abortion because it believes a woman should not
have one. The latter determination is to be made only if the minor is
not capable of consenting; denial of an abortion then must rest on a
showing that abortion is inimical to her best interests.26 1
6. Notice to Parents and Spouses
When most legislation requiring parental or spousal consent to
255. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2555 (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30(c) (Law. Co-
op. 1977).
256. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 250.
258. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2498-99. See also Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2525-26 (1983) (plu-
rality opinion).
259. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(B)(2) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(4)(a) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-54(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (Burns Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 311.732(3)-(6) (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. :112, § 12S (West 1983); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6) (West 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028(2) (Vernon 1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-347(2) (Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(2) (1981); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(c)-(f), (h) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (Supp.
1984).
260. See generally Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 480-82 (5th Cir. 1981); Zbaraz
v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1460-62 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (procedures inadequate because
there was no expedited judicial review and minor's anonymity was not protected;
prefiling assistance is not required).
261. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2498-99; on a requirement of good cause, see Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,
103 S. Ct. at 2526 (plurality opinion).
abortion fell before the Court's constitutional axe, a number of states
substituted requirements that parents262 or spouses263 be given no-
tice26 4 before an abortion is performed.265 Sometimes the same litany
of information required to be given a patient 266 must be given along
with the basic notice.267
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly in a majority opinion
on the constitutionality of such notice statutes. Statutes that require
information to be given to parents or spouses which, if communicated
to pregnant women, would place an obstacle in the way of free choice
may be unconstitutional, because they are designed to increase pres-
sures from family members against abortions.
If notice is restricted to the fact of abortion, but goes to one whose
consent cannot be required constitutionally, one may ask what func-
tion it is to play. Language in some of the opinions in H.L. v. Mathe-
son 268 suggests that if a pregnant minor is not emancipated, but still a
part of a family unit, a parental notice requirement promotes familial
262. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(A) (Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1597(2) (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1982) (notice not required
if minor does not live with parent or guardian and a reasonable effort to give notice is
unsuccessful or if notice may lead to physical or emotional abuse of minor; physician is
not civilly or criminally liable for decision not to give notice on latter basis); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4)(c) (West 1984) (not required if minor declares she is a victim
of sexual abuse as defined in § 626.556); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107(1)(b) (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347(1) (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255 (1981) (if possible
to notify); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(f) (1982) (if parents cannot be located, then to
agency or other individual to whom the minor's custody has been transferred).
263. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.4(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KY.
REV. STAT. § 311.735 (1983) (within 30 days after abortion if reasonably possible);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107(1)(a) (1983) (unless husband is voluntarily separated);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.254 (1981) (unless woman is legally separated from husband or
has obtained a judicial declaration of paternity stating that a man other than the hus-
band is father of the unborn child); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.8-2 (Supp. 1984) (if notice is
reasonably possible), 23-4.8-3 (unnecessary if woman furnishes written statement that
she has given notice to her husband, that the fetus was not fathered by the husband,
that the woman is separated from her husband, or that she has filed for divorce; or
husband gives physician written notice that he has been notified); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-304(2) (1978).
See Note, Spousal Notification; An Unconstitutional Limitation on a Woman's
Right to Privacy in the Abortion Decision, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 531 (1984).
264. Some statutes provide for notice by certified or registered mail if notice is not
communicated orally. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1597(2) (1980) (if cannot notify
orally or by mail, must notify state department of human services in writing of inabil-
ity to give notice and of intention to perform abortion); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN.
§ 20-103(d) (Supp. 1983) (proof of mailing is conclusive evidence of notice); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-347 (Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1981).
265. Notice statutes frequently require a 24 or 48 hour waiting period after notice
before an abortion can be performed. The constitutionality of waiting periods gener-
ally is discussed infra notes 326-36 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 203-23 and accompanying text.
267. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.4(A)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1981).
268. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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harmony and an ability on the part of parents to help a daughter
make an informed choice. Alternatively, if a minor is emancipated or
alienated from her parent, a requirement of parental notice would
appear to impose a burden on the minor's free choice and thus be un-
constitutional.269 If a spousal consent requirement is unconstitu-
tional, and notice is a preliminary to an exercise of a power to
consent, one may doubt the constitutionality of a duty to inform im-
posed on physicians. Conversely, if the maintenance of interspousal
harmony is promoted by a notice requirement, and that goal is not
outweighed by its impact on a woman's free exercise of discretion
under Roe v. Wade, there is at least an arguable basis for sustaining a
spousal notice requirement. 270
7. Grounds for Abortion
a. Incest.
Several states have continued their pre-Wade coverage of incest as
a humanitarian basis for abortion 271 in current. statutes. 27 2 Laws of
this nature should be unconstitutional if they are invoked to prevent
abortions otherwise medically justified under Roe v. Wade,273 but if
269. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 148, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1981),
affjd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983)(plurality opinion). Cf. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983) (requirement that no-
tice be given minor's parents concerning provision of contraceptives invalidated as con-
trary to federal statutory policy and invasive of minor's privacy); Note, The "Squeal
Rule" and a Minor's Right to Privacy, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 497 (1984) (discussion of
federal Department of Health and Human Services proposed "squeal rule" requiring
federally-funded family planning agencies to notify parents that their minor children
have obtained prescription contraceptives).
270. See Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 482-87 (5th Cir. 1981) (remanding for a
district court determination whether a husband's concern for a more than de minimis
decrease in his wife's procreative potential following an abortion, outweighed the influ-
ence of a spousal notice requirement on the wife's abortion decision). Cf. Hagerstown
Reproductive Health Servs. v. Fritz, 295 Md. 268, 454 A.2d 846, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3538 (1983) (court vacated as moot an appeal against a lower court's issuance of an in-
junction of an abortion, at a husband's request, because abortion had already been
performed).
271. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
272. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2554 (1977) (criminal statute); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25951(c)(2) (West 1984), CAL. PENAL CODE §j 274 (West Supp. 1984) (ex-
empts such abortions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(b) (Supp. 1984) (within first 16
weeks of pregnancy; limitation held unconstitutional in People v. Norton, 181 Colo. 47,
507 P.2d 862 (1973)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(3)(a) (1981); IDAHO CODE § 18-
608(1) (1979) (limited to first trimester); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (1981); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C)(4) (1984).
273. Because they are not reported or are not within tine limitations, for example.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2554 (1977) (must be reported within 7 days); COLO. REV. STAT.
they legitimate abortions not based strictly on medical consideration
(assuming pregnancies from such causes do not cause sufficient emo-
tional trauma to constitute a medical ground), they probably are
constitutional.2 74
b. Rape.
Rape as a humanitarian ground for abortion, recognized before
1973,275 continues to be acknowledged in some legislation.276 In some
instances, the individual is subject to reporting or confirmation re-
quirements. 277 The constitutionality of such provisions turns on the
same considerations mentioned in the context of incest as a ground
for abortion. 278
c. Physical or mental defect in child if born alive.
Abortion based on eugenic considerations was acknowledged in
some states before Roe v. Wade,279 and continues today.28 0 The con-
§ 18-6-101(b) (Supp. 1983) (within first 16 weeks of pregnancy); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(1)
(1979) (within first trimester).
274. This would require a consideration of whether the Court's concern in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65, over the "potentiality of human life" translates into a restric-
tion on abortions based other than on medical necessity. In context, however, the
Court's language is a limitation on a state's power to regulate abortions following via-
bility. Cf. the Court's language in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980), quoted in-
fra note 474 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
276. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2554 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25951(c)(2) (West 1984), CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1984) (exempting such
cases); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(3)(b) (1981); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(1) (1979)
(first trimester only; in cases of rape or felonious intercourse; all illicit intercourse
with female under 16 deemed felonious intercourse); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2)
(1981); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(a)(4) (Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-3(1)(b) (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C)(3) (1978).
277. E.g., MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(a)(4) (Supp. 1983) (if state's attor-
ney for county informs hospital abortion review authority in signed writing that prob-
able cause exists to believe alleged rape occurred); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C)(3)
(1984) (woman must submit to special hospital board an affidavit that she has been
raped and that rape has been or will be reported to appropriate law enforcement
officials).
278. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
280. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2554 (1977) (grave defect); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1790(a)(2) (1981) (substantial risk of grave and permanent physical deformity or
mental retardation); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(1) (1979) (physical or mental health, first
trimester only); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (life or health of fetus, final tri-
mester coverage); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (1981) (child born with physical or
mental defect); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(a)(3) (Supp. 1983) (substantial
risk of grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-5-1(C)(2) (1984) (child probably will have grave physical or mental defect).
Public funds are available for abortion on this ground in Virginia. VA. CODE § 32.1-92.2
(1982) (if qualified physician certifies in writing after appropriate tests a belief that fe-
tus will be born with gross and totally incapacitating physical deformity or mental
deficiency).
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stitutionality of this form of legislation turns on whether, in an
obverse application of Roe v. Wade priniciples,281 the potentiality of
human life in a fetus precludes abortions on this basis if not other-
wise medically indicated from the standpoint of maternal life or
health.
d. Maternal life.
As discussed earlier, for many years, in almost every jurisdiction,
abortions could be performed only to save the life of a pregnant wo-
man.28 2 Some states have continued this as the sole basis for lawful
abortions;28 3 in some instances only in later stages of gestation.28 4
There may be no constitutional barrier to recognizing this as an ex-
ception to an aggravating factor under penal statutes when abortiohs
are performed other than by licensed physicians in later stages of
pregnancies28 5 (even granted the rarity of cases in which a layperson
could properly manage abortions), or in limiting availability of public
funds for abortions unless preservation of maternal life is in-
volved.286 But limiting legislation of this sort is unconstitutional if
invoked to prevent a woman and her physician from reaching an
abortion decision within the parameters of Roe v. Wade. Perpetua-
tion of such statutes can be attributed only to legislative inertia or re-
281. See supra note 274. For a discussion of the matter of whether others may in-
tervene to contest a parental-physician decision not to use life support systems to pre-
serve an infant born with serious birth defects, see Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60
N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983) (lawyer with no disclosed relation-
ship to infant or her family could not obtain judicial authorization for surgery, overrid-
ing parental and physicians' decision not to provide extraordinary medical treatment
for infant born with spina bifida and other serious complications). See also Maguire,
Can Technology Solve the Abortion Dilemma?, 93 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 918 (Oct. 27,
1976); Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and Procedures for
Withholding Lifesaving Treatment From Infants, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1125 (1982).
282. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
283. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603 (1978); MIcB. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.14
(1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1974) (certified by two physicians to be neces-
sary); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-8 (1984) (good faith be-
lief in necessity); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(5)(b) (West 1982).
284. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1974) (quick child); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
23-5 (1981) (quick child).
285. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.010 (1977).
A similar restriction may be imposed through judicial interpretation. See, e.g., People
v. Bricker, 389 Mich. 524, 208 N.W.2d 172 (1973).
286. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.02(8)(13)(a) (We.st 1982) (public employee
health insurance plans may include abortions in which woman's life would be endan-
gered by carrying pregnancy to term). Constitutional aspects of withholding public
funding are discussed infra notes 462-74 and accompanying text.
luctance to acknowledge Supreme Court doctrine. 28 7
e. Maternal life or health.
Several states have continued a requirement that all abortions be
based on considerations of maternal life or health 288 frequently re-
stricted by a qualifying phrase such as "gravely impair."28 9 This form
of legislation, however, is unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade,290
which makes "medical judgment" the criterion during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy, and regulation of abortion procedures "reason-
ably related to maternal health" the standard during the period
before viability. Only after viability does the criterion of "preserva-
tion of life or health of the mother" become valid.2 9 1 Many states,
therefore, have legislated the "life or health" standard only for abor-
tions following viability 2 9 2 or after a stated number of weeks of
gestation. 2 9
3
The difficulty with the latter standard, however, is that, although
there may have been a basis in Roe v. Wade for use of a time stan-
dard as an alternative to viability, the Supreme Court has rejected it
in the setting of the place of performance of abortions. Viability is
287. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
288. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-7 (1982) (criminal code); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201
(1981) (see also United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3407(2) (1981); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4010 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c)(3)
(1982).
289. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2554 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25951(c)(1) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(4) (1981) ("substan-
tial risk of permanent injury"); MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(a)(1)-(2) (Supp.
1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C)(1) (1984); VA. CODE § 18.2-74 (1982) (substantial or
irremediable impairment). The pattern for the "gravely impair" qualifier is the Uni-
form Abortion Act § 1(b)(2) (1972). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 146 n.40 (quoting the
Act).
290. 410 U.S. at 164.
291. Id. at 164-65. See Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 471 A.2d 1115 (1984)
(invalidated state legislative restriction of abortions to those based on grave impair-
ment of maternal health, rape or likelihood of a seriously deformed child).
292. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-25(2) (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1984-1985);
IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-2(3)(c) (Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.780 (1983); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(8) (West Supp. 1984) (third trimester or after viability); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(4) (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.030(1) (Vernon 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(1)(c) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-329 (Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732(A) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(a) (Purdon 1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3) (1978) (if child is sufficiently developed to have any rea-
sonable possibility of survival outside womb).
293. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(2) (West Supp. 1984) (third trimester); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12M (West 1983) (24
weeks or later); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(3) (West Supp. 1984) (potentially viable);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.250(1)(c) (1983) (after 24th week); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3)
(McKinney 1975) (after 24 weeks); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(b) (1981) (after 20th
week); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(3) (1981) (after point at which fetus may reason-
ably be expected to have reached viability); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (Law. Co-op.
1976) (third trimester); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-5 (1977) (after 24th week of
pregnancy).
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the sole acceptable criterion in that context.294 Hence, application of
the "life or health" standard before actual viability in each pregnancy
risks a declaration of unconstitutionality if physicians are prosecuted,
sued or disciplined for performing medically indicated abortions in
the period between the beginning of the statutorily prescribed period
and viability.
f. General medical grounds.
Roe v. Wade legitimates the constitutional right of pregnant wo-
men to abortions before viability if medically indicated.295 Some
states acknowledge the constitutional norm only indirectly by legis-
lating specific standards following viability.293 Several others, how-
ever, have enacted the Supreme Court standard or an equivalent. 297
Such legislation has no observable constitutional defect, but is
superfluous.
8. Residency Requirements
A small number of states298 retain a residency requirement 29 9 lim-
294. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2494-95 (the Court endorsed a viability standard over a trimester test).
295. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 165-66. The medical determination may be
reached in light of all attendant circumstances. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
at 387-89; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 190-91.
296. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(5) (West Supp. 1984) (must use professional
skill to keep fetus alive if at all possible after viability); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1598(4)(A) (1980) (criminal liability for knowing disregard of fetus viability); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4164 (McKinney 1977) (viable born fetus given immediate legal
protection).
297. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (West Supp. 1984) (best clinical judgment that
abortion is necessary); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(1) (1979) (appropriate in medical judg-
ment based on factors including but not limited to physical, emotional, psychological or
familial); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.1(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (best med-
ical judgment; first trimester only); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(8.1), (9) (West Supp.
1983-1984) (unprofessional conduct to terminate pregnancy if contrary to or un-
necesssary in best medical judgment of physician); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12L (West 1983) (best medical judgment under all attendant circumstances); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.250(I)(b) (1983) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(a), (b) (Law. Co-
op. 1976) (pursuant to professional medical judgment); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 34-23A-3, 34-23A-4 (1977) (medically indicated); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c)(1)-
(2) (1982) (medical judgment of attending physician); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-303
(1978) (concurrence of attending physician based on best medical judgment), § 76-7-
304(1) (1978) (best medical judgment; must consider all facts relevant to woman's well-
being including but not limited to physical, emotional and psychological health and
safety, age and familial situation). Cf WYO. STAT. § 35-6-112 (1977) (a felony to use
other than accepted medical procedures to abort).
298. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981) (30 days); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2556
(1977) (four months unless life-threatening emergency); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1793
iting the availability of abortions. These statutes are unconstitu-
tional.30o Hence, their continued presence in statute books reflects
legislative inertia or unwillingness to acknowledge constitutional
doctrine.
9. Place of Performance
A few states retain requirements that all abortions be performed in
hospitals licensed by the state,301 accredited by outside agencies,3 0 2 or
both.303 Invoked as a limitation on performance of first-trimester
abortions, such restrictions violate the constitutional rights of preg-
nant women and their physicians.30 4 Language in Doe v. Bolton,
however, approved a prohibition against abortions performed after
the first trimester other than in a hospital. Accordingly, a lengthy
roster of states has legislated an in-hospital requirement.3 05
In hindsight, reliance on Supreme Court dicta proved unfortunate,
because, in 1983, the Court invalidated all statutes requiring perform-
(1981) (120 days; inapplicable if woman or spouse is employed in state, if woman is a
patient of a Delaware physician, or if there is a life-threatening emergency); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(d) (1982) (woman must prove bona fide residency; hospital
records must retain supporting documentation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070(b)
(1977) (90 days).
299. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
300. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 200; Smith v. Bentley, 493 F. Supp. 916, 929 (E.D.
Ark. 1980). Residency requirements affecting access to nonemergency hospitalization
or medical care at public expense constitute an invidious classification violating equal
protection and the constitutional right of interstate travel. Memorial Hosp. v. Mari-
copa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974).
301. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a)(1) (1981) (or hospital operated by federal
government or agency); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (1978) (held unconstitutional in
People v. Norton, 181 Colo. 47, 507 P.2d 862 (1973)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31a(c)
(West Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(5)(c) (West 1982) (unless emergency
prevents).
302. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(a) (West 1984) (accredited by Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals [JCAH]); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)
(1981) (accredited by nationally-recognized medical or hospital accreditation author-
ity); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (1984) (accredited hospital).
303. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2557 (1977) (licensed by state and accredited by
JCAH); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2)(a) (1981) (certificate of necessity for abortion to
be filed in hospital licensed by state and accredited by JCAH); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE
ANN. § 20-208(a) (Supp. 1983) (state licensed and JCAH-accredited).
304. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 193-95. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
305. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-608(2)-(3) (1979) (second and third trimesters); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-24 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (hospital inpatient after first
trimester); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.760(2) (1983) (after first trimester, unless emergency
to protect woman's life or health); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(8.1) (West Supp.
1984) (after first trimester; unprofessional conduct); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12Q (West 1983) (13th week or after); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.025 (Vernon 1983) (after
first 12 weeks of pregnancy); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(1)(b) (1983) (after first
three months of pregnancy); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4164(1) (McKinney 1977) (after
12th week, on hospital inpatient basis); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(b) (1981) (after 20th
week); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(2), (3) (1981) (after first 12 weeks of pregnancy);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731(B) (West 1984) (subsequent to first trimester); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Purdon 1983) (after first trimester); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
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ance of abortions in general hospitals from the beginning of the sec-
ond trimester of pregnancy through viability.30 6 A state must allow
abortions during that time to be performed in clinics and outpatient
facilities as well as hospitals. Statutes so providing are constitu-
tional.307 Several states have had such legislation in place for many
years.308
A few states have provided specifically for the licensing and regula-
tion of abortion clinics.309 Although the limited authority is not
unanimous, licensing is constitutional as long as its attendant require-
ments promote maternal health and do not impose unacceptable bar-
riers against a woman's free exercise of the right to choose
abortion.31o Requirements that designated personnel be in attend-
20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (third trimester); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c)(2)-(3) (1982)
(after three months).
On abortion services for women prisoners, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 220 (West
1984) (pregnant females in local juvenile facility may obtain lawful abortions).
306. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2520; City of Akron v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at 2495-97. The requirement im-
posed a significant burden on women wishing abortions, in terms of costs and
restricted availability of abortion services in full-service general hospitals. Medical
data recognized by the Court also established that abortions can be performed safely in
clinics or outpatient facilities during the second trimester to the time of viability.
307. In Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532, 2537-40 (1983), the Court sustained
the constitutionality of a state requirement that second trimester abortions be per-
formed in a hospital, defined to include clinics and outpatient facilities; the legislation
comported with good medical practice. Simopoulos had used the saline injection sys-
tem in his office and allowed the pregnant minor to go to a motel where she aborted;
his criminal conviction was held valid. Id. at 2534-35. See also Birth Control Centers,
Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 366 (6th Cir. 1984) (invalidating state requirement that sec-
ond-trimester abortions be performed at a clinic's parent hospital). Birth Control Cen-
ters rejected, however, an equal protection attack on a regulatory statute applicable to
clinics but not to private doctor's offices where abortions might be performed; no selec-
tive enforcement was established. Id. at 359.
308. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(b) (1982) (after first trimester); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-608(1) (1979) (during first trimester only); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2(3) (Burns
Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412 (West Supp. 1984) (after first trimester); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.250(2) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-451(a) (1981) (within first 20
weeks; in hospital thereafter); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-2((b)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(second trimester; in certified hospitals during third trimester); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 34-23A-4 (1977) (between 12th and 24th week, if hospital facilities unavailable);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301(3), 76-7-302(2) (1978); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-73, 18.2-74 (1982)
(validated in Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.02.070(c) (1977) (may terminate elsewhere if medical emergency makes abortion
immediately necessary).
309. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.014 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
§§ 157-8.1 to 157-8.16 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1984-1985); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE
ANN. § 20-203 (1982) (abortion referral services); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3207 (Pur-
don 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
310. Baird v. Department of Pub. Health of Mass., 599 F.2d 1098 (1st Cir. 1979);
ance although not mandated by medical needs,3 11 that equipment be
provided not dictated by good medical practice,3 12 or that clinic physi-
cians maintain a hospital affiliationSla have been declared
unconstitutional.
One may assume a similar vulnerability in statutes prohibiting fees
or compensation for abortion referrals3 14 or abortion referrals for
profit.3 15 Administrative search provisions may also infringe pa-
tients' rights to privacy.3 16 However, if regulations are otherwise con-
Florida Women's Medical Clinic v. Smith, 536 F. Supp. 1048, 1057-58 (S.D. Fla. 1982),
appeal dismissed, 706 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1983); Westchester Women's Health Org. v.
Whalen, 475 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care
Center v. Arft, 446 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz,
86 Ill. 2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981); Indiana Hosp. Licensing Council v. Women's Pavil-
lion of South Bend, Inc., 420 N.E.2d 1301 (Ind. App. 1981). Contra Word v. Poelker, 495
F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974) (facilities for first-trimester abortions); Margaret S. v. Ed-
wards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 223-24 (E.D. La. 1980) (facilities for first-trimester abortions);
Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter, 444 F. Supp. 12, 17 (N.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 610
F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 447 U.S. 918 (1980)
(ordinance covering only abortion clinics denied equal protection because other sur-
gery with equivalent medical risks could be performed in unlicensed facilities); Wright
v. State, 351 So. 2d 708, 711 (Fla. 1977) (term "approved facility" unconstitutional in
relation to first-trimester abortions, although it might be valid thereafter); People v.
Dobbs Ferry Medical Pavillion, 33 N.Y.2d 584, 301 N.E.2d 435, 347 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1973)
(terms "facility" and "clinic" in medical care facility licensing statute were overinclu-
sive and thus unconstitutional).
Efforts to use zoning regulations targeted at abortion clinics alone constitute an im-
pediment to exercise of Roe v. Wade rights. Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deer-
field Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1981); West Side Women's Services, Inc. v.
City of Cleveland, 573 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Framingham Clinic v. Board of
Southborough Selectment, 373 Mass. 279, 283, 367 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1977).
A statutory prohibition against performance of abortions at an educational facility
other than to save life, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-730 (1975), was sustained as consti-
tutional in Roe v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 113 Ariz. 178, 179, 549 P.2d 150, 151-52
(1976), in part because of the availability of abortion facilities elsewhere.
311. Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1984); Flor-
ida Women's Medical Clinic v. Smith, 536 F. Supp. 1048, 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1982), appeal
dismissed, 706 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1983).
312. Florida Women's Medical Clinic v. Smith, 536 F. Supp. at 1056. See also Birth
Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 366 (6th Cir. 1984) (invalidating a require-
ment that clinic corridors be 6 feet wide, as not reasonably related to the purposes of
clinic regulation).
313. Women's Medical Center of Providence v. Cannon, 463 F. Supp. 531, 537-38
(D.R.I. 1978) (invalidating requirement that physician performing first-trimester abor-
tions had to have unsupervised privileges at an accessible hospital).
314. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 311.820 (1983) (although some of the terms like "kick-
backs" are probably not objectionable as long as the practice is condemned in every
context; if only abortion is singled out, there is an equal protection problem); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(b) (Purdon 1983) (at least unless all other physicians and
clinics are under a similar disability).
315. E.g., MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-204 (1982).
316. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 214-17 (E.D. La. 1980). Basic admin-
istrative search doctrine is delineated, e.g., in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-606
(1981); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (and see Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct.
641 (1984)); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978); United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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stitutional, there should be no infirmity in legislation allowing
nuisance abatement proceedings against places where abortions are
performed in violation of law.317
10. Peer Approval
A few states have retained statutes requiring that all abortions be
concurred in by other physicians, 318 hospital review committees3 19 or
both.320 The Supreme Court invalidated both requirements, at least
as they pertain to first-trimester abortions. 321 Accordingly, legisla-
tion was approved in some jurisdictions requiring such approval in
the third trimester 22 or after viability. 323 Mandates of this sort are
probably constitutional if applied after viability, because the Court by
its judgment approved a requirement that a second physician be in
attendance at the time of an abortion after viability.324 Between the
beginning of the second trimester and viability, however, limitations
of this sort are likely to be viewed as barriers to women's free choice,
unless similar requirements govern other medical and surgical tech-
niques of approximately the same seriousness. There should be no
impediment to requirements that, if a consulting physician refers the
case to another physician for performance of an abortion, full medi-
317. See OR. REV. STAT. § 465.110 (1983).
318. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2558 (1977) (three physicians); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3407(2)(a) (1981) (three physicians); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3(2) (1972) (two repu-
table licensed physicians); WIS. STAT. § 940.04(5)(b) (West 1982) (two physicians).
319. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(b) (West 1984) (unanimous ap-
proval if no more than three licensed physicians and surgeons on staff committee);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1), (4) (1978) (ruled unconstitutional in People v. Norton,
181 Colo. 47, 507 P.2d 862 (1973)); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(b)(2) (Supp.
1983) (hospital abortion review authority); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C), (D) (1984)
(same).
320. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a), (b) (1981) (abortion review committee
plus two licensed physicians certifying necessity).
321. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 195-200. See also Smith v. Bentley, 493 F. Supp. 916,
927-28 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
322. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(2)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1984) (two physicians);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(c) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3) (1979) (one physician;
corraborated by consulting physician); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(one other physician); VA. CODE § 18.2-74(b) (1982) (two consulting physicians).
323. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(2)(b) (1983) (two other physicians); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(3) (1981) (two other physicians).
324. This was the result in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517,
2532 (1983)(plurality opinion), although there was no majority opinion. The provision
related to protection of live-born fetuses. See infra notes 147-51, 437-39 and accompa-
nying text.
cal details be transmitted. 325
11. Waiting Periods
One technique for delaying abortions is to impose waiting periods
between receipt of information required to be imparted to a wo-
man,326 her spouse327 or parent 328 and performance of an abortion,329
perhaps subject to an emergency exception if an abortion must be
performed to protect maternal life or, in some instances, health.330
Such requirements at times have been augmented by an ensuing
waiting period between a woman's submission of a signed consent
form and performance of an abortion,331 again subject to an emer-
gency exception.332
The Supreme Court has invalidated the latter form of waiting pe-
riod,3 33 as an arbitrary, inflexible limitation without a medical basis,
and a costly imposition which could require two separate trips to an
325. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.723(1)(b) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12R (West 1983).
326. See supra notes 203-28 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
329. Statutes triggered by information to pregnant women include IND. CODE § 35-
1-58.5-2(d) (Burns Supp. 1984) (24-hour period between receipt of consent form and
submission of signed form to physician); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599(1) (Supp.
1984-1985) (48 hours); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(1) (Vernon 1983) (48 hours); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2) (Purdon 1983) (24 hours); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 34-23A-10.1 (Supp. 1984) (24 hours); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(d) (1982) (two-day
minimum excluding day on which information was given); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
305.5(2) (Supp. 1983) (24 hours if possible).
Spousal information laws imposing a waiting period include ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 81-23.4(A)(1), (A)(2)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (24 hours; 72 hours if mail no-
tice); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.735 (1983) (before or, if not possible, within 30 days after);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.254 (1981) (24 hours if possible).
Waiting periods based on notice to parents or guardians of minor pregnant females
are found in: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980) (24 hours; 48 hours if mail no-
tice); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West Supp. 1984) (48 hours); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-347(1) (Supp. 1984) (24 hours; 48 hours if mail notice); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255
(1981) (24 hours); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1981) (24 hours; 48 hours if mail
notice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(f) (1982) (two days minimum).
330. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.2(A)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 311.735 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1597 (1980), 1599(1) (Supp.
1984-1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347(3) (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(f)
(1982).
331. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(b) (1981) (24 hours); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 81-23.2(A)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (24 hours); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.726(2)
(1983) (2 hours); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983) (24 hours); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.252 (1983) (24 hour minimum, 30-day maximum validity of consent);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1981).
332. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794(b) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-
23.2(A)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-10.1
(Supp. 1984).
333. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2503.
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abortion facility.334 Although the Court did not have before it a man-
dated waiting period between receipt of information and submission
of a consent, its rationale in Akron Center seems germane, particu-
larly in light of the Court's invalidation of several items of informa-
tion intended to discourage decisions to undergo an abortion.335
Legislatures are best advised to eliminate all time-delay require-
ments in light of the Court's flexible, medically-oriented approach to
counseling and consent.336
12. Abortion Techniques
a. General standard of care.
The Supreme Court's constitutional focus is on maternal health as
the sole concern after the first trimester of pregnancy, 337 based on
contemporary medical standards.338 Hence, no legislative statement
is required to establish positive medical standards for abortions; gen-
eral licensing requirements suffice. Nevertheless, there is no consti-
tutional defect in reaffirming, in the setting of therapeutic abortion
legislation, the applicability of usual standards of professional care. 3 3 9
334. The Kentucky imposition of a two-hour period might or might not run afoul of
such criteria. The Nevada and North Carolina fixing of a 30-day maximum period dur-
ing which consents are effective should prove valid, at least in the absence of an indica-
tion that other medical consent forms are not subject to equivalent time limitations. If
only abortion consent forms are so limited, there would appear to be an invidious clas-
sification violative of equal protection.
335. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text. A 24-hour waiting time for
purposes of notifying a minor's parents that a therapeutic abortion was to be per-
formed was invalidated in Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1458-59 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
336. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2503: "In accordance with the ethical standards of the proiession, a physician will ad-
vise the patient to defer the abortion when he thinks this will be beneficial to her. But
if a woman, after appropriate counseling, is prepared to give her written informed con-
sent and proceed with the abortion, a State may not demand that she delay the effectu-
ation of her decision."
337. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163: "It follows that, from and after [the end of the
first trimester], a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the reg-
ulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."
338. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2495-97. The Court concluded that the dilitation and evacuation technique for abortion
could be safely performed away from a general service hospital, at least until viability,
rendering a city ordinance requirement that all abortions after the first trimester be
performed at a hospital an unreasonable burden on women's free choice, not justified
on medical grounds.
339. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (1978) (licensed physician using ac-
cepted medical procedures); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-112 (1977); Dellapena, supra note 27, at
361-65, 411-14. To the extent, however, that more severe penalties are visited on those
otherwise allowed to perform abortions who use substandard abortion techniques,
Constitutional problems arise only when statutes purport to restrict
accepted medical practice.
b. Precluded techniques.
At least two states continue to forbid the use of saline amni-
ocentesis as an abortion technique after the first trimester of preg-
nancy, absent a special justification.3 4o The objective is to compel use
of other techniques which increase the possibility that a viable fetus
might be born alive. The Supreme Court has invalidated such
prohibitions as not reasonably related to maternal health, because
they proscribe techniques which pose less of a risk to maternal
health than those which would have to be used as an alternative. 341
Continuation of these statutes can only be attributed to a legislative
unwillingness to bow to Supreme Court mandate. Essentially, they
are dead letters as to enforceability.
There appears to be no constitutional objection to a legislative re-
statement of the Court's doctrine requiring medical personnel to use
all reasonable medical procedures to enhance the chance of a live
birth of a viable fetus if they are consistent with maternal health.342
Only if maternal health were relegated to a subordinate status would
there be a constitutional problem.343
c. Testing requirements.
Two states require blood typing and Rho-testing before an abortion
there may be an equal protection problem or a manifestation of disproportionality of
punishment to offense, violative of the eighth amendment. On the latter, see Solem v.
Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
340. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-29, and 81-26(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (if
there is a reasonable medical certainty that an abortion technique will cause pain to
fetus which use of anaesthetic or an analgesic will prevent or alleviate, physician must
inform woman of the technique which will forestall pain); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.770
(1983). Cf. WYO. STAT. § 35-6-103 (1977) (physician is not intentionally to terminate vi-
ability of infant prior to, during or following abortion).
341. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 78-79: "Moreover, as a prac-
tical matter, [the proscription] forces a woman and her physician to terminate her
pregnancy by methods more dangerous to her health than the method outlawed." See
also Note, Criminal Liability of Physicians: An Encroachment on the Abortion Right,
18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 604-05 (1981).
342. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(5) (West Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3)
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(3)-(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 120 (West 1983) (unless technique would create greater risk of
death or serious bodily harm to mother at time of abortion or subsequently during fu-
ture pregnancy; query, are the qualifiers constitutional under Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81-
84?); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.030(a) (Vernon 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-330 (Supp.
1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-734(C) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3210(b) (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-307 (1978).
343. On required protection of live-born fetuses in the context of abortion, see in-
fra notes 347-51, 437-39 and accompanying text.
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may be performed. 344 To the extent such a requirement applies to
second-trimester abortions before viability (and perhaps the stage of
viability), when survival after live birth is medically impossible, it is
probably unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's doctrine that
all limitations on abortion be supported by current medical practice
standards and paramount concerns for maternal health. If, in con-
trast, such legislation is interpreted to govern only those stages of
pregnancy when live fetal birth is a medical possibility, there is prob-
ably no impermissible barrier to an unfettered abortion decision and
its effectuation.
d. Attending physician.
Statutes occasionally require a second physician to be present when
a viable fetus is aborted. 345 The Supreme Court has sustained such a
legislative condition to abortion.346 Its rationale, as far as can be
gleaned from the judgmental majority's serial opinions, was that such
a requirement reasonably relates to preservation of the life or health
of a live-born fetus, without detrimental consequences to maternal
health.
13. Status of Infants, Fetuses and Fetal Tissue
a. Live-born infants.
There is no need for special statutes confirming that viable fetuses
born alive are persons entitled to the full protection of civil and crim-
inal law. Those who terminate human life, whether neonate or of
greater duration, whether intentionally, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence, may be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter, and in-
cur wrongful death liability. Nevertheless, some statutes confirm
long-established general legal principles in the setting of abortion
legislation by providing a definition of human life347 or confirming a
344. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12R (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
23A-6 (1977).
345. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.030(3) (Vernon 1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 4164(1) (1977) (after 20th week of pregnancy); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05 (1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732(E) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(c)
(Purdon 1983).
346. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2521-22, 2532 (1983)
(five Justices concurring in separate opinions).
347. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 12.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides alternative medical standards by which live
birth is to be determined.
duty, usually enforced by criminal penalties, 348 to care for fetuses
born alive.349 Other provisions, perhaps reflecting difficult proof
problems in establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the independent
human existence of a fetus/child, mandate a special obligation to
safeguard fetal life during abortion processes. 350 These are seemingly
constitutional as long as, expressly or through judicial interpretation,
the protection of maternal life or health takes priority over the pres-
ervation of fetal life.351
b. Experimentation involving fetuses.
Quite a number of states have prohibited experimentation with,
and research on, embryos and fetuses before35 2 and after 353 abor-
348. See infra notes 437-39 and accompanying text.
349. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.9 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
24, § 1795(a) (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(c) (1982) ("if capable of meaning-
ful or sustained life"); IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-7 (West 1984); IOWA CODE § 707.10 (1979);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:87.5 and 37:1285(28) (West Supp. 1984) (taking life of viable
fetus aborted alive is a basis for license revocation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1594
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.415
(West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(1) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-330
(Supp. 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(3) (McKinney 1982); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 4164(2) (McKinney 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.1-08 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-734(A), (C) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3202(b)(3), 3212(b) (Purdon
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-18 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-16.1
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-206(a) (1982); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.05(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1984); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-104 (1977).
350. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3) (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-24 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (measures for life support for fetus must be available and uti-
lized if there is clearly visible evidence of viability), 81-26(3) (1984); IOWA CODE § 707.7
(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.780 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.1 (West 1974);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West 1983) (must have life-support equipment,
as defined by state department of public health, in room where abortion is performed);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325(3) (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-734(C) (West 1974)
(all reasonable measures to preserve life of child alive when partially or totally re-
moved from uterus as long as such measures do not create a significant danger to wo-
man's life or health); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-206(a) (1982) (however, extraneous life
support measures need not be attempted if it can be determined through amni-
ocentesis or medical observation that a fetus is severely malformed); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976) (during parturition, destroying vitality or life if
child would have been born alive); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-308 (1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-
74(c)(1982); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-103 (1977).
The Tennessee exception is obviously based on eugenic considerations. See supra
notes 8-9, 80 and accompanying text.
See also the discussion of requirements that attending physicians be present during
abortions during viability, supra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 338-44 and accompanying text.
352. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302(A) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(6) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1593 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735(B) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3216(a) (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-
115 (persons consenting to, aiding or abetting traffic in viable aborted children commit
a felony).
353. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302(A) (Supp. 1984); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
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tions, and on stillborn354 and live-born 355 infants. Exceptions, how-
ever, are provided to cover acts done to advance fetal356 or
maternal 357 health, and for pathological examinations. 358 Traffickers
in fetal or neonate tissue for such purposes may be penalized.359
Limited authority sustains the constitutionality of such provisions.360
c. Tissue analysis.
Several states require that pathological examinations be performed
on dead fetuses and on removed fetal tissue,3 1 or at least contem-
CODE § 25956 (West 1984) (exempting public or private educational institutions); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-32 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a) (West 1983); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.2688(1)(West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West Supp. 1984);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-346 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 34-23A-17 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208(a) (1982) (includ-
ing photography); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
354. Eg., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(b)
(Purdon 1983).
355. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (written con-
sent from one parent in instances of stillbirth or fetal death not resulting from abor-
tion); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West
Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONr. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3)
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-346 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (1981).
356. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6) (West Supp. 1984) (protection of life or
health); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (protection of life
or health); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974) (life and health of live-born
child; preserve life or improve health of embryo or fetus); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422
(West Supp. 1984) (protect life or health); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983)
(same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1983) (same); NEB3. REV. STAT. § 28-346 (1979)
(same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735(A) (West 1984) (unless therapeutic to child or
unborn child); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Purdon 1983) (life or health of
child); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978) (allowed when, in a physician's best medical
judgment, a technique should be used to test for genetic defects).
357. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302(A) (Supp. 1984) (strictly necessary to di-
agnose disease or condition in mother, if abortion was performed because of that dis-
ease or condition).
358. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)(II) (West 1983); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.2688(1) (West 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02(1) (1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735(B) (West 1984). See infra note 4141.
359. E.g., IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-6 (1979) (transporting fetus out-of-state); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-342 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.2-02 (1981).
360. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 219-21 (E.D. La. 1980). See also
Destro, supra note 27, at 1315-16; Note, Ethical Standards for Fetal Experimentation,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 547 (1975).
361. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 83-32 (1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.047 (Vernon
1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(c) (Purdon 1983), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
plate that such examinations may properly be conducted.362 The
Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of such a require-
ment,3 6 3 apparently because tissue examinations are an incident to
surgical techniques, and do not impose a special economic hardship
on women desiring abortions.
d. Disposition of fetal remains.
Some states have legislated with reference to the disposition of fe-
tal remains, sometimes through specific criminal legislation,364 and
sometimes by recognizing the need for administrative regulations on
the matter.365 The Supreme Court invalidated a criminal statute re-
quiring physicians to ensure that fetal remains be "disposed of in a
humane and sanitary manner," on grounds of vagueness and indefi-
niteness. 366 Arguably, a purely administrative law approach is not
vulnerable as long as residual criminal penalities are not provided.
14. Records and Reports
With the recognition of therapeutic abortions came a concern for
documentation of the fact of and medical grounds for abortion.367
Since 1973, such requirements have become the norm. Physician and
hospital records may have to reflect consents36 8 and information
§ 34-23A-19(3) (1977) (if facility is equipped to complete pathology reports); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-309 (1978), 76-7-313(8) (1978 & Supp. 1983).
362. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-5(8) (Burns 1979) (physician's report to in-
clude results of pathological examination, if performed); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.341(3) (Page 1980) (public health council to adopt rules concerning pathological
reports following abortions).
363. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2522-25, 2532. There was
no majority opinion.
364. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-09 (1981) (physician performing abortion).
365. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 390.001(7), 390.012(1)(e) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 81-32 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (no exploitation of aborted fetus or
tissue); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.423(3) (West Supp. 1984) (child born alive and dying
after birth to be disposed of according to general statutes governing human burials);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4164(4) (McKinney 1977) (similar); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.341(4) (Page 1980) (public health council to adopt rules relating to humane dis-
position of products of human conception); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-109 (1977) (state board of
health to prescribe rules and regulations for disposal of bodies, tissues, organs and
parts of unborn child, human fetus or aborted human embryo).
366. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2503-04. Cf. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d
1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984) (district attorney could not contract for private inter-
ment of fetuses with Roman Catholic religious services without violating the first
amendment prohibition against establishment of religion).
367. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
368. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-611 (1979) (discretionary); IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-2(d)
(Burns Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.252 (1983) (as well as marital status and
age); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.7-5, 23-4.8-3(d) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-313 (1978).
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given to patients,369 as well as data of purely medical significance. 370
In addition, physicians and institutions are expected to submit statis-
tical information 371 or detailed information about each abortion.37 2
The contents of reports may be left for determination through ad-
ministrative regulation or provision of state reporting forms.
373 Most
legislation reflects the Supreme Court's concern 374 over patient pri-
369. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-58.5-1(f), 35-1-58.5-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-4.7-5 (1984).
370. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-25(3), 81-29 (1983); IND. CODE §§ 35-1-58.5-
2(3)(c), 35-1-58.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § .88.052 (Vernon 1983); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 442.250(3) (1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 41.64(3) (McKinney 1977) (life
sustaining efforts for viable fetus born alive); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-07 (1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-732(B)-(D), 1-738, 1-739 (West 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-4.7-4 (1984) (medical emergency requiring immediate abortion).
Some statutes require medical records to be retained for a specified time. See, e.g.,
Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.060 (Vernon 1983) (7 years); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.256 (1981)
(consents and information documentation retained at least 5 years); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.1-07(1)(a) (1981) (7 years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-739 (West 1984) (7
years). Courts disagree as to whether these are unreasonable requirements burdening
therapeutic abortion decisions. Compare Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641
F.2d 1006, 1018 (1st Cir. 1981) (constitutional), with Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181, 213-14 (E.D. La. 1980) (burdensome requirement attached only to abortion
case records).
371. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-516 (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(c)
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(d) (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-445 (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 213.055 (1983); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(c) (Supp. 1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-14-18 (1981); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4164(3) (McKinney 1977); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(c) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-07 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3124(e)-(f) (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-23(3) (1984); VA. CODE
§ 32.1-264 (1982).
372. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 429.50(3) (West 1979), 25955.5 (West
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-30 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-58.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12R (West 1983);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2835 (West 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.052 (Vernon
1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-343 (Supp. 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(a) (Pur-
don 1983); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 232 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-19
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c)(3) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-313 (1978 &
Supp. 1983).
373. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.5 (West 1984); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 211.027 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(2) (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.413 (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-106(2) (1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.260(2) (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.341(2) (Page 1980) (public health
council to adopt rules relating to abortion reporting forms); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 1-738 (West 1984); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 234 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-60
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-107 (1977).
374. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 80: reporting and record-keeping
requirements are constitutional as long as they "properly respect a patient's confidenti-
ality and privacy." Despite the latter reservation, some courts have held that the
names of patients and physicians reported to government offices become public records
accessible under freedom of information laws. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v.
Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982); Minnesota Medical Ass'n v. State, 274
vacy by requiring the names of patients37 5 and at times physicians76
to be kept confidential, subject perhaps to a possibility of disclosure
through court order.3 77 Hospitals also may be required to report to
authorities cases of complications apparently flowing from
abortions.3 78
Reporting and record-maintenance requirements are constitutional
as long as they are not abused or overdone to the point where they
accomplish an unacceptable burden on exercise of constitutional
right to abortion.379 For the most part, state laws appear to respect
that qualification. However, Illinois, Nevada, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania and Utah, for example, decree such detailed requirements or
tie report contents to matters of consent and information (some of
which are unconstitutional in isolation), that one may doubt they are
consonant with the Supreme Court's concerns.
15. Sanctions
Many of the details regarding therapeutic abortion practice are
found outside criminal codes. Nevertheless, supplementary criminal
penalties may well be provided, 3so in addition to criminal penalties
N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1978). Cf. Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38
N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975) (reporting requirement sustained in
absence of indications that identification information was leaked or made available to
other governmental agencies for illegitimate purposes). If harassing use is made of in-
formation obtained by members of the public, release would seem to infringe through
public action the privacy rights of patients and their physicians in the exercise of fed-
eral constitutional rights.
375. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-516(c) (Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25955.5 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(c) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-
141(d) (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-445 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(2)
(1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(c) (Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.2835 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.413 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 188.055(2), 188.070 (Vernon 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-343(10) (Supp. 1984); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-14-18(B) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(2) (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14.02.1-07(2)(a) (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(a) (Purdon 1983) (pa-
tient identification); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-19 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-505 (1983) (but some means of
identification must be used in case further information is needed); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-313 (1978 & Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-108 (1977).
376. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-343 (Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-18(B)
(1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3214(e)(2) (Purdon 1983) (unique identifying number
to be substituted for physician's name). See, however, the decisions cited supra at note
374.
377. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(d) (West 1984) (shall be available to district
attorney of circuit in which hospital or health facility is located); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 81-30 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 213.055(7) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-343(10) (Supp. 1984); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 233 (1979) (except as fur-
nished to judges, prosecutors or police or peace officers for proper action).
378. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-30.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.413(2) (West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 422.265 (1981); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(g)-(h) (Purdon 1983).
379. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-81.
380. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-31a
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attached to nontherapeutic abortions.3 81 In general, the former are
directed at medical personnel who fail to conform to statutory re-
quirements, while the latter have laypersons as their targets. In ad-
dition, participation in criminal abortions is usually a basis for
professional discipline.38 2 Wrongful death liability also may be con-
firmed specifically in abortion legislation.38 3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(4) (1980); MD. PUB.
HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-210 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12N (West 1983);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(4) (West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.257 (1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(4) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-17-5 (1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(b) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-314 (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-110 (1977).
381. See infra notes 411-18 and accompanying text.
382. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.380(3)(A) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-31
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-2837(b)(5) (Supp. 1983) (healing
arts), 65-2912(f) (Supp. 1983) (physical therapist); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(8)-(9)
(West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3282(5)(A) (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH
CODE ANN. § 14-504(24) (Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 147.021(h), 147.101 (West
Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-29(5) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.065
(Vernon 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-148(6) (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.306(4) (1983)
(physician), § 632.320(6)(b) (1983) (nurse); § 633A.100(1)(i) (1983) (naturopath); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-16(c) (medicine, surgery or chiropractic), 45:10-9 (midwifery) (West
1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-1OA-5(A) (osteopathic physician's assistant), 61-6-14(B)(1)
(Supp. 1984) (medicine and surgery); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(2) (Supp. 1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 43-17-31(2) (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 509(1) (West Supp.
1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3219 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-7 (1984)
(failure to obtain consents is unprofessional conduct); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-
30(1) (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-214(6) (1982) (medicine and surgery), 63-
9-111(6) (Supp. 1983) (osteopathic physicians); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b,
§ 3.08(14) (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-12-36(1) (1974 & Supp. 1983)
(medicine), 58-12-7(1) (Supp. 1983) (osteopathy); VA. CODE § 54-317(1) (1982); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 18.36.140(1) (1978) (drugless healer), 18.50.100 (Supp. 1984) (mid-
wifery), 18.57.170(1) (Supp. 1984) (osteopathy), 18.72.030(2) (Supp. 1984) (physician).
If abortion is not specified, convicted abortionists can be disciplined on the basis of
their criminal record. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16221(b)(v) (West 1980);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:17(VI)(d), (j) (Supp. 1983); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 52(b)
(Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1354(3) (Supp. 1984). On constitutional require-
ments of administrative due process governing professional discipline, see Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
383. This usually is aimed at failure to preserve the lives of live-born fetuses. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
58.5-7(c) (Burns Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1594 (1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 442.270(2) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-206(c) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
11-24 (Supp. 1984).
On the traditional refusal to consider a fetus a human being with a consonant right
to sue for prenatal injuries persevering after live birth, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
161-62. Cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-103 (1983) ("A child conceived but not yet born is
to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necossary for its interests in the
event of its subsequent birth."). Precedent conflicts as to whether a wrongful death
action may be maintained for injuries after viability which result in a stillbirth,
although a majority of jurisdictions appear to allow such litigation. See, e.g., Shirley v.
16. Conscience Exception
The legalization of medically indicated abortions, which had begun
to emerge before 1973 in some states, necessitated protective legisla-
Bacon, 154 Ga. App. 203, 267 S.E.2d 809 (1980); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill.
2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); O'Neil v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971);
Ryan v. Beth Israel Hosp., 96 Misc. 2d 816, 409 N.Y.S.2d 681 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)
(guardian ad litem not allowed to maintain action which was an effort to attack a law-
ful abortion); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974) (summariz-
ing authorities to date of opinion). If the fetus is not viable, such an action seems not
to be allowed. See, e.g., Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 237 N.W.2d 297 (1975). If a
viable fetus is born alive and expires after even a short existence, a wrongful death
action will be allowed. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 453
A.2d 1198 (1983); Weiler & Catton, supra note 168, at 651-55; Special Project, supra
note 27, at 152-55.
A now-repealed statute allowing the parents of a fetus aborted in noncompliance
with abortion statutes to maintain a wrongful death action against a physician who
performed the abortion was held unconstitutional as an unacceptable burden on the
woman's and physician's abortion decision. Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D.
Utah 1973) (three-judge court).
Courts generally rule out homicide criminality based on acts causing stillbirths. See,
e.g., People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979); People v. Guthrie, 97
Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), appeal denied, 417 Mich. 1006, 334 N.W.2d 616
(1983); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982). The same result is decreed if a crime
of assault is charged based on injury to a fetus in a woman's uterus. Love v. State, 450
So. 2d 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (prosecution charged "aggravated assault of fe-
tus"; court ruled that "person" in statute does not include a fetus). If a fetus is born
alive and then dies, however, a contrary conclusion is appropriate. See, e.g., People v.
Bolar, 109 Ill. App. 3d 384, 440 N.E.2d 639 (1982) (defendant properly convicted of reck-
less homicide as drunken driver of car which struck car in which pregnant woman was
riding, necessitating a caesarean section).
Because of the legitimacy of contraception and abortion, some parents have sued be-
cause bungled tachniques have resulted in birth of defective children. See, e.g., Robak
v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting argument that, because case
facts arose in 1972 before Roe v. Wade, an abortion would have been unavailable to a
mother suffering rubella and the government should not be liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1982);
Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Author. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Jones v.
Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984) (court not required to instruct jury that
woman could have had an abortion); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834
(1981) (pediatricians treated first child for four years without diagnosing cystic fibrosis
until mother was eight months pregnant with second child); Delaney v. Krafte, 98
A.D.2d 128, 470 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1984) (plaintiff not required to mitigate damages by un-
dergoing later abortion); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Certifi-
cation re Harbeson v. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). However,
recoveries do not extend to the costs of rearing a healthy child to maturity. See, e.g.,
Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984) (bungled sterilization);
Morse v. Soffer, 101 A.D.2d 856, 476 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1984) (defective abortion); Delaney
v. Krafte, 98 A.D.2d 128, 470 N.Y.S.2d 936 (defective abortion); McKernan v. Aasheim,
102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984) (defective sterilization).
See generally Parness & Pritchard, supra note 110, at 257, 270-75; Stoutamire, Effect
of Legalized Abortion on Wrongful Life Actions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 137 (1981); War-
ren, supra note 17, at 51-55; Weiler & Catton, supra note 168, at 651-55; Note, Genetic
Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe v. Wade: How Viable is Roe's Viability Stan-
dard?, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113, 137-41 (1983); Note, Wrongful Birth in the Abortion
Context-A Critique of Existing Case Law and a Proposal for Future Actions, 53 DEN.
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tion for institutions and medical professionals whose religious, ethical
or moral beliefs foreclosed their participation in abortion practice.
3 84
These statutes are nearly universal today. A number of states allow
all hospitals,385 including publicly operated fa'-ilities,38 6 to refuse to
L.J. 501 (1976); Comment, Wrongful Life: Birth Control Spawns a Tort, 13 J. MAR. L.
REV. 401 (1980).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-25 (Supp. 1983) states that a failure or refusal to prevent a
live birth is not a defense in any action and is not to be considered in awarding dam-
ages or child support, or in imposing a penalty in any action. Speck v. Finegold, 497
Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981), disallowed a so-called wrongful life action, but there is con-
trary authority. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (doctor
failed to detect rubella in mother and to advise her to undergo an abortion; damages
affirmed for extraordinary medical expenses); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404
N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Certification re Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d
460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (citing authorities). See generally Parness & Pritchard, supra
note 110, at 275-81; Warren, supra note 17, at 55-57 (wrongful life).
Precedent allowing wrongful death actions based on the deaths of women resulting
from improperly performed abortions, observable before 1973, Wolcott v. Gaines, 225
Ga. 373, 169 S.E.2d 165 (1969); Martin v. Hardesty, 91 Ind. App. 239, 163 N.E. 610 (1928);
True v. Older, 227 Minn. 154, 34 N.W.2d 700 (1948); Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110
Ohio St. 381, 144 N.E. 264 (1924); Androws v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, 1 P.2d 320 (1931)
(only for negligent aftercare, not an abortion itself), clearly remains valid today,
although the availability of therapeutic abortions and the low risk rate for previability
abortions has caused such litigation to drop from sight.
On malpractice liability in abortion cases before Roe v. Wade, see Richey v. Darling,
183 Kan. 642, 331 P.2d 281 (1958); Lembo v. Donnell, 117 Me. 143, 103 A. 11 (1918);
Henrie v. Griffith, 395 P.2d 809 (Okla. 1964). After 1973, there has been no basis to
treat abortion-related medical malpractice actions differently from all other such ac-
tions, at least if the abortion was lawful. See, e.g., Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341 So. 2d 1059
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (no negligence in x-raying pregnant accident victim who did
not know she was pregnant; pathologist report after abortion showed fetus already
dead); Byrne v. Pilgrim Medical Group, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 386, 454 A.2d 920 (1982)
(husband allowed wages lost in caring for wife, to amount which would have been nec-
essary to pay professional attendant); S.R. v. City of Fairmont, 280 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va.
1981) (state long-arm statute gave plaintiff ability to sue Pennsylvania facility for fail-
ure to provide proper care following lawful abortion there). Compare Reno v. D'Javid,
55 A.D.2d 876, 390 N.Y.S.2d 421, affd, 42 N.Y.2d 1040, 369 N.E.2d 766, 399 N.Y.S.2d 210
(1977) (no malpractice action is allowed arising from unlawful abortion which woman
solicited, on principle that she could not profit from an illegal act in which she had
participated).
384. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text; Isaaws, supra note 115, at 77-78;
Warren, supra note 17, at 34-38. On the recognition of the conscience exception under
the English Abortion Act, 1967, § 4, see Royal College of Nursing v. Dep't of Health &
Social Security, [1981] A.C. 800 (H.L.).
385. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a) (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151
(Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(b) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104 (1978);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(b) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 111 1/2, § 87-9 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1.5-8 (Burns 1983); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-444 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MD. PUB.
HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-214(b) (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12! (West
1983), ch. 272, § 21B (West Supp. 1984) (private hospitals and facilities); MINN. STAT.
allow abortions or admit patients for the purpose of abortion. There
is no constitutional infirmity in granting a conscience exception to
public facilities.387 A few states, however, limit the conscience ex-
emption to private or religious institutions.3 8 8 Hospitals cannot be
held civilly liable38 9 or denied public subsidies39o because of refusals
ANN. §§ 145.414, 62D.20 (West Supp. 1984) (health maintenance organizations); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-337 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-2 (West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-5-2 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(f) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14
(1978); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-4-204, 39-4-205 (1982); VA. CODE § 18.2-75 (1982); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.080 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(1) (West 1974).
386. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 311.800(1) (1983) (public), (3) (Supp. 1984) (religious or
private); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (Vernon 1983) (public or private); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4731.91 (Page 1977) (public or private).
387. Poelker v. Doe, 434 U.S. 880 (1977) (public hospitals may refuse to allow thera-
peutic abortions even though they subsidize childbirths).
388. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(c) (West 1984) (religious or non-
profit); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(1) (1983) (private hospital or health care facil-
ity); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741(A) (West 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (private or nongovernmental hospital or clinic); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 34-23A-14, 34-23A-15 (1977) (public hospitals cannot adopt policy excluding or deny-
ing admissions for abortions); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 2 (Vernon Supp.
1984) (private hospitals); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(2) (1978) (private or denomina-
tional hospital not required to admit patients for abortions); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-105
(1977) (private institutions).
Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
914 (1977), interpreted state law to prohibit private, nonprofit, nonsectarian hospitals
from closing their facilities to first-trimester abortions. See also the case on remand,
160 N.J. Super. 266, 389 A.2d 526 (1978) (state decision unaffected by United States
Supreme Court decisions in Maher, Beal and Poelker (discussed infra notes 462-69 and
accompanying text)).
The European Court of Justice has recognized that medical facilities in one member
state can refuse abortions for visiting workers, authorized by another member state, if
abortion is prohibited in the competent institution's own nation. Bestuur van het Al-
gemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v. G. Pierele (Case 182/78), [1979] E.C.R.
1977, 1990.
389. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(b) (1977);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(a) (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104
(Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(b) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.800(5)(a)
(1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-
214(b)(2)(i) (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(1) (Vernon 1983);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(1) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-337 (1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:65A-3 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79i (McKinney 1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91(d) (Page 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741(A)
(West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-
11 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 34-23A-14 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(1) (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-75 (1982);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(2) (West 1974); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-105 (1977).
Several jurisdictions reject invocation of the hospital conscience exemption in cases
of emergency. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(d) (West 1984) (or in
instances of spontaneous abortion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(9) (West Supp. 1984) (in-
applicable to induced labor); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emergency
admittance).
390. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(4) (1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2313(d) (Purdon 1983).
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to allow abortions, although they may be required to notify patients
beforehand of their policies.39 1
The private right of conscience is usually delineated in terms of
religious, moral, ethical or professional scruples, 392 but may be left
unrestricted. 393 Most frequently, conscientious objectors are required
to file a written statement of objection. 39 4 In some jurisdictions that
burden is not specifically imposed. 395
Laws may be drafted simply to allow the conscience exception to
any person, 396 or may designate physicians,397 nurses, 398 or other
391. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-337 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(1) (1983) (physician to advise patient);
WYO. STAT. § 35-6-105 (1977).
392. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (1974); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25955(a) (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(8) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-612
(1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-2 (Burns 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.800(4) (1983);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (Vernon
1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(2) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475(1) (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (1984); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79i (McKinney 1976); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-17-11 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(1) (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-75
(1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(1) (West 1974).
393. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(a) (1977); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) ("conscience"); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-443 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1591 (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH
CODE ANN. § 20-214(a) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-338 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-16-14 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (Page 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-741(B) (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(1) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
50(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-:-3A-13 (1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-4-204 (1982); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.080 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-106 (1977).
The conscience exemption may not be invoked in emergency situations. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(9) (West Supp. 1984) (induced labor); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 146.1 (West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475(3) (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-741(C) (West 1984).
394. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (1974); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25955(a) (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104 (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.800(5) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121
(West 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475 (1983); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79i (McKinney
1976); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE § 18.2-75 (1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(1) (West 1974).
395. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-
2 (Burns 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42
(West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (1978);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 435.485 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (1978).
396. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(a) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104 (1978);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West Supp.
1984); GA. CODE § 16-12-142 (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West Supp. 1984-1985);
hospital, clinical or medical office personnel.99 Those who invoke
their personal conscience rights cannot be held criminally400 or
civilly401 liable, or subjected to administrative penalties,402 or to disci-
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (1981); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-214(a)(2) (Supp.
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-338 (1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79i(1) (McKin-
ney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741(B) (West 1984); VA. CODE § 18.2-75 (1982);
WYO. STAT. § 35-6-106 (1977).
397. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(a) (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(8) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 16-612 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-2 (Burns 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 311.800(5)(b) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42 (West Supp.
1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(1) (Vernon 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(1) (1983); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-41-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-12 (1977); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-4-204 (1982); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 1 (Vernon Supp.
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.080 (1977);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(1) (West 1974).
398. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(a) (West 1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-
612 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.800(5)(b) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591
(1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42 (West Supp. 1984); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(1)
(Vernon 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon 1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-12
(1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.02.080 (1977). See Durham, Wood & Condie, Accommodation of Consci-
entious Objection to Abortion: A Case Study of the Nursing Profession, 1982 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 253.
399. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (1974); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25955(a) (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-612 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-2 (Burns 1983); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 311.800(5)(b) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42 (West Supp. 1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 632.475 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-
14 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(2) (1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Pur-
don 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 (Law. Co-op.
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-12 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4512.7, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(1) (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.02.080 (1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(1) (West 1974).
400. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-3 (West Supp. 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3213(d) (Purdon 1983).
401. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(c) (1977);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(a), (c) (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104
(1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(a), (b) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West
Supp. 1984); GA. CODE § 16-12-142 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 16-612 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (1981); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 311.800(5) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MD. PUB.
HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-214(a)(2)(i) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121
(1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.42(1) (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(1)
(Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(1) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-338
(1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1 to 65A-3 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79i(2) (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.91 (Page 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
41-50(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-12 (1977); UTAH CODE
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plinary4O3 or recriminatory 40 4 action. Statutes also proscribe discrim-
ination against those relying on their statutory rights,40 5 particularly
in connection with employment4o6 or educational4 7 opportunities.
On occasion, sanctions are supplied for violations of the conscience
ANN. § 76-7-306 (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-75 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(2) (West
1974); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-106 (1977).
402. Eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon 1983).
403. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104 (1978);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-2 (Burns 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1592 (1964); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-214(a)(2)(ii) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145-414 (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(1) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A-65A-3 (West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
45.1(e) (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91(C) (Page 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-741 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-17-11 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-25 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-75
(1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(1) (West 1974).
404. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-256(a) (1977); COLO. RE"v. STAT. § 18-6-104 (1978);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(a), (b) (1981); FLA,,STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (1979); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1592 (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-214(a)(2)(ii) (1983);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(1)
(1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-11-25 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-75 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(1)
(West 1974). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West Supp. 1984) proscribes coercion to al-
low abortions.
405. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1, 2A:65A-3 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 79i (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (Page 1977).
406. Eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(a) (West 1984) (but medical em-
ployer can inquire into conscience reservation before hiring); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-2 (1983); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 146.1 (West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 311.800(5) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1592 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 197.032(2) (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(1) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-341 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475(2) (1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3213(d) (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-13 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, §§ 1, 3, 4
(Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-25 (Supp. 1983) (including employment
with other discrimination); VA. CODE § 18.2-75 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.02.080 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 140.42(3) (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-106 (1977).
407. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955(b) (West 1984) ("No medical school
or other facility for the education or training of physicians, [or] nurses ... shall refuse
admission ... or penalize ... because of such person's unwillingness to participate in
the performance of an abortion .... ); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.800(5)(c) (1983); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 121 (West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (Purdon
1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
exception in the form of criminal penalties,408 and civil injunctive 40 9
and damage410 remedies.
C. Criminal Statutory Provisions Affecting Abortions
1. General Principles
In the immediate aftermath of Roe v. Wade, a few states voided
their abortion legislation entirely, eliminating criminality for non-
physician abortionists, as well as for medical practitioners performing
therapeutic abortions.411 This was judicial overkill. In Connecticut v.
Menillo,412 the Court confirmed that its 1973 Roe and Bolton deci-
sions were not intended to provide a constitutional exemption from
criminal law coverage for nonphysician abortionists.41 3 State deci-
sions are now uniform in recognizing the state's power to prosecute
nonphysician abortionists.414 This power extends, as well, to physi-
408. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-339 (1979) (class II misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 632.475(4) (1979) (misdemeanor); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79i(1) (McKinney 1976)
(misdemeanor); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-113 (1977) ($10,000 fine).
409. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111(3) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-341 (1979);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-114
(1977).
410. Eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 5201(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985)
(treble damages with minimum $2,000 recovery); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-2 (Burns
1983) (reinstatement of employment also available); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(3)
(Vernon 1983) (may recover in action at law, suit in equity or other redress); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-340 (1979) (damages), § 28-341 (1979) (injunctive relief); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4731.91(e) (Page 1977) (civil damages available); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3213(d) (Purdon 1983) (civil liability in addition to liability for punitive damages in
the amount of $5,000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (reinstatement
of employment also available); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-114 (1977).
411. See State v. Hodgson, 295 Minn. 294, 204 N.W.2d 199 (1973) (per curiam) (phy-
sician who performed abortion within first trimester secondary to the contraction of
rubella by his pregnant patient not criminally convicted); Commonwealth v. Jackson,
454 Pa. 429, 312 A.2d 13 (1973) (per curiam) (nonphysician's conviction of committing
an unlawful abortion was used).
412. 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam).
413. The Court noted that it was concerned with maternal health, and had only le-
gitimated an "abortion ... performed by medically competent personnel under condi-
tions insuring maximum safety for the woman." Id. at 11. Hence, prosecutions of
nonphysicians for first-trimester abortions "infringe upon no realm of personal privacy
secured by the Constitution against state interference." Id. "The ever-increasing state
interest in maternal health provides additional justification for such prosecutions." Id.
414. See, e.g., State v. Orsini, 187 Conn. 264, 445 A.2d 887, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 136
(1982) (persistent felony offender claimed record of earlier conviction for aiding in
criminal abortion was silent as to whether the principal was a physician; the court
thought indications in the record that the abortion was performed in a motel room us-
ing a "shoehorn device" was a sufficient indication the abortion was criminal); State v.
Menillo, 171 Conn. 141, 368 A.2d 136 (1976) (application of abortion statute held valid
as to nonphysicians) (on remand from Connecticut v. Menillo); Rhim v. State, 264 Ind.
682, 348 N.E.2d 620 (1976) (statute regulating abortions performed by nonphysicians re-
mained unchanged when legislature passed statute regulating abortions by physicians);
Spears v. State, 278 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1973) (nonphysician subject to criminal penalties
for performing abortion); State v. Norflett, 67 N.J. 268, 337 A.2d 609 (1975) (one with-
out medical degree can be convicted under criminal abortion law). See also Smith v.
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cians who violate constitutionally acceptable regulations of therapeu-
tic abortions.4 15
When prosecutions of the latter sort are initiated, however, federal
constitutional principles require that the underlying legislation be
sufficiently precise to give warning of the prohibited and acceptable
activities. If the statute is vague and indefinite, it will be invali-
dated.416 Beyond that, consistent with the Court's general approach
to strict liability criminal legislation,417 abortion statutes imposing
felony or serious misdemeanor penalties must include a scienter (in-
tent or knowledge) component, or they will be invalidated.418 There
is no constitutional barrier to a statutory requirement that proof of a
medical justification be advanced by a physician defendant as an af-
firmative defense. 419
2. Persons Covered
As noted above, criminal statutes can only be invoked constitution-
ally against nonphysicians in general or against physicians who de-
part from acceptable medical practices. 420 This is express in some
statutes;421 if not, courts must apply this meaning to the general
Bentley, 493 F. Supp. 916, 924-27 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (states can prohibit nonphysicians
from performing abortions during any stage of pregnancy).
415. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) (requirement that second tri-
mester abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of fur-
thering state's compelling interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety).
416. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
2503-04 (invalidating criminal statute requiring disposal of fetal remains "in a humane
and sanitary manner" because it failed to give physicians fair notice that the contem-
plated conduct is forbidden); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (statutes turning
on whether fetus is "viable" void for vagueness); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. at 81-84 (statute imposing criminal penalties for failure to exercise degree of pro-
fessional skill, care and diligence necessary to preserve life and health of fetus held
invalid).
417. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434-46 (1978) (re-
fusal to construe the Sherman Act as embracing strict liability criminal offenses). See
also Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
418. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 395 ("[b]ecause of the absence of a scienter
requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is
or may be viable, the statute is little more than 'a trap for those who act in good
faith.' ").
419. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2535 (placing burden on a defendant of going forward
with evidence on an affirmative defense generally is permissible).
420. See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 683 P.2d 775 (Colo. 198.4) (osteopath could be con-
victed for performing a nontherapeutic abortion even though criminal statute uncon-
stitutionally outlawed certain therapeutic abortions by licensed medical practitioners).
See also supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2551 (1977);
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101 (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 24, § 1790(a) (1981); D.C.
term, "any person," if constitutional problems are to be avoided.422
3. Actus Reus
The objective acts embodied in traditional abortion legislation, still
in force in some jurisdictions, are administering drugs or sub-
stances423 or using instruments or other means424 to terminate preg-
nancy. A majority of states, particularly those which have
modernized their criminal legislation, require that the woman be
pregnant,425 while a minority do not include that specific require-
CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(3) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-12-140(a) (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-606(2), 18-608 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 38-23.1(A) (defined in ch. 38, § 81-22[3]) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-1-58.5-2, 35-1-58.5-4 (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7, 3 (West
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 311.750, 311.760(2) (1983)
(see also section 311.760(1) under which a woman herself is not a criminal for produc-
ing abortion during first trimester on advice of licensed physician); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:1285(8), (8.1), (9) (West Supp. 1984) (therapeutic abortions are dealt with
under medical licensing statutes; this would seem to qualify § 14:874); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(3)(A) (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-210(a)(3) (Supp.
1983-1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §§ 12L, 12M, 12N (West 1983); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.412(1) (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (Vernon 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-335 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.250(1) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3)
(McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-44, 14-45, 14-45.1(a), (b) (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14.02.1-04(5) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731(A) (West 1984); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4010 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (defined
in § 44-41-10[b]); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-3 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-
201(c) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(1) (1978) (defined in § 76-7-301(2)); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 151(b) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-72, 18.2, 74.1 (1982); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(5)(a) (West 1982); WYO.
STAT. § 35-6-111 (1977).
422. See, e.g., People v. Bricker, 389 Mich. 524, 208 N.W.2d 172 (1973) (conviction of
nonphysician for conspiracy to commit an abortion); Beecham v. Leahy, 130 Vt. 164,
287 A.2d 836 (1972) (no justiciable controversy where physician sues for injunctive
relief).
423. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-7 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603 (1978);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2551, 41-2553 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31a(a) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 654
(1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-140(a) (1982); IDAHO
CODE § 18-605 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87(1) (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(1)(A)
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.14 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3(1) (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120(1) (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(2) (McKinney 1975); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (West 1983); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 33, § 4010 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(1), (2) (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 101 (1974); VA. CODE § 18.2-71 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.010(1) (1977); W.
VA. CODE § 61-2-8 (1984).
424. The statutes cited supra in note 423 contain this alternative with the following
exceptions and additions: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-102(1) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 651, 654 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.720(1) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120(2)
(1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.020 (1977).
425. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-7 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603 (1978);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2551, 41-2553 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (1978) (ter-
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ment.426 If pregnancy is required, but the particular woman in fact
was not pregnant, general attempt provisions in contemporary codes
will cover the activity because traditional doctrines of impossibility
have been abrogated.427 However, statutes based on activities with
intent to produce a miscarriage function as a crystallized application
of attempt law;428 at times, attempted abortion is covered
minating pregnancy); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 651 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 18-605 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (woman known to be
pregnant; but see §§ 81-31[f], 81-31.1[11], making it a class 2 felony to perform abortions
on women who are not pregnant); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1(b) (Burns Supp. 1984)
(termination of human pregnancy); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.7 2, 707.8(2) (West 1979)
(termination of pregnancy); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(l) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 311.720(1) (1983) (woman known to be pregnant); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1596(a)(A) (1980) (interruption of pregnancy); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208
(Supp. 1983) (terminating human pregnancy); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12K
(West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411(5) (West Supp. 1984) (must result in termina-
tion of pregnancy); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3(1) (1973) (pregnant with child); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.015(1) (Vernon 1983) (termination of pregnancy); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
20-104(4) (1983) (terminate a pregnancy); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(1) (Supp. 1984) (wo-
man known to be pregnant); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 585:12, 585:13 (1974) (pregnant
woman; pregnant with quick child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (1984) (pregnant wo-
man); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-44, 14-45 (1981) (pregnant or quick with child; pregnant
woman); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(1) (1981) (definition of abortion as termination
of human pregnancy); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4010 (1983) (pregnant woman); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1979) (unborn quick child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10(a) (Law.
Co-op. 1976) (abortion defined as termination of human pregnancy); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-1(1) (1977) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(a)(1) (1982)
(pregnant, whether quick or not); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301(a) (1978 & Supp. 1983)
(termination of pregnancy); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 151(a) (Supp. 1983) (termination
of human pregnancy); VA. CODE § 18.2-71 (1982) (intent to destroy unborn child, pro-
ducing abortion or miscarriage and thus destroying child); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-8 (1984)
(producing abortion or miscarriage); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982) (destruction
of life of unborn child); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-102 (1977) (after viability).
426. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-
29, 53-31a(a) (West 1960); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-
140(a) (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87(2) (West 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120(1)
(1979) (whether pregnant or not); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 125.05(2) (McKinney 1975)
(same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (West 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1974)
(pregnant or supposed to be pregnant); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.010(1) (1977)
(whether pregnant or not).
427. See authorities cited supra at note 46.
428. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2551 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-103 (1978) (pretending to end real or apparent preg-
nancy); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (West 1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 654
(1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-140(a) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-605 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-31.1, 81-31.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:87 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(1)(A) (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (West 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(4) (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.120(1) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:12 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 861 (West 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1974).
specifically.429
Some statutes continue to embody distinctions based on the stage
of a pregnancy, in terms of time430 or viability.431 These cannot be
invoked against physicians practicing within the constitutional
bounds established by the Supreme Court. They are, however, appro-
priately applied to laypersons as a means of grading punishments.
The further into the pregnancies that illicit abortions are performed,
the greater the danger to maternal life and health, and the greater
the justification for augmented penalties. If, however, the statutes
restrict the coverage of criminal abortion legislation as applied to
nonphysicians, they are unwise, because there should be no lawful
scope for such abortions.432
4. Scienter
Traditional statutes are clear that abortions must be done with in-
tent to produce an abortion or miscarriage. Thus, they create no con-
stitutional infirmities as far as scienter requirements are concerned.
That seems to be a problem exclusively generated by recent thera-
peutic abortion statutes supported by residual criminal penalty
provisions.433
5. Weight
The overwhelming majority of abortion statutes carry felony-level
punishments,434 with few offenses punishable as misdemeanors.435 It
429. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1981); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(a)
(Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(a)(2) (1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301(1) (1978 & Supp. 1983).
430. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(1) (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West
1979); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208(b)(1) (Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.250(b)-(c) (1983); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.45 (McKinney 1975); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.02.070 (1977).
431. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2551, 41-2553
(1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411(2) (West
Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-329 (Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13
(1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-23-5 (1979); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982).
432. See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. at 11. See also supra note 413 and accom-
panying text. For illustrations of legislation apparently so limited, see IOWA CODE
ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-101 (1977).
433. See supra notes 417-18 and accompanying text. See also Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 311 n.17 (1980) (Hyde Amendment criminal sanctions were valid because they
contained "a clear scienter requirement under which good-faith errors are not
penalized").
434. See the statutes cited supra in notes 423-31, all of which, except as listed infra
in note 435, carry felony penalties.
435. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-7 (1982) (fined not less than $100 nor more than
$1,000 and imprisonment for not more than 12 months); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-
31(a)-(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (remaining provisions are punishable as felo-
nies); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1598(4) (1980) (abortion by a physician after viabil-
ity is a class D crime, all other abortions are class C crimes); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
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is possible that this field of penal law will prove susceptible to re-
striction under the eighth amendment prohibition against dispropor-
tionate punishments.436
6. Criminality Based on Neonatal Death
Statutory provisions governing care of neonates and fetuses during
abortion and birth processes have been noted. 437 Specific criminal
penalties usually are set forth governing what in most instances is a
form of medical malpractice.4 38 The chief deficiencies observable in
§ 585:12 (1974) (imprisoned not more than one year, or fined not more than $1,000, or
both); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(4) (1981) (class A mi:;demeanor if physician vio-
lates regulations); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (1977) (gross misdemeanor, if phy-
sician performs the abortion without consent or if the woman has not resided in the
state for 90 days or if the abortion is performed in other than an accredited hospital or
medical facility).
436. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (eighth anendment barred life sen-
tence of imprisonment without possibility of parole against fourth offender for writing
a check of $100).
437. See supra notes 347-51 and accompanying text.
438. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1795(b) (Supp. 1982) (knowing and reckless con-
duct detrimental to life or health of live-born infant after abortion a class A misde-
meanor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1976) (killing unborn child by injury to
mother deemed manslaughter); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 31-24, 81-26(1) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-1985) (class 2 felonies); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-7(c) (Burns Supp. 1984)
(subject to homicide and manslaughter criminality); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.9 (inten-
tional killing of live-born fetus a class B felony), 707.10 (West 1979) (failure to preserve
life and health of viable fetus a serious misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:87.1
(West 1974) (killing child during delivery punishable by life imprisonment), 14:87.5
(West Supp. 1984) (intentional failure to sustain life and health of live-born viable in-
fant punishable by up to 21 years imprisonment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12T
(West 1983) (failure to take reasonable steps to protect life and health of live-born
child a misdemeanor, together with any other criminal liability); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.322 (1968) (wilful killing of unborn quick child by injury to mother is man-
slaughter), § 750.323 (1981) (successful efforts to kill unborn quick child is manslaugh-
ter); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(1) (1983) (purposely, knowingly or negligently to
cause death of premature viable infant born alive is criminal homicide); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-332 (Supp. 1984) (class IV felony to fail to take reasonable steps to preserve
life of live-born infant); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.270(2) (1981) (failure to preserve life
and health of live-born person subjects person to general criminal statutes); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.1-05, 14-02.1-08 (1981) (class C felony to fail to preserve life and
health of unborn child); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-734(D) (West 1984) (persons kill-
ing neonate or failing to take reasonable measures to preserve life of infant are guilty
of homicide); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(b) (Purdon 1.983) (third degree felony to
fail to protect life of unborn viable child); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-18 (Supp. 1984)
(knowingly and intentionally failing to provide reasonable medical care and treatment,
causing death of live-born infant is manslaughter); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-17-6
(1978) (intentional killing of human fetus by causing injury to mother, other than dur-
ing therapeutic abortion, a class 4 felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-206(b) (1982) (fel-
ony to fail to use good medical skill to preserve life and health of live-born infant);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976) (destroying life during parturition
some of these statutes are lack of a clear scienter requirement,
vagueness problems in statement of the standard of duty,439 and dis-
proportionality of punishments.
7. Criminality Based on Maternal Death
There is no need for special legislation governing the death of a
woman in the course of an unlawful abortion or manifesting criminal
negligence in the setting of a therapeutic abortion.440 Nevertheless,
several states specially address that form of homicide.441
8. Liability for Seeking Criminal Abortion
Some jurisdictions penalized women before 1973 for seeking abor-
tions.442 Some continue such penal law coverage as far as nonthera-
peutic abortions are concerned.44 3 Perpetuation of that form of
if child would have been born alive is a felony punishable by a minimum 5 years' im-
prisonment to life); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-314(2) (1978) (third-degree felony to fail to
use medical skills to preserve life of unborn child); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.32.060(b) (1977) (intentionally killing unborn quick child by injuring mother is
first-degree manslaughter); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-110 (1977) (felony intentionally to termi-
nate viability of unborn infant or to fail to use accepted means of preserving live-born
fetus).
See State v. Lewis, 429 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Indi-
ana, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982) (doctor could be retried for unlawful postviability abortion
performed at clinic rather than hospital; viability demonstrated by fact fetus had been
born alive and had survived 2 hours).
439. See materials cited supra at note 416. See also Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371
Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976) (insufficient evidence that physician's conduct was negli-
gent or reckless, so that verdict of acquittal should have been directed; court divided
equally as to whether death of fetus could be manslaughter); Special Project, supra
note 27, at 156-59; Note, Criminal Liability of Physicians: An Encroachment on the
Abortion Right?, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 609-15 (1981); Note, Current Technology Af-
fecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1221, 1249-55
(1982).
440. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
441. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-102(2) (1978) (class 2 felony); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-201 (1981) (second-degree murder); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (West
1970) (felony punishable by five to 20 years' imprisonment); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
3(1) (1972) (murder); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:14 (1974) (second-degree murder);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (1984) (second-degree felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(2)
(McKinney 1975) (second-degree manslaughter); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1974)
(felony punishable by five to 20 years' imprisonment); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(2)
(West 1982) (felony punishable by not more than 15 years' imprisonment).
Several statutes require coroners or medical examiners to inquire into deaths appar-
ently resulting from criminal abortions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 406.11(1)(a)(9)
(West Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1561 (West Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 38, § 6 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-61-9 (1972).
On wrongful death civil liability, see supra note 383 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
443. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3604 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West
Supp. 1984) (exempting therapeutic abortions); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-30 (1960),
53-31a (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 651 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 18-606(2)
(1979) (soliciting, submitting to or self-inducing), § 18-609(1) (Supp. 1984) (except for
lawful abortion); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.750 (1983) (prohibits self-abortion), § 311.760(1)
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criminality, however, is as unwise today as it was before 1973, be-
cause of the difficulties it creates in criminal justice
administration. 444
9. Advertising Abortifacients
Criminal statutes penalizing the advertising of abortions and abor-
tifacients have been evident for generations.44 5 A number of such
provisions continue to exist in unmodified form.446 They are uncon-
stitutional because they do not exempt dissemination of information
about lawful therapeutic abortions which constitute a form of com-
mercial speech protected by the first amendment.447 Therefore, sev-
eral statutes have been amended to conform with Bigelow v.
(1983) (except on advice of licensed physician); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(4) (1983)
(abortion defined to include "submission to act or operation"); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.220 (1983) (submission to abortion after 24th week of gestation except as author-
ized under therapeutic abortion statute), § 201.120(2) (1979) (self-abortion except as a
therapeutic abortion on advice of licensed physician); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.05(3)
(McKinney 1975) (woman's act is justifiable if she believes it is done by physician per-
forming lawful abortion), 125.50 (McKinney 1975) (second-degree self-abortion through
24th week of pregnancy; class B misdemeanor), 125.55 (McKinney 1975) (first-degree
self-abortion if more than 24 weeks pregnant; class A misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 862 (West 1983) (soliciting, taking substance or using means to procure
miscarriage; misdemeanor), tit. 63, § 1-733 (West 1984) (no woman to perform or in-
duce abortion on self except under supervision of licensed physician); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 33, § 4011 (1979) (any solicitation for an abortion is a felony punishable by 2 to 5
years' imprisonment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (misdemeanor
to solicit abortion unless justified); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 152 (Supp. 1983) (woman
lawfully may submit when physician lawfully may perform abortion), 156 (Supp. 1983)
(violation a felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.020 (1977) (submitting to abortion a
felony unless justified).
Some states, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218 (Purdon 1983) and VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 101 (1974), specifically preclude a woman's criminality.
444. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
446. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3605 (1978) (misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 797.02 (West 1976) (misdemeanor); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 20 (West 1970)
(felony); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.15, 750.34 (1968) (immoral advertising); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-5 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-10914) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.270(1) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-06 (1981); P.R. LAWS. ANN. tit. 10, § 315
(1976) (public display or advertising), tit. 33, § 4012 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104
(1974 & Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68.030 (1977).
447. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983) (contraceptives
and contraceptive information); Carey v. Population Serv:;. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02
(1977) (same); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertisement of lawful thera-
peutic abortion services).
See also Coalition for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse v. Niagara
Frontier Transp. Auth., 584 F. Supp. 985 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (public transportation au-
thority's refusal to allow advertising about the availability of therapeutic abortions at
public service rates, when similar advertising bearing on reproductive choices had been
Virginia concepts; 448 the residual coverage would seem to be
constitutional.449
10. Soliciting Abortions
Some traditional statutes have penalized the act of soliciting wo-
men for abortions.450 To the extent they fall within the advertising
cases discussed immediately above, they are subject to equivalent
constitutional attack. However, even if such statutes apply only to
personal contacts, they seem clearly unconstitutional under Roe v.
Wade because they impede access by women to lawful therapeutic
abortions. Recent legislation reflects such concerns. 45 1
11. Trafficking in Abortifacients
Criminal regulation of abortifacients, like restrictions on advertis-
ing and solicitation, came onto statute books in the nineteenth cen-
tury.45 2 Many such laws have been continued in force without
change.453 However, to the extent they burden the availability of
lawful therapeutic abortions, they are unconstitutional. 454 Conse-
accommodated at those rates, violated the Coalition's first and fourteenth amendment
rights).
448. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-31 (1960), 53-31a (Supp. 1984);
IDAHO CODE § 18-604 (1979) (physicians and licensed health care providers), § 18-607
(1979) (except to physicians or druggists or distributors to others, or in trade or profes-
sional channels unlikely to reach the general public); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN.
§ 20-210(a)(2) (Supp. 1983) (other than by physicians in licensed and accredited hospi-
tals [probably too limited an exception to meet Bigelow requirements]); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-76.1 (1982) (amended after Bigelow); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 450.11(2) (West Supp.
1984).
449. Cf. Baird v. La Follette, 72 Wis. 2d 1, 239 N.W.2d 536 (1976) (statute construed
not to cover educational and informational exhibits in the context of free public lec-
tures; could not ban even in a commercial setting good faith educational presentation
of general information regarding contraception). See generally Warren, supra note 17,
at 45-47. A telephone company acted properly in refusing to delete abortion clinic ad-
vertising in a classified directory, ordered by state public utilities commission based on
the commission's ruling that the advertising was "deceptive." Neary v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Comm'n, 78 Pa. Commw. 636, 468 A.2d 520 (1983).
450. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-29 (1960), 53-31a (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-
606(1) (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 20 (West 1970); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
20-109(4) (1983) (by physician, hospital or other person or agency); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 442.270(1) (1981) (person or organization not to advertise directly or indirectly abor-
tion costs or conditions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-06 (1981); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 153 (Supp. 1984) (no public or private organization or society is to be created for pur-
pose of soliciting candidates for abortion).
451. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 276 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1792(2) (Supp. 1983).
452. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
453. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:88(1) (West 1974); MISs. CODE ANN. § 97-3-5
(1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.130 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104 (Supp. 1984).
454. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977):
[T]he same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individ-
ual's right to ... terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the
means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit
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quently, most contemporary statutes either exempt therapeutic abor-
tions455 or limit their coverage to unlawful abortions.
4 56
12. Special Evidentiary Provisions
A few statutes require that a woman's testimony concerning a
criminal abortion be corroborated.45 7 Vermont's abortion statute al-
lows a woman's statements in evidence as a dying declaration if she
dies following an abortion.458 Two jurisdictions immunize a woman's
testimony against incriminating use so that she may be called as a
prosecution witness. 459 Legislation of this sort is probably residual
from earlier times and deserves repeal.
Rhode Island legislation states that it is unnecessary for the prose-
cution to prove that an abortion was not legally justified.460 Current
constitutional doctrine legitimates placement of a burden of going
forward with evidence on the defendant; however, the legality of im-
the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest' . . . and . . . must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interests at stake."
Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).
455. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-105
(1978) (other than licensed physician); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-31a(b) (West Supp. 1984)
(exempts licensed physician or hospital); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1792(1) (1981) (ex-
empting for purposes of lawful abortion under § 1790); IDAHO CODE § 18-607 (1979) (ex-
cept to physician or druggist or distributor, or on prescription or order of physician, or
possession with intent to supply to lawful recipient); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-31(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (without prescription); IOWA CODE ANN. § 205.1 (West
1969) (exempting supplying on prescription), § 205.2 (West 1969) (exempts those sup-
plying physicians, etc., for use in the practice of their profession); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.15 (1968) (except on prescription [probably too narrow under Carey]); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-41-80(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (except in connection with therapeutic
abortions; women on whom abortions performed are not within criminal provisions);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 450.11(2) (West Supp. 1984) (except to licensed physicians or medi-
cal services).
456. Eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.60 (McKinney 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.030(1977).
457. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2115 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.301 (1981) (unless the
person on whom the offense was committed was at the time a police officer or deputy
sheriff (legitimating use of policewomen decoys)). See also supra notes 58-59 and ac-
companying text.
458. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 102 (1974).
459. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.140 (1979) (abortion, attempted abortion or selling abor-
tifacients); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.020.040 (1977) (no person can claim a privilege
against self-incrimination in prosecutions for abortion, attempted abortion or selling
drugs, but is immunized under WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.52.090 (1980)). See also
supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
460. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981) (unnecessary to save woman's life, this basic
provision is unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade if applied to physicians, and superflu-
ous in actuality in instances of criminal abortion).
posing the burden of persuasion on the defendant is unclear. 461 The
volatile and controversial context of abortion is probably not the
most appropriate one to test such issues.
D. Economic Aspects of Therapeutic Abortions
1. Public Funding of Abortions
A logical corollary of the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade
seemingly would have been that states and the federal government
should be required to provide the same financial support for thera-
peutic abortions as they offer for other medical services to financially
unable citizens. Otherwise, government would burden the free exer-
cise of women's rights to have abortions and create invidious distinc-
tions among classes of patients based on financial considerations.
However, logic lost as the issue came before the Supreme Court.
In Maher v. Roe,46 2 welfare recipients attacked a state exclusion of
Medicaid payments to patients receiving therapeutic abortions; a fed-
eral district court found the preclusion to deny equal protection. The
Supreme Court disagreed. Although it did not depart from its Roe v.
Wade principle that the Constitution protects women from unduly
burdensome interference with the freedom to terminate pregnancies,
it held that there is no constitutional barrier to a state's making "a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and . . . imple-
ment[ing] that judgment by the allocation of public funds."46 3 Finan-
cially unable patients not wishing to take advantage of state-
supported childbirth must depend on private sources:
The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to
abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make it diffi-
cult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abor-
tions is neither created nor in any way affected by the [state] regulation. 46 4
In short, the Court perceived a
basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and
461. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. at 2535. Whether the burden of persua-
sion may be placed on the defendant requires a harmonization of language in Read v.
Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977); and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), an important issue
which, nevertheless, need not be elaborated upon here.
462. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See generally Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproduc-
tive Choice: The Contribution of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights
Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 724-31 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Appleton]; Canby, Government Funding, Abortions, and the Public Fo-
rum, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11; Horan & Marzen, The Moral Interest of the State in
Abortion Funding: A Comment on Beal, Maher & Poelker, 22 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 566
(1978); Jones, supra note 11, at 594-600; Petersen, The Public Funding of Abortion
Services: Comparative Developments in the United States and Australia, 33 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 158 (1984).
463. 432 U.S. at 474.
464. Id.
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state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative pol-
icy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose
its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in
the public interest is necessarily far broader,
4 6 5
Two other decisions during the same term documented the Court's
theme. In Beal v. Doe,466 the Court applied an identical analysis to
title XIX of the Social Security Act,467 which it construed not to re-
quire state funding of nontherapeutic abortions, but not to preclude
such funding either.468 In Poelker v. Doe,469 it ruled that publicly-
owned and operated hospitals did not have to offer free hospital abor-
tion services even though they provided free childbirth facilities. The
rationale was that of Maher v. Roe.
While Beal v. Doe was awaiting final resolution, Congress had be-
gun enacting an annual prohibition470 which in varying forms banned
the use of federal Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions or
therapeutic abortions other than for certain restricted reasons.471
Constitutional attacks on it were launched immediately, since Beal v.
Doe had dealt only with construction of Medicidd provisions not bear-
ing the Hyde Amendment limitation. In Harris v. McRae,472 the
465. Id. at 475-76 (footnote omitted).
466. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
467. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(B), (17), 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1983).
468. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 447.
469. 432 U.S. 519 (1977). Poelker was distinguished by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, when it enjoined a city hospital commission from refusing to allow
staff at the only hospital in the community, publicly owned, to perform lawful abor-
tions for paying patients. Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 667 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir.
1982), appeal dismissed, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 3102 (1983).
470. Called the Hyde Amendment after its original congressional sponsor. See Har-
ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1980); Vinovskis, The Politics of Abortion in the
House of Representatives in 1976, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1790 (1979).
The Republican Party Platform of 1984 opposed the use of public revenues for abor-
tion and called for elimination of funding for organizations advocating or supporting
abortion. 42 Cong. Q. 2110 (Aug. 25, 1984). The Democratic Party Platform ap-
proached the question somewhat more elliptically: it opposed "government interfer-
ence which denies poor Americans their right to privacy by funding or advocating one
or a limited number of reproductive choices only." 42 Cong. Q. 1767 (July 21, 1984).
471. The 1977 version acknowledged only danger to maternal life, while the 1979
language recognized "severe and long-lasting physical health damage"; the 1980 ver-
sion included rape or incest if reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or pub-
lic health service. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 302-03. The fiscal year 1984 version
covers only instances "where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
were carried to term." Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Educa-
tion Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 98-139, § 204, 97 Stat. 871, 887 (1983).
472. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Later the same term, in Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358
(1980), the Court held that a state participating in the Medicaid program is not obli-
gated to underwrite medically indicated abortions for which federal reimbursement is
unavailable under the Hyde Amendment; the Court confirmed that state funding re-
Court reiterated its Maher v. Roe premise that legislative bodies, in-
cluding Congress, can refuse to underwrite therapeutic abortions and,
"by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical
services, encourage alternative activity deemed in the public inter-
est." 4 7 3 Moreover, it rejected a contention that the Hyde Amend-
ment, by embodying Roman Catholic doctrines rejecting abortion,
violated the establishment clause dimension of the first amend-
ment.4 74 The Court thought, as well, that the legislation embodied
no invidious discrimination violating equal protection as guaranteed
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Congress could authorize
federal reimbursement for medically necessary services generally,
but need not do so for medically indicated abortions: "Abortion is in-
herently different from other medical procedures, because no other
procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life."475
The Court's 1977 and 1980 rulings have served to legitimate legisla-
tion in about one-quarter of American jurisdictions limiting the use
of state, 476 local477 and on occasion federal pass-through478 funding
strictions patterned on the Hyde Amendment do not violate fourteenth amendment
equal protection. See generally Appleton, supra note 463; Isaacs, supra note 11, at 71-
75; Jones, supra note 11, at 600-05; Yarbrough, The Abortion-Funding Issue: A Study
in Mixed Constitutional Cues, 59 N.C.L. REV. 611 (1981).
473. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
474. Id. at 318-20. The Court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to liti-
gate whether the Hyde Amendment interfered with their "free exercise" rights under
the amendment. Id. See also Note, Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs and the First
Amendment, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 487 (1980); Comment, The Establishment Clause and
Religious Influences on Legislation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 944 (1980).
On the religious dimension of the Hyde Amendment and similar legislative efforts to
limit the impact of Roe v. Wade, see, e.g., Symonds, The Denial of Medi-Cal Funds for
Abortion: An Establishment of Religion, 9 GOLDEN GATE 421 (1978-1979); Pilpel, The
Fetus as Person: Possible Legal Consequences of the Hogan-Helms Amendment, 6 FAM.
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, No. 1, p. 6 (Winter 1974); Editorial, Do Catholics Have Con-
stitutional Rights?, 105 COMMONWEAL 771 (Dec. 8, 1978).
475. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 325.
Following enactment of the Hyde Amendment, federal courts required interim fund-
ing for therapeutic abortions until welfare recipients could be notified about reduc-
tions in Medicaid benefits, Pennsylvania v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 723 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1983) (based on more general federal legislation creat-
ing the Medicaid system), and continued reimbursement to states for abortions per-
formed pursuant to federal court order. Georgia Dep't of Medical Assistance v.
Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (based on federal legislation and imple-
menting administrative regulations).
Efforts to deny to Planned Parenthood groups eligibility to participate in the Com-
bined Federal Campaign for charitable giving by federal employees, based on their
support for therapeutic abortion, have been frustrated through federal court interven-
tion based on the first amendment. Planned Parenthood Federation of Am. v. Devine,
No. 83-2118 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1983), summarized in Devine v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educ. Fund, Inc., 727 F.2d 1247, 1262 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 322 (1984).
476. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.02 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, §§ 5-5, 6-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3.3 (Burns 1983);
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 205.560(1), 311.715 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.925(2) (West
Supp. 1984), § 256B.40 (West 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981) (but see
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982)); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
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for purposes of abortion. Similar restrictions may govern public em-
ployee or other health insurance plans,479 family planning services 48 0
and miscellaneous benefits.48 1 Exceptions may be indicated, how-
ever, to cover abortions necessary to preserve maternal life,482 or
used to terminate pregnancies resulting from rape48 3 or incest. 484
02.3-01, 14-02.3-05 (1981) (violation a class B misdemeanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 3215(c) (Purdon 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 26-18-4(3)-(4) (Supp. 1984) (violation of a class B misdemeanor), § 26-18-
10(7) (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-2 (1979) (state funds not to be used for abor-
tion as a means of family planning); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 20.927(1) (West Supp. 1984).
477. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.02 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-
3.3 (Burns 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.715 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 261.28,
393.07(11) (West Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3215(c) (Purdon Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1984-
1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-18-10(6)-(7) (1984); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-2 (1979); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 20.927(1) (West Supp. 1984).
478. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.40 (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01
(1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(c) (Purdon Supp. 1933); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62,§ 453 (Purdon Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 20.927(1) (West Supp. 1984).
479. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 526 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (noncontributory
health insurance payments to state employees); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.3-03 (1981)
(all health insurance policies, except by optional rider with extra premium); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(d) (Purdon 1983) (funded for employees out of public mon-
ies); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-12-2.1 (1984) (state or local health insurance plans); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-13-30(l) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (sex discrimination statute does not require
employer to pay health benefits for abortion, but employer may agree to do so through
collective bargaining).
480. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-322, 76-7-323 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-2
(1979).
481. Including prohibitions against providing hospital or nursing care services, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-
04 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(a), (b) (Purdon 1983) (except for treatment
of post-abortion complications or when no other facility performing abortions is avail-
able within a radius of 20 miles), disability benefits, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 6-1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985), or burial benefits. Id. § 7-1.
482. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.02 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,§§ 6-1, 7-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE § 16-10-3-3 (1983); KY. REV. STAT.§§ 205.560(6), 311.715 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.02(8)(13)(a) (West 1982); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6-1 (West 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1981); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3215(c)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-18-4(3) (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 20.927(2)(a)
(West Supp. 1984). In addition, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ (;-1, 7-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-1985), exempts abortions necessary to the health of either mother or unborn via-
ble child, while WiS. STAT. ANN. § 20.927(2)(b) (West Supp. 1984) exempts cases in
which a preexisting condition will cause grave, long-lasting physical health damage to
a woman if she is not given an abortion. The health of an i inborn viable child may be
recognized under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 6-1, 7-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985), and
VA. CODE § 32.1-92.2 (Supp. 1984) recognizes the eugenic ground of a physician's certifi-
cation that a fetus will be born with a gross and totally incapacitating physical deform-
ity or mental deficiency.
483. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.02(13)(b) (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
Moreover, a few state appellate courts have invalidated or limited the
impact of restrictive legislation on state legal grounds.48 5
2. Protecting Women Electing Abortions
It would be a clear violation of Roe v. Wade standards for state of-
ficials in any way to coerce women to have or to decline abortions. A
few states specifically prohibit the former.4 86 Beyond that, legislation
may bar discrimination or loss of privileges487 or denial of public ben-.
efits488 to women who refuse to have abortions489 or, on occasion,
§ 3215(c)(3) (Purdon 1983); VA. CODE § 32.1-92.1 (Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 20.927(2)(a) (West Supp. 1984).
484. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.02(13)(c) (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3215(c)(2)(3) (Purdon 1983); VA. CODE § 32.1-92.1 (Supp. 1984); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 20.927(2)(a) (West Supp. 1984).
485. E.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625
P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (budget act excluding funds to underwrite therapeu-
tic abortions was declared in violation of the state constitution); Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights, Inc. v. Rank, 151 Cal. App. 3d 83, 198 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1984)
(budget act restricting use of public funds for abortions found in conflict with basic
Medi-Cal statute authorizing funds for therapeutic abortions); Kindley v. Governor of
Md., 289 Md. 620, 426 A.2d 908 (1981) (court construed state legislation to cover all
abortions determined by physicians in the patients' best interest, but noted the lack of
a legal obligation to fund abortions); Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d
67 (1978) (budget appropriation for public funding of abortions was not subject to state
constitutional provision for popular referendum, which specifically excluded budgetary
legislation); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982) (state constitu-
tion required invalidation of state legislation tracking Hyde Amendment; public fund-
ing must extend to all abortions necessary to maternal health); Stain v. Hunt, 66 N.C.
App. 116, 310 S.E.2d 623 (1984) (rejecting citizen attack on state funding for therapeu-
tic abortions based on claim that $1 million appropriation for purpose had been ex-
hausted; legislature had appropriated additional funds).
In Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Wiirttemberg, 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 33, 40,
the European Court of Justice held that special interest-free loans to residents upon
childbirth were a "social advantage" which could not be denied workers from another
member state under art. 7(1) of the EEC Treaty and art. 7(2) of Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1612/68 (the anti-discrimination regulation). The court rejected a justifica-
tion advanced by Baden-Wiirttemberg that childbirth loans were intended to en-
courage larger families among residents; demographic objectives of countering falling
birth rates among a member state's nationals cannot be pursued in a way which dis-
criminates against nationals of other member states.
486. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.925(8) (West Supp. 1984) (misdemeanor); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-106(4) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(3) (1981); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3215(f), (h) (Purdon 1983).
487. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(c) (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25955.3 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(c) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 311.810 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 197.032(2) (Vernon 1983).
488. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(c) (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25955.3 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(c) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 311.810 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE
ANN. § 20-214(c)(2) (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983) (patients
are to be informed that refusal to undergo abortion is not a ground for denial of public
assistance); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(2) (Vernon 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.435
(1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(g) (Purdon 1983).
489. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2560(c) (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
(Vol. 12: 427, 1985] Abortion Legislation in the 1980's
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
consent. 490 The latter, of course, is a preferably neutral statement,
but neutrality is not an evident objective of most such legislation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION: A SUNSET LAW
ANALOGY FOR ABORTION LEGISLATION?
Unless a right-to-life amendment to the United States Constitution
is ratified, the right of women to elect medically indicated abortions
is protected. On the other hand, it is unlikely the Court will depart
from its position in Harris v. McRae that the Constitution does not
require that therapeutic abortions be underwritten for financially un-
able women because of the possible ripple effect a contrary interpre-
tation would have on allocation of public funds in other sensitive
areas.491 The want of public funding may in time impel women to re-
sort to clandestine abortionists and thus recreate a public health
problem manifest before 1973.492
State legislatures hostile to the Court's doctrines no doubt will
stand pat with their present legislation, 493 because they are unwilling
to reopen the volatile issue of abortion reform. If other legislatures
in good faith track the details of each Supreme Court decision, they
§ 25955.3 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(c) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 311.810 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591 (1980); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE
ANN. § 20-214(c) (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.414 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(2) (Vernon 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 435.435 (1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(g) (Purdon 1983).
490. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.3 (West 1984); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 311.810 (1983).
491. Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protec-
tion against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in
the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to
such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.
To hold otherwise would mark a drastic change in our understanding of the
Constitution. It cannot be that because government may not prohibit the use
of contraceptives ... or prevent parents from sending their child to a private
school ... government, therefore, has an affirmative constitutional obligation
to ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain contraceptives
or send their children to private schools. To translate the limitation on gov-
ernmental power implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative fund-
ing obligation would require Congress to subsidize the medically necessary
abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid
program to subsidize other medically necessary services. Nothing in the Due
Process Clause supports such an extraordinary result.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 317-18 (citations omitted).
492. Clandestine abortion was viewed as a public health problem before 1973, see,
e.g., Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
948 (1960), and has that potential today if the availability of lawful therapeutic abor-
tion is restricted. Sneideman, supra note 19, at 192-94.
493. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
may find themselves out of step with the next sequence of constitu-
tional precedent, with defective or inadequate legislation productive
of new litigation. Legislating the details of rights to privacy is as fu-
tile and unproductive as endeavoring to duplicate through statute the
myriad of refined points to doctrine adjudicated under the fourth
amendment.
Therefore, as we find ourselves in the mid-1980's, one may wonder
whether abortion legislation of any sort is any longer needed. Civil,
administrative and disciplinary proceedings can be brought against
medical providers who make professionally unsound decisions to
abort, and hospitals and clinics can be required to provide appropri-
ate personnel and equipment to safeguard maternal and fetal health
and life. Laypersons who offer medically unsupervised abortion serv-
ices can be prosecuted for unlawful practice of medicine, just as if
they had purported to offer any other form of surgical or pharmaceu-
tical treatment. Abortion regulation adds nothing not already achiev-
able through existing general legislation and administrative
regulations.
Nor is there a need for special criminal abortion statutes aimed at
clandestine or nonmedically indicated abortions, even though they
are constitutional.494 If a pregnant woman dies as a result of a crimi-
nally negligent abortion or bungled aftercare, or if a viable fetus born
alive dies for similar reasons, the coverage of manslaughter or crimi-
nally negligent homicides statutes is clear. If a neonate's life is inten-
tionally snuffed out, murder or manslaughter provisions are fully
available.
If an unqualified person performs an abortion, or a medically quali-
fied person departs the bounds of proper abortion techniques without
causing maternal or neonatal death, criminality is clear under mod-
ern assault statutes. Administering a substance other than for lawful
medical or therapeutic purpose can be made a form of assault,495 and
the use of instruments almost certainly causes physical injury496 or
serious physical injury.497 If an abortion is unlawful, a woman's con-
494. See supra notes 412-15 and accompanying text.
495. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(5) (McKinney 1975); 30 HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND 43 (4th ed. 1980); MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 comment 3-4 (Official
Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
496. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(9) (McKinney 1975) (physical injury defined as
impairment of physical condition or substantial pain), § 120.00(1), (2) (McKinney 1975).
497. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(10) (serious physical injury defined as that which
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted dis-
figurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ), § 120.05(1), (2), (4), § 120.10(1), (3). The crime of reck-
less endangerment also may be available in abortion cases not producing death or in-
jury but substantially risking either. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.20, 120.25
(McKinney 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05(a) (Vernon 1974); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 211.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980).
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sent to it is legally irrelevant to the criminality of the abortionist,
since it does not tend to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence
of the actus reus element of physical injury or serious physical in-
jury.498 If there is an unclear area, it is the criminality of negligent
or intentional activity which destroys fetal life during birth processes.
If this is a problem, curative legislation should be addressed directly
at the basic problem without regard to whether birth processes result
from abortion of a viable fetus, induced labor, or spontaneous prema-
ture or near-term miscarriage.
Accordingly, just as some states have legislated the demise of a
great many regulatory provisions affecting professions, occupations,
businesses, industries and enterprises, which have no affirmative jus-
tification for perpetuation, 49 9 so legislatures should recognize that
abortion legislation is currently unnecessary and unproductive, and
terminate all special legislation relating to abortions, whether lawful
or unlawful.
498. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 143 N.J. Super. 571, 364 A.2d 27 (Super. Ct., Law Div.
1976), affd, 154 N.J. Super. 511, 381 A.2d 1231 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 211.1, (2)(a) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980); Green, supra note
249, at 99-100; Comment, Mayhem: Consent of Maimed Party as a Defense, 47 IOWA L.
REV. 1122, 1127 n.25 (1961-1962).
499. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-20-1 to 41-20-16 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.61 (West
Supp. 1984), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-G.1 to .10 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 4-10-1
to 4-10-14 (Supp. 1984) (sunset law).
For a model abortion law consistent with the Supreme Court's doctrines, see Com-
ment, A Decade of Cementing the Mosaic of Roe v. Wade: Is the Composite a Message
to Leave Abortion Alone?, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 681, 749-53 (1984). Other legislative pro-
posals appear in Walker & Puzder, State Protection of the Unborn After Roe v. Wade:
A Legislative Proposal, 13 STETSON L. REV. 237 (1984).

